



General Intelligence and
Security Service
*Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations*

Annual Report 2011





Louis Einthoven, the first head of the National Security Service (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, BVD), the predecessor of today's General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD), was responsible for the service's motto and shield. He believed that citizens in a democracy such as ours must play an active role in society, and not just passively drift along on the waves of history. The motto he chose was ***Per undas adversas***: against the current. Living fish swim against the current; only the dead ones are carried along. This saying symbolises the service's mentality: it is an active organisation, working against the current if necessary, watching out for threats to national security.

Working together for a secure future

The AIVD responded to numerous threat reports in 2011, and also conducted investigations covering a very wide range of areas. These included terrorism, extremism, espionage, proliferation and political intelligence. In addition, the service performed thousands of security screenings, completed dozens of threat assessments as part of the national Safety and Security System and also reviewed threats from the communications security perspective.

All of these activities took place against a background of risks and threats which have been developing ever more quickly and unpredictably. Moreover, they increasingly have a clear international dimension and their nature has been changing as technology advances. All in all, these are developments that demand ongoing investment to reinforce and extend the AIVD's unique intelligence position.

To respond effectively to the challenges we face, good co-operation is essential. For this reason, the AIVD is investing in closer collaboration with its partners at home and abroad. Internationally, it plays an active part in a network of intelligence and security services with a particular focus upon counter-terrorism. Nationally, the AIVD is pursuing more intensive collaboration with the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism and Security – now incorporating the National Cyber Security Centre, established in 2011 – the national police service, the Regional Intelligence Units and, in particular, the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD).

Closer co-operation between the AIVD and MIVD will increase the effectiveness of intelligence activities, and also their efficiency. In the past year the two services have presented many joint analyses, have worked together on counterproliferation and have formed combined teams in a variety of domains. At the same time each retains its own – complementary – duties and expertise, based upon its specific remit and responsibilities.



The AIVD is one of several organisations dedicated to safeguarding Dutch society and Dutch interests on the global stage. In an uncertain world, our task is to be the first to identify and to clarify otherwise invisible threats, risks and international political developments that might have huge repercussions for the Dutch state. We can then use this knowledge to warn others and so avert danger.

It is our goal to be more open about the activities we perform as part of our statutory task, so that the public better understands how our work benefits society. Such openness is not always easy for a secret service, but through this annual report we are taking a further step along the road to greater transparency.

Rob Bertholee
Head of the General Intelligence and Security Service

Inhoud

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The AIVD's

The AIVD safeguards the national security of the Netherlands by identifying threats, political developments and risks which are not immediately visible. To this end, it conducts investigations both inside and outside the country. Where necessary, the service shares information so that partners and other interested parties can take appropriate measures.

The AIVD identifies risks and advises and mobilises third parties. And, if necessary, it works actively to reduce risks itself. Thus the service has a clear position in the network of official organisations dedicated to the protection of national and international security.

mission

Introduction

The AIVD focuses on risks and threats that might potentially have a major impact upon the national and international security interests of the Netherlands. From its independent intelligence position, the service seeks to provide its stakeholders and partners with context, unique information and perspectives so that threats to the Dutch national interest can be identified in good time and tackled effectively.

The tasks of the AIVD

Dutch law entrusts the AIVD with a number of defined tasks. These are described in Article 6, clause 2, subclauses a-e of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, Wiv 2002). In carrying out those tasks, the service may make use of special investigative powers. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations bears political responsibility for the AIVD's proper conduct of its assigned tasks.

According to the Wiv 2002, the work of the AIVD encompasses "safeguarding the democratic legal order, the security of the Dutch nation and other important state interests". The service is expected to act if any of these security interests are at stake, nationally or internationally, and especially if the risks or threats to them:

- are clandestine in nature – in other words, if they are invisible or difficult to detect by parties without the AIVD's special investigative powers;
- are prompted by undemocratic political intentions or involve an attempt to change or disrupt our society through undemocratic means;
- could have a major impact upon the national or international security interests of the Dutch state and society.

Tasks

Under the Wiv 2002 (Article 6, clause 2, subclauses a-e), the AIVD's statutory tasks can be divided into a number of categories.

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|--------|---|
| Task A | To investigate people and organisations reasonably suspected of representing a serious danger to the democratic legal order, to national security or to other important interests of the Dutch state. |
| Task B | To screen candidates for so-called positions involving confidentiality, and also to issue recommendations on which positions should be designated as such. |
| Task C | To promote security by interpreting information about threats and by sharing it as necessary with affected parties, and also to promote the security of information and communications. |
| Task D | To conduct investigations in respect of other countries. This is also referred to as the foreign intelligence task. |
| Task E | As part of the national Safety and Security System, to compile risk and threat analyses geared towards protecting people, property and services in the national security domain. |

In the case of Task A, the subjects for investigation are determined using risk analyses and assessments. These weigh up the national security interests of the Dutch state and society, the risks or threats to them and the present level of resilience, which includes checking whether other government agencies are already involved in identifying or attempting to reduce the threat in question.

Task B – screening candidates for positions involving confidentiality – has its own statutory basis, the Security Screening Act (Wet veiligheidsonderzoeken, Wvo). Such positions are designated by the responsible government ministers and employers, with the AIVD acting in an advisory capacity.

The scope of Task D – international investigations – is defined in the Foreign Intelligence Designation Order (Aanwijzingsbesluit Buitenland), which is issued by the Prime Minister in consultation with ministers in the relevant government departments. This is preceded by a process in which the end users' interests and information needs are weighed against the threat assessments compiled by the AIVD and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), as well as their operational capabilities and the risks involved.

For tasks C and E – security promotion and protection of the national security domain – the choices as to which institutions, sectors or subjects to focus on are in part the AIVD's own responsibility, based upon its in-house expertise, and in part are made jointly with government departments or agencies.

2011 in brief

In fulfilling its remit, the AIVD currently faces two significant and continuing trends: internationalisation and technological progress. To an ever greater extent, threats to the national and international security interests of the Dutch state and society have their origins beyond our borders; they are the product of an increasingly dynamic and uncertain international environment. In 2011 these developments produced, among other things, jihadist-inspired terrorist threats that manifested themselves at unexpected moments in various European countries. New threats can arise unpredictably, in a very short time and from external sources (exogenously). Radicalised individuals with few, if any, links to networks known in Europe are receiving training in inaccessible conflict zones. Their potential targets may be in their home nations, but can just as easily be in other countries. It is difficult to predict where they might strike. For this reason, the AIVD remains highly vigilant with regard to complex and interrelated factors such as radicalisation, recruitment, travel plans and other intentions, as well as actual readiness to resort to violence.

The attacks committed by Anders Breivik in and around Oslo in July 2011 show only too well that the threat from lone perpetrators is not confined to the jihadist movement. In the manifesto he distributed at the time, Breivik defended his acts in terms of an ideology that can be described as anti-Islamic, anti-multiculturalist and anti-leftist. In the wake of his action, the AIVD initiated an investigation to determine whether ideas of this kind might prompt individuals in the Netherlands to pose a threat to the democratic legal order here.

The “Arab Spring” is another example of a development that might, directly or indirectly, endanger Dutch national interests. The destabilisation within the Arab world has given those with jihadist sympathies more room to manoeuvre, and so may pose a threat to the West. Moreover, the Netherlands has a clear interest in the region's stability because of its strategic location, its importance in terms of energy production and supply and its role in global transport links.

Technology is an increasingly significant factor in the risks and threats we face. Both state and non-state actors now have access to advanced information, communications, security and weapons technologies which, when combined with often aggressive geopolitical intentions, have the potential to undermine Dutch national security interests.

One development of particular concern is progress in the field of encryption, denying access to information on the Internet. This represents a major challenge for the AIVD and its partners in the fight against terrorism. The September 2011 security breach at Dutch digital certificate authority provider DigiNotar revealed just how quickly and unexpectedly threats of a technological nature can unfold. This incident is also a reminder that such attacks may pose a serious danger to national security.

These two trends are forcing the AIVD to invest in improving its technological know-how and to further intensify its collaboration with strategic and other partners. For a more detailed description of how this is being done, see Chapter 8 (Organisation, development and management). In 2011 the service made significant investments in technological intelligence resources, in systems to gather, filter and analyse vast quantities of data and in communications security measures.



