Process for designating a position involving confidentiality

Within which sector does the position fall and which ministry is responsible?

In case an expert minister wants to designate a position involving confidentiality within its own ministry, the own ministry is the responsible department. In the table below you can find which expert minister is responsible for which vital sector.

Which national security interest is at stake?

There are six national security interests. Establish whether, and if yes on which, security interest the position and location has an influence.

1. Territorial security. The unimpeded functioning of the Netherlands and its EU and NATO allies as independent states in the broader sense, or territorial security in the narrower sense.
2. Physical security. The undisturbed functioning of man in the Netherlands and their surroundings.
3. Economic security. The unimpeded functioning of the Netherlands as an effective and efficient economy.
4. Ecological security. The unimpeded continued existence of the natural environment in and surrounding the Netherlands.
5. Social and political stability. The unimpeded continued existence of a social climate in which individuals can function undisturbed and in which groups of people coexist within the context of the achievements of the Dutch democratic state and its shared values.
6. International legal order and stability. The functioning of the international system of norms and values, aimed at international peace and security.

There are three aspects which may pose a threat to the national security when these are under threat, and with that a well-founded basis for the designation of a position involving confidentiality: ‘information’, ‘access’, and ‘national exemplary function’. For the designation of a location, only the aspect ‘access’ forms a well-founded basis.
 

Information

• Is it foreseeable that the position will come into contact with one of the forms of information mentioned below which may cause damage to the national security when compromised? ‘Information’ can then form the basis for designation.
   
• Classified state secret information. All information which forms a vulnerability to the national security at the central government (the ministries and the services, companies, and institutions which fall under it) has to be classified as state secret based on the Decision Decree on Civil Service Information Security of Classified Information 2015 (Besluit Voorschrift Informatiebeveiliging Rijksdienst Bijzondere Informatie 2025, VIRBI 2025). There are four levels of classification, of which three have the level of state secret:
  • TOP SECRET (Staatsgeheim Zeer Geheim, Stg. ZG)
  • SECRET (Staatsgeheim Geheim, Stg. G)
  • CONFIDENTIAL (Staatsgeheim Confidentieel, Stg. C)
  • RESTRICTED (Departementaal Vertrouwelijk, Dep. V)
• Core interests
  A core interest is the most important information of an organisation. It is conceivable that foreign intelligence services, governments, or other actors attempt to obtain this information. This is also the case for unclassified information: if unauthorised parties obtain this, it could threaten the national security. Information that is obtained during cooperations with foreign intelligence or police services is likewise categorised as a core interest, because this information could also compromise the national security.

The core interests of an organisation can be categorised in roughly three categories:

1. Datasets and blueprints: data files, designs, and schematics present in organisations.
   • This concerns factual and bundled information or detailed (technical) information. These include blueprints of advanced technologies, descriptions of important production processes, or files with privacy-sensitive information. For Special Investigation Services (such as the FIOD, ILT-IOD, NVWA-IOD, and the Labour Inspectorate) and the Public Prosecution Service, the information obtained under the Police Data Act (Wet politiegegevens, Wpg) is categorised as part of the ‘core interest datasets and blueprints’ because if these were compromised this could directly harm the national security. However, for the National Police designation of a position involving confidentiality cannot be sufficiently motivated by the coming into contact with Wpg information.
      
2. Standpoints and strategy: policy standpoints present in organisations, long-term visions, and negotiation strategies.
   The core interests under this category are seen in the government, the corporate world, and the interface between the two. At the government, think of information on Dutch standpoints with relation to expansion of the European Union or the economic negotiations in the Group of 20.
   The public administration and the Dutch corporate world could be seriously harmed by a leak of sensitive policy strategies, visions, and standpoints. The other party can, based on this information, make decisions which are at the cost of the Dutch government of the Dutch corporate world.
    
3. Trends in scientific innovations (upcoming core interests and infrastructure): Think, for example, of: scientific innovations which could become profitable in concrete applications in the future. The interests in this category include ideas, scientific research or insights, and concepts which are currently still public, but could in time lead to economic and strategic relevant applications. Crucial parts of the Dutch infrastructure belong in this category. Both are currently not secret or legally protected, but they are still essential to the (future) economic functioning of Dutch society.