1 Terrorism

Terrorism remains one of the AIVD's principal focal areas. Maintaining and further developing a high-quality intelligence position in respect of individuals and organisations, at home or abroad, which might pose a terrorist threat to the Netherlands or to Dutch interests elsewhere is a service priority. The attacks carried out by Anders Breivik in July 2011 are a reminder that this threat is not necessarily external in nature – it can also arise within our own society. And they show, too, that such acts are not always the work of an organisation or network, but can be planned and carried out by a lone individual.

1.1 Jihadist terrorism

In 2011 the AIVD gave priority to the timely detection of “exogenous” threats to the Netherlands from jihadist terrorists based elsewhere. Although no specific threat of this kind was identified during 2011, in general terms jihadists continue to militate against “the West”, which they regard as an enemy of Islam, as well as against what they see as “infidel” regimes in the Muslim world itself. As a Western nation, in jihadist eyes the Netherlands therefore remains a legitimate target.

The death of Osama bin Laden in a US military operation has dealt a severe blow to Al-Qaeda. Under his successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the organisation appears to have shifted its strategy somewhat. He and other leading figures have begun calling upon Muslims throughout the world to carry out acts of violence in their own countries. Although there is every indication that Al-Qaeda itself still wishes to attack the West directly if possible, its general call to jihad now appears to have taken on a more practical and modest form, with individual sympathisers being urged to act of their own accord. This same message has also been propagated through *Inspire*, the online magazine published by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Whilst these calls have had no visible impact in the Netherlands as yet, they and various sermons and other texts in a similar vein can easily be found on the Internet and so have to the potential to inspire individuals to terrorism.

An example of how this can happen is provided by Arid Uka, who shot dead two American servicemen and wounded another two at Frankfurt Airport in March 2011. Because individual jihadists in the Netherlands might be susceptible to these messages in a similar way, lone attackers have now been given greater prominence in the threat picture compiled by the AIVD.

The Arab Spring

The series of uprisings often referred to as the “Arab Spring” came as a surprise to many – not least leaders of the global jihad like Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri. On the Internet, Al-Zawahiri in particular tried to portray the upheavals as jihadist-inspired and, with hindsight, to “reframe” them in those terms. In fact, though, the jihadists had nothing whatsoever to do with the revolts; they were primarily socioeconomic and politically secular in nature. The one exception was Libya, where groups with a radical Islamic agenda did take part in the fighting against Gaddafi forces. Although a few individuals from the West attempted to join the conflicts out of jihadist motivation, on the whole the Arab Spring has not changed attitudes within this movement: it continues to focus upon regions where the “true” jihad is being fought. The transitional phase in which several Arab nations now find themselves may create more opportunities for jihadists, though, since the pressure placed upon them by the old regimes has eased.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Jihadists from the West – the Netherlands included – continue to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan to take part in the jihad. Once there they become embroiled in local conflicts, particularly in the border region between the two countries. As such, they constitute a threat to Dutch and other Western interests in that part of the world. In 2011 we were reminded once again of the danger posed by those returning with concrete plans to commit acts of terrorism in Europe, following the arrest in Germany and Austria, in April and June respectively, of jihadists trained in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. They had received specific instructions to attack the West. Meanwhile, strikes by unmanned “drone” aircraft have eliminated numerous leaders of jihadist groups, Al-Qaeda included, thus eroding their communications and planning capability.

Somalia

The jihadist group Al-Shabaab (AS) is fighting to establish an Islamic state on Somali territory. This remains primarily a local conflict, although AS has an affiliated faction of foreign jihadists who wish to see the struggle internationalised and have both the intention and the means to carry out attacks outside Somalia. Whilst primary AS targets within the country do include Western and other aid organisations, elsewhere in the region it is this international group which poses the main threat to Dutch interests. In response to a number of abductions of Westerners, in October 2011 Kenya launched a major offensive against AS. This has dealt the organisation a severe blow militarily, but at the same time has increased the terrorist threat to Western – and hence Dutch – interests in Kenya and other countries in the region. Several small-scale terrorist operations were mounted in Kenya towards the end of 2011, apparently in response to its actions in Somalia.

AIVD investigations revealed no indications of any direct threat to the Netherlands originating in Somalia in 2011. However, there are more and more signs that some Dutch nationals wish to join AS or have already done so. For the time being it seems that the main motivation of jihadists travelling to Somalia is to take part in the conflict there, but it is quite conceivable that some might return with a view to committing acts of terrorism in the West. Moreover, there remains a certain susceptibility to radicalisation amongst Somalis resident in the Netherlands; there are indications that several members of this community are active in transnational networks providing support to AS.

Yemen

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is engaged in a military struggle with the Yemeni army and other armed groups in the country. As a result of territorial gains, it is currently in a better position to facilitate, train for and prepare attacks both inside and outside Yemen. But in 2011, unlike the previous year, AQAP did not actually carry out any operations in other countries. This is probably due to limited capacity caused by its active participation in the fighting in Yemen itself. One of the key figures behind AQAP was the ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki, whose death in October 2011 struck a major blow to the international jihadist movement. With his ability to present his message in fluent English, Al-Awlaki was able to reach a large non-Arabic-speaking audience and, in particular, to inspire jihadists in the West. In recent years it has become apparent that his pronouncements explicitly encouraged some of them to commit terrorist acts. But the AIVD observed no direct link between Al-Awlaki’s online magazine *Inspire*, with its call for sympathisers to strike in their own countries, and any activities to that end in the Netherlands in 2011.

North Africa

During 2011, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) concentrated upon improving its regional position. It has further extended its sphere of influence beyond Algeria, its original base, into Mali, Mauritania and Niger. This means that its activities now cover a huge geographical area, throughout which it represents a clear threat to Western interests by, for example, kidnapping Europeans. In November 2011, a Dutch citizen was abducted in Mali.

The revolution in Libya largely passed AQIM by. Although radical Muslims, some with affiliations to the group, were involved in the uprising to some extent, their role in overthrowing the Gaddafi regime was not a decisive one. Nevertheless, there is great international concern about the potentially destabilising effect of weapons smuggled out of Libya upon other existing security problems in the region – not least AQIM’s terrorist activities. Such repercussions are already apparent in northern Mali, where arms and fighters from Libya have reignited the long-dormant struggle for independence by Tuareg rebels.

Travel movements

In 2011 the AIVD invested considerable effort in investigating persons planning to travel from the Netherlands to regions where they might be able to take part in the jihad, for example by engaging in combat with Western troops in Afghanistan. It is known that several dozen people have left the country with the intention to take part in jihadist activities in recent years. The number of such movements increased in 2011, compared with previous years, and more Dutch jihadists succeeded in making contact with key figures in international terrorist networks. If and when they return to the Netherlands, it is quite possible that these individuals might commit acts of terrorism or assist others in doing so. Elsewhere in Europe, a number of people were detained last year on suspicion of planning attacks after training in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. One consequence of Europe's open internal borders is that jihadists, like anyone else, can move easily between countries. For this reason, arrests abroad sometimes prompt investigations of possible links with the Netherlands.

The AIVD also attempted to disrupt jihadists' travel plans. To this end, the service works closely with and supplies information to a number of strategic partners. They include the Public Prosecution Service, the National Criminal Investigation Service and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service.

Internet

The Internet plays an important role in international jihadism. Certain online jihadist forums are very influential, effectively sustaining a global virtual movement. The AIVD estimates that about 25,000 people in more than a hundred countries are active on these core sites. One of their most powerful characteristics is that they enable members to participate in group discussions on a wide range of themes. In this interactive environment, participants urge and incite one another to resort to what they regard as legitimate violence against the supposed enemies of "true" Islam. In addition, they provide Western sympathisers with a unique opportunity to engage directly with like-minded individuals in actual conflict zones like Afghanistan and Yemen. This contact could easily inspire and encourage them to travel to such regions to join in the struggle, or even to carry out acts of terrorism in the West.

The identities of most of those active on these forums are unknown. This makes it difficult to assess the actual threat they pose as individuals. Because of that, the AIVD made the identification of important figures of "online Jihadism" one of its principal investigative objectives in 2011. This effort has resulted in a better overall picture of the online network and the mutual relationships between various individuals, cells and groups involved in it. The investigation is ongoing and is being conducted in close co-operation with partners abroad.

Co-operation

Jihadist terrorism is an international phenomenon, unhindered by traditional frontiers. And it is one in which the Internet, a transnational medium par excellence, plays a major role. Tackling it therefore requires wide-ranging collaboration between intelligence, security and other services, both domestically and internationally. In investigating "online Jihadism", the AIVD is working closely with partners in other countries, sharing information and knowledge. The technological "arms race" in cyberspace makes it absolutely vital that know-how and expertise be pooled. For example, the increasing use of encryption and other means to hide online information represents a huge challenge for agencies charged with fighting terrorism. At home the AIVD is co-operating more intensively than ever before with its military counterpart, the MIVD, to gather and analyse intelligence. At the European level, the service contributes to multilateral analyses of jihadist and other terrorist phenomena through such bodies as the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG).

1.2 The threat from endogenous jihadist terrorism

The situation with regard to local jihadist networks was largely unchanged in 2011. As in previous years, they have only a limited appeal and lack internal cohesion. Nonetheless, although not well-organised, there are still jihadists active in the Netherlands. Generally, those who wish to play an active part in the struggle choose to do so in other parts of the world. Al-Qaeda's call for individual sympathisers to carry out acts of terrorism close to home had no discernible effect in the Netherlands in 2011. But there are some active Dutch participants on radical web forums, where they come into contact with jihadists elsewhere. Consequently, local jihadist groups continue to pose a threat to the Netherlands.

"Unstable" jihadists

From time to time, investigations into the "endogenous" (internal) jihadist threat identify individuals who can be characterised as more or less mentally unstable. The combination of psychological problems and jihadist ideology, and sometimes a fascination with violence as well, makes these persons a potential danger to national security. But since it is not always clear where they draw the line between reality and fantasy, and also because they usually operate alone, it can be difficult for the AIVD to compile reliable threat assessments about them. Moreover, these investigations consume a lot of resources. In this domain the service works closely with a variety of partners, such as the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, IND), the Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie, OM) and the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism and Security (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisbestrijding en Veiligheid, NCTV), as well as national and local police services. The AIVD contribution includes official reports.

1.3 Other terrorism

Jihadism remains the principal terrorist threat to the Netherlands. However the attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway show that there are also risks from other quarters (see also 2.5). Although there are no indications at present that any non-jihadist extremist group is likely to resort to violence on Dutch soil, an action by a radicalised "lone wolf" can never be ruled out. And activities facilitating separatist terrorism abroad remain a problem.

PKK

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) continues to recruit young Kurds in Europe – the Netherlands included – for its armed struggle against the Turkish army in south-eastern Turkey and northern Iraq. This is a long-standing activity and is well-organised. The AIVD notifies both national authorities, such as the Ministry of Security and Justice and the Ministry of the Interior, and local governments about these clandestine recruitment efforts with a view to improving knowledge about and enhancing resilience to them.

The conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army has intensified since July 2011. At the same time there has been increasing concern amongst Kurds regarding the fate of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who is serving a prison sentence in Turkey. These developments have caused frustration and heightened activism in the Dutch Kurdish community, resulting in several public order incidents during the course of 2011.

Irish Republican terrorism

Prompted in part by the approach of the 2012 Olympic Games in London, during the year under review the AIVD stepped up its interest in Irish Republican terrorist groups. The number of active terrorists and the level of violence in Northern Ireland have been increasing again in recent years, with several dozen attacks carried out there in 2011. This is almost twice as many as just a few years ago. The primary targets are usually security personnel, such as police officers and British troops.

In the past the Netherlands unwillingly played a significant role as a logistical base for groups like the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Although today's Irish terrorists lack the strength, the degree of organisation and the striking capabilities of the PIRA and its contemporaries, they still pose a constant and serious threat to the United Kingdom. The purpose of the AIVD's investigations is to ensure that the Netherlands does not once again become a logistical base for Irish Republican terrorism.

TOP UITSLUITING
LUITING-UITZETT



2 Radicalism and extremism

2.1 Islamist extremism

In investigating Islamist extremism, in recent years the AIVD has concentrated especially upon radical and ultra-orthodox movements like Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism. From this work, the service has concluded that the threat they pose is limited at present. Relevant national and local parties have been informed of these findings over the past year. As it has also observed that radical Muslims are increasingly acting alone or in small groups, since the second half of 2011 the AIVD has been paying greater attention to individual cases and, in particular, to persons, organisations and institutions proclaiming messages likely to encourage others to radicalise.

Salafism

The AIVD notes that a prominent group of Salafists associated with the As-Soennah mosque in The Hague has begun exerting significant influence over several other mosques in the region. As a result, the ideas being propagated at those places of worship have become more Salafist in orientation. However, no activities likely to endanger national security have been observed. Indeed, young people expressing sympathy with violent jihadism have been emphatically excluded from the mosques in question. Despite this, the fact that the Salafist ideology incorporates elements at odds with the democratic legal order and with the potential to encourage polarisation and intolerant isolationism makes it essential that its proponents continue to be monitored. The AIVD has informed the relevant local authorities about the developments observed in 2011.

The Muslim Brotherhood

Having thoroughly investigated the Muslim Brotherhood in the Netherlands, the AIVD has concluded that this movement currently poses no tangible threat to national security or the democratic legal order. Neither its identified objectives nor its activities in this country run counter to democratic principles. In the longer term, however, it is possible that this movement could constitute a risk.

The written results and conclusions of the AIVD investigation were submitted to Parliament in April 2011.¹

Shariah4Holland

Shariah4Holland is a small radical Islamic group which campaigns openly for the imposition of Sharia law in the Netherlands. In so doing, it issues provocative statements attacking “apostate” Muslims and “corrupt” Western society. Similar movements exist in a number of other countries, including Shariah4Belgium and the now-banned Islam4UK. On 7 December 2011 supporters of the group disrupted a debate on Islamic reform in Amsterdam. Shortly afterwards, Shariah4Holland and Shariah4Belgium announced that they would be carrying out more such demonstrations.

The immediate threat from Shariah4Holland lies in the polarising and radicalising effect of its provocative activities and its ambiguous statements concerning the use of violence. There is a risk that either core members or sympathisers might cross the line and actually commit violent acts.

¹ Second Chamber of the States-General, 2010-2011 session, 29 614 no. 26.

2.2 Moluccan activism

The government in exile of the Republic of the South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS) chose the path of confrontation in 2011, with a series of high-profile political and media activities. Their purpose was to build upon the unexpected success of the RMS legal case against the Dutch state in October 2010, which forced President Yudhoyono of Indonesia to cancel a planned state visit to the Netherlands. Activities in the past year included the publication of a strongly-worded open letter from RMS president John Wattilete to Prime Minister Mark Rutte, in which he warned of “excesses” by Moluccan activists if the government’s appeal against the original verdict were to be upheld.

The Moluccan community, its younger members in particular, responded to the court case with demonstrations and flag-waving. And on 7 April youths disrupted the Pasar Malam Indonesia, an Indonesian cultural event in The Hague. This form of activism drew attention several times in 2011, linked to occasions such as the annual commemoration of the proclamation of the RMS on 25 April, developments on the islands themselves and political events like the arrival of Indonesian dignitaries in the Netherlands. Thus far, RMS activism has remained primarily a public order issue with a focus upon raising awareness and acknowledgement of the call for South Moluccan independence.

2.3 Left-wing extremism

Anti-fascism

On the whole, very little was heard from the national group Anti-Fascist Action (Antifascistische Actie, AFA) in 2011. The exception was its Frisian branch, AFA-Fryslân, which carried out some entirely autonomous actions in a manner that drew criticism from other sections of the organisation. AFA-Fryslân also extended its activities to include protests against Dutch immigration and asylum policy.