Aggregation of knowledge

Aggregation of knowledge is taken to mean obtaining an overview position or a higher level of abstraction via access to large amounts of information (up to and including the level RESTRICTED). Even though the risks posed by the information itself are limited, the overview position or a higher level of abstraction could harm the national security. This occurs both at the central government and the vital sectors. Think, for example, of a system administrator who has access to various systems and the accompanying data; as a result of the sum of this information it could form a potential risk.

Access

Does the position or location give direct, unsupervised access to the list below in which being compromised can cause harm to be done to the national security?

• Possible targets for an attack or espionage.
  Attack and espionage targets include persons and objects which have been designated in the framework of the Safety and Security System.
• Possible means which could facilitate an attack or espionage.
  Think, for example of access to so-called backbones (below ground/submarine communications cables between various continents) or large supplies of chemical substances.
• Vital processes. Refer to the website of the NCTV for more information on vital processes.

National exemplary function

When a position is a key position in an organisation which protects the democratic legal order or social order, the ‘national exemplary function’ can be used as a basis for designation. Abuse of this position cannot be corrected within the normal hierarchical lines, because the official within the functional line has the ultimately responsible and acts without intervention of a third party. Such an official cannot only harm the core interests of the organisation, but also the trust in the democratic legal order and the political stability of the Netherlands. The designation of a position involving confidentiality on the basis of these grounds is limited to the central government.

Within the central government this includes members of the senior management group of the Senior Civil Service, persons with comparable positions, as well as ambassadors. Furthermore, this concerns the highest officials at the High Council of State and state committees established by the government. On the basis of this ground, a position involving confidentiality can also be designated by strategic senior police officers and other government organisations. This also includes specific positions at embassies or consular posts in which the interests of the Dutch state are served.

The designation of positions or locations involving confidentiality and the starting of a security screening takes place only once the required organisational, personnel, and technical security measures have been taken. Only if despite these measures there are still residual risks which could harm the national security, a position involving confidentiality can be designated. This principle is called the last recourse principle and is important to prevent there is an unnecessary violation of privacy. After tall, carrying out a security screening is a violation of the personal privacy of the person under consideration for or in a position involving confidentiality in question.

The application of the last recourse principle concretely means: 

• This information is secured in accordance with the demands of the VIRBI. For information outside of the central government, reasonably comparable security measures should be taken.
• For threat to access, the organisation has already taken measures and access is only granted if functionally necessary. Because of this, the as few persons as possible have unsupervised access to attack and espionage targets and/or means and vital processes. It should also be considered whether measures were taken against a possible long-term disruption.
• The grounds ‘national exemplary function’ is only applied to those with the ultimate responsibility within the organisation.

Dependent on the seriousness of the risk to the national security, the position or location involving confidentiality can be categorised in three levels: A, B, or C. Level A is paired with the highest risk and has the most extensive security screening.

In order to determine which level requires a position or location involving confidentiality, it is required to have an assessment of the impact a position or location could have on the compromising of the national security. Furthermore, an assessment is required of the likelihood that the position or location is compromised.

In order to determine the level of the position or location involving confidentiality, the methodology of the Government-Wide National Security Risk Analysis (Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid) is used. In this analysis, a risk is defined as the combination between impact (the total extent of the consequences of a threat) and likelihood (the expectation that a threat will manifest). The impact is assessed on a scale of five (limited, considerable, serious, very serious, and catastrophic) as is the likelihood (unlikely, doubtful, possible, likely, and highly likely). In the table below, the relation between impact and likelihood is translated to the definitive level of the position or location involving confidentiality.

Establish the impact of likelihood per designation ground

In order to establish the impact criteria for a position or location, it is important to link the position or location to (at least) one of the six national security interests from step 1. In order to establish impact criteria, the aforementioned impact criteria from the Risk Assessment Guidelines (Leidraad Risicobeoordeling), and the National Security Integrated Risk Analysis (Geïntegreerde risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid) can be consulted. The likelihood has been established per designation ground. In order to appoint a location, only the indication ground “access” is relevant.