The AFA “working group” Don’t Let Them March (Laat Ze Niet Lopen, LZNL) targets any initiative by the extreme right to hold demonstrations or meetings. This group manifested itself in 2011 through a concept of its own devising, whereby LZNL organises the logistical aspects of a protest (mobilisation, support for arrestees, publicity) but leaves its actual execution to local group and individuals. LZNL itself rarely takes part in these actions. In Enschede in May, a planned confrontation with the extreme-right Dutch People’s Union (Nederlandse Volks Unie, NVU) led to scuffles with the police in which several people were injured and a large number of local activists were arrested.

Anarcho-extremism

In recent years, single-issue extremism in the Netherlands has been giving way to a more collaborative approach, with activists from a range of backgrounds (environmentalism, asylum issues, anti-fascism, anti-repression, anti-globalisation and so on) demonstrating together. More and more, solidarity across this spectrum of issues has become a matter of deeds rather than just words. In 2010 the AIVD began using the term “anarcho-extremism” to describe this phenomenon. Its common factor is that proponents are anarchists only in theory (in their words and ideas), but in practice are extremists: they are out to change society, and are prepared to use violence to achieve that goal. This is reflected in the nature of their response to perceived repression (compulsory ID, video surveillance, anti-squatting laws) and in their actions on such issues as animal welfare and opposition to the extreme right. This form of violence increased in 2011.

Anarcho-extremists are active in many fields and in various ad-hoc groupings, and a section of the movement does not shy away from direct confrontation with the authorities.

Early in 2011, for example, anarchists from Amsterdam and local AFA activists were largely responsible for a student demonstration in The Hague ending in violence.

On 1 May a Labour Day demonstration in Utrecht descended into disorder, as did a protest in Amsterdam on 1 October to mark the first anniversary of the adoption of the Anti-Squatting Act. On that occasion clashes with police resulted in injuries on both sides. Shortly afterwards, a post appeared on a left-wing website calling for the destruction of police property. This prompted a petrol bomb attack on some parked police cars.

2.4 Right-wing extremism

In November 2010 the AIVD released a report entitled *Right-wing extremism and the extreme right in the Netherlands* about the threat from the extreme right and right-wing extremists.

The past year has seen no major changes to the situation described in that publication. Right-wing extremism poses only a limited danger to the democratic legal order in the Netherlands, with the movement still hampered by organisational fragmentation, ideological differences and a small support base grouped mainly along social lines. International developments in 2011, such as the attacks in Norway by Anders Breivik and the discovery of a possible extreme-right terrorist network in Germany, the National Socialist Underground (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, NSU), had little or no impact upon right-wing extremism in the Netherlands. The AIVD has found no links between Breivik or his ideology and Dutch extremists, nor between them and the NSU. Nonetheless, these events abroad underline the need for continued vigilance when it comes to the potentially violent excrescences of extreme-right ideology.

In October 2011, acting upon official reports from the AIVD, police arrested a number of right-wing extremists in the province of Noord-Holland after it had been established that this so-called Ulfhednar or Vanguard Group was in possession of firearms. As far as the police investigation could ascertain, these weapons were intended for sale rather than to serve any direct political ends.

2.5 Anti-Islamism

In the wake of the attacks by Anders Breivik, the AIVD intensified its investigation of the potential threat to the democratic legal order from anti-Islamist, anti-multi-culturalist and anti-left forces. This phenomenon finds its principal outlet through online blogs and forums. Immediately after the events in Norway, several of these hosted discussions about the possibility of something similar occurring in the Netherlands. However, such ideas found little support. Anti-Islamism differs from “traditional” right-wing extremism in that it lacks the latter’s more antisemitic elements.

The rise and fall of the Dutch Defence League

On 30 October 2010 a new Dutch Defence League (DDL) held its inaugural demonstration in Amsterdam. This was also attended by members of the English Defence League (EDL). Given the negative publicity it generated, and the counter-demonstrations it attracted from left-wing extremists and from ethnic-minority youths they were able to mobilise, it turned out to be the first major public manifestation by the DDL but also its last. A second demonstration, outside the Iranian embassy in The Hague in December 2010, was deliberately kept small in order to avoid unleashing similar reactions. Apart from a speech at an anti-Islam conference in Paris, also in December 2010, and an appearance by a small delegation at an EDL demonstration in Luton, UK, in February 2011, little more was heard from the DDL. It has since transpired that the “organisation” revolved around the activities of a single person with only a handful of supporters. Citing “security considerations” and “lack of manpower”, on 13 June 2011 the DDL announced that it was disbanding with immediate effect. But although the League itself has disappeared, others continue to propagate its ideology, mainly on Internet forums.

2.6 Animal rights extremism

The anarchist group Respect for Animals (Respect voor Dieren, RvD) expanded its activities in 2011. It has been conducting a three-pronged campaign, with associated organisation Unheard (Ongehoord) targeting the livestock farming industry, “core” RvD focusing upon the shipment by Air France-KLM of monkeys for use in animal testing and the “working group” Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty Netherlands (SHAC Nederland) protesting against a number of pharmaceutical companies. Sometimes intimidatory in nature, on occasions RvD actions are so disruptive that they also cause commercial damage to their targets.

One notable characteristic of animal rights extremism is the degree of international co-operation within the movement. This can be seen in the campaign against Air France-KLM, for instance, and was reinforced at the International Animal Rights Gathering (IARG) held at Appelscha, Friesland, in mid-July 2011. That consisted of workshops and discussions in which participants shared ideas for new campaigns and actions. As predicted by the AIVD in its advice to the local “tripartite group”², the IARG passed off without incident. In 2011 the service advised affected parties (specifically the pharmaceutical industry and Air France-KLM) about likely developments, and it continues to do so.

2.7 Intimidating/violent opposition to Dutch asylum and immigration policy

Resistance against Dutch – and European – asylum and immigration policy continued to intensify in 2011. The number of individuals and groups involved in the campaign increased, particularly those of an anarchist complexion. As in previous years, at the forefront of this movement were the Utrecht Anarchist Anti-Deportation Group (Anarchistische Anti-deportatie Groep Utrecht, AAGU) and the Stop Deportations Working Group (Werkgroep Stop Deportaties, WSD), which organised actions including occupying the construction site of the new Schiphol-West Immigration Detention Centre. The online activist known as “Joke Kaviaar” played a particularly prominent part in these events through her inflammatory writings, the content of which resulted in her arrest for incitement and the closure of her website. Subsequently, however, these works reappeared on so-called “mirror sites” and so her message was propagated even more widely.

As well as intensifying, the asylum and immigration campaign also radicalised in 2011. This is apparent from, for example, a significant increase in cases of criminal damage and arson. The contractor responsible for the construction of the Schiphol-West centre, where failed asylum seekers are to be held whilst awaiting deportation, was a particular target of such violence.


Some of those responsible for these acts were outsiders wishing to show their solidarity with AAGU and WSD. Another tactic employed during the course of 2011 was the so-called “home visit”. Three such cases were reported, all involving serious forms of intimidation such as throwing paint bombs, smashing windows and puncturing tyres.

The year 2011 also saw an initiative to establish a Dutch No Border Network. Bringing together moderate and extremist groups, this organisation hopes to hold the annual international No Border Camp in the Netherlands in 2013. That event is usually peaceful, although the 2010 camp in Brussels ended with acts of vandalism and widespread public disorder.

The heightened threat in this domain caused the AIVD to enhance its own intelligence position and to intensify international co-operation in 2011. In addition, the service sought to increase alertness and resilience on the part of affected companies and institutions by providing them with specific information. In some cases, after all, the intimidation and threats go hand in hand with actual economic damage.

² The mayor, public prosecutor and chief constable with jurisdiction over the district in question.

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3 Clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers

The AIVD investigates clandestine activities by foreign powers in the Netherlands. Often through their own intelligence agencies, certain nations use a variety of methods to gather sensitive political, military, technological, scientific and economic information. Others secretly seek to influence Dutch political and governmental decision-making processes or to monitor and control migrant communities. Such activities encroach upon our sovereignty and can damage national security. For this reason, the AIVD makes every effort to identify them at an early stage and to prevent or frustrate them.