The manner in which the impact has been established differs per designation. Below, there is an explanation per designation ground and the accompanying categories. This describes how the impact is established and which likelihood is used.

Information

Classified state secret information (VIR- BI)

There is a position involving confidentiality if an official within the central government [I-blokje] each part of the organisation to which the ministerial responsibility applies (source Decision VIRBI 2025)] can conceivably come into contact with the following classified documents. Confidential, Secret, Top Secret.

• Impact:
  • TOP SECRET: Catastrophic
  • SECRET: Very serious
  • CONFIDENTIAL: Serious
  • Likelihood: Possible
• Aggregation of knowledge
  • Impact: Serious
  • Likelihood: Possible
• Core interests
  • Impact: Use the impact criterion of the relevant security interest.
    • To establish whether a position may contain risks of disruption, failure, or manipulation of the core interest, it is recommended to determine which role the tasks or position has with relation to the core interest. With this, the possible threat to the established national security interest can be formulated. For more information on the core interests, see the Kwetsbaarheidsanalyse Spionage (KWAS).
  • Likelihood: Possible

Access (for examples see Step 2)

• Possible targets for an attack or espionage
  • Impact: Use the impact criterion of the relevant security interest
  • Likelihood: Likely
• Possible means which could facilitate an attack or espionage
  • Impact: Use the impact criterion of the relevant security interest
  • Likelihood: Likely
• Vital processes
  • Impact: Use the impact criterion of the security interest that is relevant
  • Likelihood: Likely

National exemplary function

• Impact: Use the impact criterion of the security interest that is relevant
• Likelihood: Possible

The concept designation decision contains a number of set elements, including a list of the positions or locations involving confidentiality with reasons/explanations for the decision. The reasons/explanations describe which security interest is at stake and the manner in which a person in the position or location could harm the national security, and which cannot be covered by other security measures. Furthermore, it describes under which category or categories of the methodology of the Government-Wide National Security Risk Analysis the damage falls. A causal relationship is recorded between the position or location and the possible erosion of the security interest.

The level of the designation is motivated on grounds of the results of step 4.

Besides the above-mentioned reasons the list of positions or locations involving confidentiality includes identifying characteristics, so that positions or locations can also be identified after designation, for example a position code for the position and the department and/or directorate which the position falls under. For location, the location has to be given a uniquely identifiable name.

If there are any changes within the organisation which can influence the positions or locations involving confidentiality on the list, there is a change decision on an existing list. The above principles are also in place for proposed changes.

As described in the Security Screening Act, the designation of positions or locations involving confidentiality takes place in agreement with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The mandate for this has been given to the Director General of the AIVD. The expert minister requests the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations/the Director General of the AIVD for agreement, after which the expert minister proposes the concept decision. The AIVD reviews this on the likelihood of the threat and the reasons for this, as a result of which possibly a higher (or lower) level of designation is required. Moreover, the AIVD checks whether the designation process has been executed and applied correctly.

When an agreement is reached on the designation of positions or locations involving confidentiality, the expert minister takes a formal decision on the designation of positions or locations involving confidentiality. This designation has to contain an attachment which states the reasons for the positions or locations involving confidentiality. The expert minister sends a copy of this document to the AIVD.

Upon formally establishing the list of positions or locations involving confidentiality, the list in place at that time with positions or locations involving confidentiality will become redundant.

For a uniform and legitimate designation, the expert minister periodically (at least once every five years) requests an external review of the list of positions involving confidentiality. This can be done internally or with the Central Government Audit Service (Auditdienst Rijk, ADR). The following questions could arise during this review:

• Have all steps for the concept designation decision been followed, such as in the designation positions involving confidentiality?
• Are the statements as regards content correct, about the security interest, the threat, the resilience, and the impact?
• Is the administration of the positions involving confidentiality sound?
• Do all employees in a position involving confidentiality have a valid VGB?