The Netherlands makes an attractive target for espionage. Not only is our country a member of the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but it also hosts many international organisations, is home to diverse migrant communities and has a thriving knowledge economy. For foreign security and intelligence services, that means that there is plenty of valuable information to be obtained here. Moreover, our open society and international orientation increase our vulnerability for espionage.

3.1 Forms of clandestine activity and interference

Digital espionage

The role of digital resources in intelligence-gathering activities by foreign powers continued to expand in 2011. As a country with a relatively extensive and high-quality electronic information and communications infrastructure, the Netherlands is a tempting target for digital “cyber attack”. Moreover, an intrusion against a server located here may not necessarily be directed against Dutch interests or nationals – it could also be used as a conduit to compromise the interests of other nations.

Various states use electronic means to gather political, military, technological, scientific and economic intelligence, or to monitor dissidents and opposition groups. For foreign intelligence agencies, this form of espionage is safe, remote from the target and low-risk. And their involvement is almost impossible to prove. Even if an attack is detected, it remains highly unlikely that the culprit’s location will be established beyond any doubt.

Given the sheer scale of the modern digital society, even recognising cyber attacks and espionage is far from easy. By the time intelligence activity is spotted, the damage may well have been done. Operations of this kind require specialist knowledge, but that can be hired commercially or developed in-house.

The continued expansion of the worldwide digital possibilities only heightens the need to stay alert and to take proper protective measures against future digital attacks.

In late August 2011, it became clear that the systems at Beverwijk-based certificate authority provider DigiNotar had been the target of a successful cyber attack. As a result, its certificates and other services designed to guarantee the reliability of online communications could no longer be trusted. These included certificates issued in respect of the Dutch government’s public key infrastructure, PKI-O. In addition, it was apparent that the attackers had generated fraudulent certificates.

In the interests of national security, the AIVD has investigated the DigiNotar incident in co-operation with national and international partners. The primary goals of that exercise were to discover the perpetrator’s motives and methods and to determine how the data obtained might be used.

In addition, as part of its security promotion remit the AIVD has since reviewed the resilience of other PKI-O certificate authority providers. Where necessary, these bodies have now been notified of potential vulnerabilities and advised as to how they can increase their resistance to attack. They have also been asked to examine their own IT environments for signs of improper use. In support of its resilience-building activities, the AIVD has drawn upon the lessons learned from the DigiNotar attack as well as its own knowledge and experience of hacking to identify risks facing certificate authority providers. And specific information has been shared with them so that they are better able to identify traces of digital attacks.

Economic espionage

An intelligence service can further the economic interests of its own nation through various forms of espionage. Whether or not originally gathered for this purpose, political, military, technological and scientific information obtained by clandestine means may also be of enormous economic benefit. Conversely, a country that falls victim to this kind of activity is damaged economically by it. The term “economic espionage” should therefore be interpreted in the broadest of senses, encompassing all the economic repercussions of intelligence activity.

The economic benefits to be derived from intelligence work are increasing as commercial competition between states gathers pace. Globalisation, the rise of new economic superpowers like China, India and Brazil and rapid technological progress have all intensified that race in the past decade. More and more intelligence agencies have therefore been ordered by their governments to add economic goals to their traditional duties in the national security domain. Of particular interest to them in this respect are details of innovative manufacturing processes, scientific advances, economic policy, planned public and private-sector investments and the production of and trade in basic commodities.

One factor which makes the Netherlands a particularly attractive target for economic espionage is the presence here of a large number of companies working with innovative technologies. Dutch know-how and expertise in this area are highly regarded throughout the world, and much sought after by foreign intelligence agencies. For the same reason, universities may also be targeted. Our vulnerability is enhanced by the fact that foreign nationals have relatively easy access to Dutch society, with national borders forming less and less of a hindrance. Moreover, many of our companies, research institutes and universities have a strong international orientation. To compete effectively in today's global commercial and scientific markets, it is essential to maintain good international relations and to share knowledge widely. But these factors also increase opportunities for espionage. Finally, the fact that awareness of the risks remains low in the Netherlands considerably increases the economic spy's chances of success.

It is vital, then, that intelligence activities of this kind be investigated and countered. To this end, the AIVD provides both government agencies and private companies with information designed to increase awareness of the dangers posed by economic espionage and so reduce the risk that they will fall victim to it.

To China, the Netherlands is a prime target for economic, technological and scientific espionage. Of particular interest to its intelligence services is information about advances in science and technology and about investment plans, both governmental and commercial. Beijing is now actively encouraging overseas Chinese researchers and technical specialists to return to their motherland, where it can exploit their expertise and experience. In the Netherlands and surrounding countries, this call is going out mainly to experts in the high-tech sector. Various state-backed programmes have been established to attract these highly educated and talented ethnic Chinese, with those who take them up being promised excellent financial rewards and special privileges. The result is that these individuals end up using knowledge acquired at Dutch companies and institutes to benefit their rivals in China. Conferences held in China to promote such schemes have been attended by specialists working for Dutch companies, with their employers not always informed that that is the purpose of their trip.

The Chinese authorities are also interested in members of Chinese minorities living in the Netherlands, and keep a close eye on them. Uyghurs, in particular, are tightly monitored and even put under pressure to collect information about other members of their community. Chinese agents have attempted to infiltrate Uyghur organisations in the Netherlands, and China has very detailed knowledge of their internal affairs. The purpose of these activities is to maintain a grip on the community, preventing it from organising effectively. Wherever possible, the AIVD informs potential victims, other interested parties and its own partners about what the Chinese authorities are doing. In part this is to prevent the rights of Dutch residents being infringed, and in part to put an end to the activities themselves. After all, these activities by the Chinese government in the Netherlands are unwanted.

Migrants targeted by foreign intelligence services

Certain foreign intelligence services are keen to obtain personal information about migrants and dissidents living in the Netherlands, or to infiltrate their organisations here. In this way they hope to stifle open protest and activism against the regime in the subjects' country of origin. In 2011 the AIVD continued to observe interest of this kind by foreign intelligence services in various migrant communities and opposition groups. In some cases it takes the form of more or less open attempts to exert influence, sometimes through diplomatic channels, but in others it involves clandestine espionage targeting specific communities and groups. Because such activities may compromise the rights of Dutch residents, the AIVD actively seeks to identify and counter them.

Teheran's efforts to undermine the opposition People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (Mujahedin-e Khalq, MEK) in the Netherlands continued unabated in 2011. In a campaign co-ordinated and financed by the Iranian intelligence services, the media and a number of politicians and other public servants were approached with a view to portraying the MEK in a highly negative light.

Targeting of international organisations

As host nation, the Dutch government is responsible for the security and the unimpeded functioning of several international organisations based here. The AIVD is charged with identifying and countering intelligence activities directed against those institutions by other powers. Over the past year it has been established that certain foreign intelligence agencies have been showing an untoward interest in them.

Where such activities have been identified, the AIVD has taken action to frustrate them. It has also informed those concerned about the risk of espionage, advised them of their responsibilities and encouraged them to enhance their security measures.

Hostile activities by foreign intelligence services represent a constant threat to Dutch national security. These organisations are unceasingly active in the Netherlands, whilst foreign agents are trying all the time to enter the country posing as businesspeople or scientists. In one case in 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied a visa to a foreign national after being advised by the AIVD that he was actually an intelligence officer using cover as a scientist. In another incident, in March 2011 the Russian military attaché to the Netherlands and a former Royal Netherlands Air Force officer were arrested on suspicion of espionage. This case came to light following an investigation by the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), to which the AIVD contributed.

3.2 Activities and results

As a result of ongoing investigations or specific incidents, the AIVD can implicate at least ten foreign powers in clandestine intelligence activities in the Netherlands in 2011. These range from cases of economic espionage and cyber espionage to attempts to manipulate migrant communities, to influence international organisations and to obtain specific sensitive (government) information.

The legal scope to deal with such operations remains limited, however. For example, aiding and abetting the clandestine activities of a foreign intelligence agency is not a specific offence in the Netherlands. On the other hand, disclosing state secrets and violating an oath of public office are.

Wherever possible, the AIVD has sought to disrupt activities hostile to the Netherlands. This response can take a variety of forms, from preventing a person entering the country to directly challenging the foreign service responsible about its unwanted activities.

Incidentally, targeted AIVD disruption of its activities in 2011 prompted the country concerned to take countermeasures. Under the Security Screening Act (see chapter 7), the service can block the employment by the Dutch government or a company of persons implicated in intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power.

Increasing awareness and resilience

In 2011, following on from the Espionage Vulnerability Analysis (*Kwetsbaarheidsanalyse spionage*, KWAS) issued in 2010, the AIVD continued its efforts to increase resilience. The service sought to raise awareness of the risks through an intensive programme of education and information dissemination, and also used investigative techniques to improve its understanding of possible intelligence activities by foreign powers. These targeted both the public and the private sectors. In partnership with the Ministry of Security and Justice, employers' confederation VNO-NCW, SME association MKB-Nederland and others, much attention has been paid to risk awareness and resilience enhancement over the past year. In March 2011 a declaration of intent against espionage was signed with these partners, with the aim of improving governmental, corporate and institutional resistance to it.

At the same time, the AIVD acknowledges that public resilience to espionage in the Netherlands remains limited. Hostile agents try to work subtly and inconspicuously, exploiting the naivety and opportunism of human targets. Many people and organisations are either unaware of the value of the information they hold or put their own economic interests before security considerations. In every sector, from the high-tech industry to the government, employees at all levels – from secretaries to directors – may become the focus of espionage efforts. Moreover, the security of IT and communications systems is consistently overrated. Foreign intelligence services are often prepared to invest considerable resources in exploiting the personal preferences or weaknesses of those they select as potential sources of information.



2011 Revolution
July 25 2012

4 Foreign intelligence

In mid-July 2011 the Prime Minister signed a new Designation Order as provided for in articles 6 and 7 of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, Wiv 2002). Among other things, this document defines the current foreign intelligence task of the AIVD and its military counterpart, the MIVD. Under the Designation Order, both services are permitted to gather political intelligence – information about the political intentions, activities and opinions of governments, institutions and inhabitants – related to specific, named countries. In all cases, the basic intention is to discover the true motives of the leading actors in the country or region concerned, to determine what real influence the government has and to find out what aims are being pursued. A second aspect of the foreign intelligence task is early warning and quick response – that is, the timely identification and notification of developments abroad which may pose a potential threat to Dutch national security, as well as responding adequately to them. On this front, the service collects data both autonomously and on request. The results are reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Since the Minister of Foreign Affairs is the primary contributor to the Designation Order, the AIVD performs its foreign intelligence duties in close co-operation with his department. In this relationship the service seeks out information that is difficult or impossible to obtain through diplomatic channels, producing focused reports which fill in and clarify any gaps in the knowledge garnered by other means. The Prime Minister and his department, the Ministry of General Affairs, also receive foreign intelligence reports compiled by the AIVD. The partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is structured in such a way that there is minimal overlap between AIVD activities and those of the Diplomatic Service. To ensure that its reports meet recipient's needs, the AIVD surveys their opinions on a regular basis. These exercises reveal that a significant proportion of the reports are valued and make a positive contribution to the formulation of Dutch foreign policy.

4.1 Regional developments

4.1.1 The Arab world and Iran

The Arab world

In the Middle East and North Africa, 2011 was the year of the so-called Arab Spring. What began with one man in Tunisia setting himself on fire in protest at high unemployment, poverty and corruption led to mass demonstrations from Morocco to Yemen. People across the region came out onto the streets to challenge incumbent regimes and to demand better socioeconomic conditions and greater political freedom. Social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube played an important role in these protests: the calls to demonstrate always appeared on them first. In Tunisia and Egypt this social revolution brought about regime change, with their armies largely choosing the side of the people. But although the presidents of both countries were forced to step down, sections of their state apparatus remain intact and in the hands of the “old guard”. In Libya and Yemen, on the other hand, the Arab Spring became enmeshed with tribal conflicts. And not everywhere has it been so successful. In Bahrain the protests were suppressed by the authorities with help from the Gulf Co-operation Council, which intervened under Saudi leadership. In Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Oman, limited reforms were announced to take the wind out of the activists' sails. Moreover, the monarchies in these countries appear to enjoy greater political legitimacy than the republicans running their neighbours. In Syria the Assad regime has dug in its heels, turning the revolution into an all-out civil war.

Several major demonstrations were held in the Palestinian Territories in 2011. But these had neither the scale nor the impact of the protests in other parts of the Middle East. Their primary focus at first was reconciliation between the main Palestinian factions, which signed an accord to that effect in May 2011. This was partly inspired by the Arab Spring and the resulting, potentially threatening power shifts in several countries in the regions. Later in the year, the focus of the demonstrations turned to the Israeli occupation.

Islam-inspired political parties have gained ground and influence across the Middle East and North Africa, but still have to tread carefully in the face of vested political and military interests. They also need to try to stimulate economic recovery in order to win back the trust of foreign investors.

Iran

During the past year, the internal political situation in Iran has been largely dominated by a complex power struggle between various factions. On the one hand there was conflict among supporters of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whilst on the other elements outside the government made every effort to thwart him. The tensions reached a peak in April, when Ahmadinejad tried to remove his intelligence minister, Heydar Moslehi, but found him reinstated by the country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Although the considerable rivalries within the regime have repeatedly resulted in unforeseen incidents, there is no indication that the dominant position of Supreme Leader is in any danger. In that light it is clear that the wind of change which has been sweeping through the Arab world since the beginning of 2011 has not blown into predominantly Persian Iran. Quite the contrary, in fact: the political reformers who profiled themselves as the "Green Movement" during the 2009 presidential election race have found themselves increasingly marginalised during the course of 2011. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) and the Basij militia, which are charged with maintaining internal security and suppressing domestic opposition, have further tightened their grip on the country's politics, society and economy. These organisations are an integral part of the regime's power base and at present remain loyal to the Supreme Leader.

Iran is trying to strengthen its regional position and wants to be taken seriously as a player in the Gulf and across the Middle East. In adopting an assertive and confrontational attitude, the country finds itself squaring up to other major regional players, most notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey. On the international stage, Teheran is becoming increasingly isolated due to its continuing refusal to engage constructively with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the potential military applications of its nuclear programme. Following the publication of a critical IAEA report in November 2011, this recalcitrance resulted in a further tightening of EU and US sanctions. These measures are now putting even more strain on the Iranian economy. Although the country has been benefiting from high energy prices on the global market, economically it is still struggling with a number of fundamental problems.

Against this background, in 2011 the government took the first steps in implementing an ambitious programme of economic reforms. These included abolishing the high state subsidies on basic commodities like water, food and petrol. The inflationary effects of those measures, combined with the international sanctions and inadequate economic policy, have only served to put even more pressure on the economy. As a result of US sanctions, for example, it is becoming more and more difficult for the Central Bank of Iran to interact with international financial institutions and to conduct international transactions. At the end of the year, this combination of problems culminated with the Iranian rial falling sharply against the US dollar. As yet, however, the worsening economic situation has not translated into large-scale popular unrest or organised political resistance. And it is questionable whether sanctions alone will achieve that in the medium or long term, especially if global energy prices remain high.

4.1.2 Asia

The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in December 2011 was an important event for the region. At the time of writing it remains unclear how the transfer of power to the next generation will affect the country's internal politics, regional relationships or the six-party talks.

It has become clear that 2012 will be an important year for the Communist Party of China (CPC). This autumn the party holds its eighteenth national congress, at which a large section of the current leadership is due to step down and be replaced. It is expected that after the forthcoming change, China will maintain its assertive pursuit of its own political and economic interests. Towards the end of 2011, China and the Russian Federation were the only two permanent members of the UN Security Council to oppose the extension of sanctions against Iran. They also vetoed a resolution on Syria, intended to end the violence there. China is now the world's second-largest economy, having achieved a growth rate of approximately 9 per cent in 2011. The CPC has a vested interest in continuing to stimulate growth in order to maintain internal social stability. The Arab Spring did not provoke any similar upheavals in China, although there were numerous local protests against the authorities. As a rule, these were put down by force. The authorities closely monitor all developments which might undermine the stability of the nation and hence the position of the CPC.

Relations between Pakistan and the United States worsened dramatically during 2011. At one point they were even suspended altogether following a series of incidents, including the American raid which killed Osama bin Laden in May and the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers in another US military operation. But because of their common struggle against terrorism and the Western presence in neighbouring Afghanistan, the two countries ultimately have no choice but to co-operate. As of early 2012, therefore, they were gradually restoring their relationship. At the same time Pakistan is trying to improve its political, military and economic ties with China in order to offset American dominance. India, which has traditionally had a difficult relationship with China, has also been pursuing rapprochement. For example, the two countries held a joint economic summit in September 2011. The United States regards Asia as increasingly important to its own foreign policy interests and so has been endeavouring to improve its position in the region through partnerships and agreements with countries including China and Indonesia. The circumstances surrounding the death of Bin Laden have somewhat weakened the position of the Pakistani military, but it still plays a dominant role in key policy domains such as foreign affairs and defence. With the country's chronic political instability likely to continue at least until the presidential election of 2013, the army has plenty of scope to maintain that position for the time being.

All parties in Afghanistan are preparing for the final withdrawal of US troops, in mid-2014 at the latest. It is in this light that we must view the tentative start of negotiations with the Taliban. Pakistan continues to back the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, which has links with both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, in order to steer the formation of a new government in Kabul in its favour. Meanwhile, relations between Afghanistan and India are gradually improving, particularly on the economic front.

4.1.3 Africa

A large number of African countries are cautiously democratising. Moreover, the continent is experiencing significant economic growth which is undermining the support base for uprisings. Important recent developments include the independence of South Sudan and the transfer of former Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. But there have also been setbacks. In Nigeria, for instance, not only have continuing corruption and poverty continued to undermine democracy, but so too has increasing violence by radical Islamists. Based in the north of the country, the group Boko Haram has been waging a campaign of attacks on the Nigerian state and its democratic system. Seeking the imposition of Sharia law, Boko Haram's strategy is to dent public confidence in the government and the security forces. Its use of terrorist methods has considerably worsened the security situation in Nigeria, whilst at the same time deepening mistrust between the country's Muslim and Christian communities.

4.1.4 Russian Federation

Overshadowing most political developments in the Russian Federation during 2011 was the forthcoming presidential election. The country's leaders had to make a final decision about their candidate in the poll, to be held on 4 March 2012. In October, at the congress of the ruling United Russia party, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev announced that Putin would stand for election as president, with Medvedev as his intended prime minister. The early declaration of this role reversal was seen by many voters as a cynical attempt to sideline them, and so did not give Putin the boost he had hoped for in the subsequent election for the State Duma. At the polls on 4 December, United Russia lost substantial ground. Moreover, for the first time proof of widespread electoral fraud appeared on the Internet. After the election there were large-scale demonstrations against the continuing dominance of Putin and his regime.

Energy is of huge importance to the Russian economy, and hence to the political stability of the nation. The Russian Federation's position as an energy superpower largely shapes its political agenda, and will continue to do so. Increasingly, though, developments beyond its control have the potential to undermine demand for its products. They include advances in energy production and transportation technology, EU competition rules and a more assertive European energy policy.

As result, Russia can no longer take for granted its super-power status in this field. For the Netherlands, these developments represent an opportunity to strengthen our position in the European energy matrix.

The North Caucasus region faces a number of interrelated problems, amongst them persistent terrorism, corruption, ethnic tensions and a growing socioeconomic gap between the southern periphery and the Russian heartland. To prevent this widening even more, the Moscow government has compiled a very expensive and ambitious economic development plan for the region. It intends to cover much of the cost itself, a major financial commitment which has nurtured an opposition movement in Russia itself. But with just two years to go before the Winter Olympics are held at Sochi, not far away, the federal government cannot allow the instability in the North Caucasus to escalate any further. It will therefore continue to pursue a two-pronged strategy for the time being, on the one hand cracking down on armed separatist groups and on the other investing in economic development.

4.1.5 Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America continues to walk a tightrope between ties with the United States, despite the disapproval of Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba, and greater regional economic co-operation. The thaw in relations between Venezuela and Colombia which began in 2010 has continued, and the Colombian government has sustained its offensive against illegal armed rebel groups.

The Dutch Caribbean

Since the island of Bonaire became a special municipality of the Netherlands on 10 October 2010, Dutch territory is now separated from the South American mainland by just a few dozen kilometres of sea. Because of this new geographical proximity, developments in the region have the potential to directly affect Dutch interests more than ever before. For the MIVD the permanent presence of Dutch forces in the Caribbean is reason enough to monitor developments in all the Caribbean Islands within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, insofar as they may touch upon our national military interests.

Venezuela

The dominant issue in Venezuela throughout 2011 was the health of President Hugo Chávez. Because of illness, he was unable to maintain his usual high profile. Despite this, the country's democratic institutions continued to come under pressure. More than ever, Chávez controls the judiciary, the legislature and the executive powers. Private property rights and press freedom were further curtailed during the year. Internationally, Chávez remains close to the more or less like-minded regimes in Cuba, Bolivia and Ecuador. Also notable is Venezuela's amicable relationship with Iran, which is primarily political in nature. Most of the grandiose joint projects and enterprises announced by the two countries have stagnated, are losing money or have never come to fruition.

As in previous years, in 2011 Chávez again referred to the Dutch territories in the Caribbean as "colonial remnants". But he was less vocal than he has been in accusing the United States and the Netherlands of harbouring aggressive intentions towards Venezuela.

Surinam

The government of the former Dutch colony of Surinam, a coalition of the parties led by ex-military leader Desi Bouterse, his one-time arch-rival Ronnie Brunswijk and the former speaker of the country's parliament, Paul Somohardjo, consolidated its position in 2011. But Bouterse's dominant role as president has fed underlying tensions. Although he was elected democratically, Bouterse's outstanding conviction in the Netherlands for drug offences has led to a cooling of relations between the Dutch and Surinamese governments. Meanwhile, the trial in the case of the so-called December murders of 1982, in which Bouterse is one of the defendants, has suffered delays.

4.2 Activities and results


The developments in the Arab world increased the Dutch government's need for information about the region from the beginning of 2011. This led the AIVD to temporarily expand its intelligence focus on the Middle East. A service-wide project was initiated to enable the organisation to better track and understand what was happening there. Activities included new investigations, the intensification of ongoing ones and closer monitoring of the situation in certain countries. To facilitate these additional efforts, several other current investigations were suspended for a time. The service's early warning and quick response capability focused almost exclusively upon the Arab world.

The AIVD produced more than 530 intelligence products related to countries covered by the Designation Order in 2011. These included intelligence briefings, more detailed analyses, official reports and responses to requests for information (RFIs) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The number of presentations and briefings delivered by the service increased again in 2011. AIVD personnel regularly addressed meetings of the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Services Committee (Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Nederland, CVIN) and the Council for the Intelligence and Security Services (Raad voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, RIV). In addition, about 25 briefings and presentations were given to the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Services Committee (Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CIVD) and to individual members of the CIVD and RIV, to ministers and to policy-level civil servants.

In fulfilling their foreign intelligence tasks, the AIVD and MIVD work closely together and co-ordinate their activities in order to optimise the effectiveness and productivity of both services. They also continue their combined proliferation and counterproliferation efforts and their collaboration in the Dutch Caribbean, and in 2011 intensified their partnerships – including joint reporting – in several other domains.

The Caribbean Regional Team (Team Caribisch Gebied, TCG) established jointly by AIVD and the MIVD in 2010 continues to lead all intelligence and security tasks arising out of the Wiv 2002 in that part of the world.



5 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose a huge potential threat to international peace and security. To prevent their further proliferation and that of associated technologies, nuclear tests and the development and possession of biological and chemical weapons, the international community has developed a system of binding treaties. The Netherlands is part of this and the AIVD and its military counterpart, the MIVD, are charged with upholding the obligations it imposes upon our nation. Given the evident national and international security implications involved, it is their task to investigate proliferation-related activities by so-called “countries of concern”: nations suspected of acting in breach of the international conventions by possessing WMD and their delivery systems, or endeavouring to develop them.

5.1 Joint Counterproliferation Unit

The AIVD has been working closely on proliferation issues with the MIVD since 2008, when the two organisations established a joint Counterproliferation Unit (Unit Contraproliferatie, UCP). This has proven highly effective in enhancing knowledge related to the proliferation of WMD, their means of production and their delivery systems.

The UCP has both an intelligence and a security remit. The former entails informing the government about WMD and related programmes in countries of concern. In practice, this means that much of the unit’s investigative capacity is devoted to Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. It also monitors Syria’s development of chemical weapons. The security task, meanwhile, centres on preventing countries of concern procuring relevant materials and know-how in or through the Netherlands, either directly or via intermediaries.

Nuclear weapons and delivery systems

Iran’s nuclear programme continues unabated, although Teheran claims that it is purely civilian in intent. The country has already achieved 20 per cent uranium enrichment, and in 2011 upped its production of this material. Although that is still well short of weapons grade, in one of its regular reports, published in November 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) again expressed concerns regarding possible military aspects of the programme. The IAEA’s main finding in 2011 was that Iran has conducted activities consistent with the development of a nuclear explosive. That was done as part of a structured programme until 2003, it says, but some work may have continued thereafter. Iran’s pre-2003 activities encompassed all aspects of nuclear weapons development, namely the production of fissile material, atomic bomb technology and a nuclear warhead for a ballistic missile. The UCP considers this IAEA report to be complete and well-researched. By continuing its close monitoring of developments related to the Iranian programme, the unit is in a good position to understand its current status and possible future direction, and to explain the implications thereof to the government.

Iran also has an active space programme, working on rockets designed to launch satellites. Whilst in itself civilian in nature, much of the knowledge and experience gained from this effort can equally be applied to ballistic missiles for military use. The programme has made significant progress in recent years, with Iran successfully launching a probe into earth orbit for the second time in 2011. Teheran also announced that in February it had launched two long-range missiles, which covered a distance of some 1900 kilometres before coming down in the Indian Ocean.

Chemical and biological weapons

Syria has an active chemical weapons programme. These devices are probably stored at various locations within the country. Since the uprising against the Assad regime began in March 2011, there has existed a real risk that they might fall into other hands, although there is no indication that that has actually happened.

Procurement of materials and know-how

As part of their security task, the AIVD and MIVD seek to prevent the open or clandestine procurement of relevant know-how, equipment, materials and natural resources by or on behalf of countries of concern in or through the Netherlands. As in previous years, in 2011 they examined several cases of suspicious activity by individual business-people and small trading companies. These investigations were prompted by reports received from Dutch authorities and foreign partner services. In this domain, the services closely combine efforts with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation and with enforcement agencies such as Customs and the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (Fiscale inlichtingen- en opsporingsdienst, FIOD). In a number of cases, this work resulted in shipments of proliferation-sensitive materials being prevented or intercepted. As and when necessary, policy-making bodies and other investigative agencies were notified of the outcome. In addition, a number of businesses and educational and research institutions were alerted with a view to raising their awareness of attempts at procurement.

Export controls

The UCP plays an important supporting role in the enforcement of Dutch export control regulations in respect of so-called dual-use goods.³ Applications for licences to supply such items to countries of concern are almost always referred to the unit for investigation. It then checks what is known about the buyer and the end user, as well as any intermediaries involved, and may also provide an opinion as to whether the know-how and goods in question could be useful in the development of WMDs or delivery systems. The UCP submits its findings to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, where they are combined with information from other sources, internal and external, to assist in making a final decision on the licence application.

Because of the advances in Iran's nuclear programme and the ever-stricter sanctions being imposed upon the country as a result, the UCP pays particular attention to its efforts to acquire know-how, technology, materials and resources.

5.2 Activities and results

Thanks to a strong autonomous intelligence position with respect to the countries of concern, as well as intensive co-operation with partner services abroad, the UCP is able to supply the government with a good range of relevant products. It issued approximately 65 proliferation-related intelligence reports and special briefings during 2011. Most of these were addressed to the Prime Minister and the ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Defence and Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation.

To raise awareness of proliferation issues and promote security, about 35 companies and institutions were visited. And in respect of export controls the AIVD and MIVD supplied the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation with information on 63 separate occasions.

By participating in innovative joint international operations and contributing to the exchange of analytical information, the UCP acted as a valuable partner to several foreign services during 2011.

³ Goods or materials which can be used for either civilian or military purposes. This term is commonly used in the battle against further proliferation (of weapons of mass destruction).



6 Security promotion

The AIVD actively promotes measures to protect confidential data vital to national security and to safeguard key parts of the public and private sectors. It also contributes to the national Safety and Security System (Stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen, SBB) by analysing and assessing threats and by compiling risk analyses concerning those people, premises, services and events for which the government bears a special responsibility.

6.1 Safety and Security System

The AIVD plays its part in ensuring that the subjects covered by this system are able to function safely, securely and without interruption or disruption. They are people, premises, services and events for which the government bears a special responsibility because of their importance to Dutch state and society. Under the SBB, the AIVD provides the national Safety and Security Co-ordinator (Coördinator Bewaking en Beveiliging, CBB) with information detailing both known and conceivable threats, so that he can take appropriate action.

To this end, in 2011 the service submitted 101 threat assessments, fifteen threat analyses and seven risk analyses, plus six summaries. In consultation with the CBB, it also substantially improved the quality of these products. They now provide a more fundamental insight into the threats discussed, thus giving the parties responsible for acting upon them a better guide as to how to respond.

Threats against individuals in the national security domain

The so-called “national security domain” includes a select group of important individuals who may be subject to particular threats. They include members of Parliament, government ministers and members of the Royal Family. Politicians, for example, regularly receive threats. These often come from people who vent their own anger and frustration through letters, e-mails or tweets formulated in menacing terms. Young people, especially, sometimes use highly threatening language on Twitter or the Internet. In most cases there is no genuine threat behind what are really expressions of high emotion, but sometimes they do have more substance to them – as with the “lone individuals” described below.

About half of the 101 threat assessments compiled by the AIVD in 2011 involved people and events in the national security domain. The subjects included prominent parliamentarians as well as state visits, conferences and ceremonial occasions attended by members of the Royal Family. The service also prepared risk analyses covering the portfolios of six members of the Cabinet: the Prime Minister and the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Security and Justice, the Interior and Immigration and Asylum.

Diplomatic premises

Each year the AIVD carries out threat assessments in respect of diplomatic premises. In 2011 there were 19 exercises of this kind. But this year, for the first time, the service also produced a threat analysis providing an overall picture of the risk to diplomatic premises in the Netherlands and abroad. Among other things, this revealed that the threat to such facilities is generally higher in conflict zones and in countries suffering unrest than it is in the Netherlands. For jihadists, the diplomatic missions of countries involved in military or other operations in their own or another Muslim nation, and indeed those belonging to any state viewed as an “enemy of Islam”, are a preferred target. Specific events can also make an embassy or consulate a potential target. In 2011 this was the case with Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan diplomatic premises in the Netherlands. With the onset of the so-called Arab Spring, the missions of all three nations were subjected to telephone threats, demonstrations and actual or attempted vandalism. The AIVD therefore issued several threat assessments concerning these premises.

International organisations

As their host, the Dutch government is responsible for the security and the unhindered functioning of the many international organisations based on its territory. They include the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Court (ICC) and NATO. Under the SBB, in 2011 the AIVD compiled threat and risk analyses in respect of these organisations.

Events of national importance

There are several designated “events of national importance”: Queen’s Day, Remembrance Day, Veterans’ Day, Budget Day (Prinsjesdag) and national elections. For those which recur annually, the AIVD again produced threat analyses in 2011.

Threats from lone individuals

Certain individuals undergo a personal process, not involving any third party, which results in them posing a threat that they express in the form of violent conduct or language. This phenomenon has come to play a prominent part in the Safety and Security System in recent years. Since early 2011 the AIVD has been participating in the National Police Services Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, KLPD) pilot project Threat Management (Dreigingsmanagement), which is pooling knowledge and expertise about such individuals in order to investigate how to counter the threat they pose.

6.2 Vital sectors

The safe and uninterrupted functioning of services vital to the Dutch state, society and economy is primarily the responsibility of the operating companies and organisations themselves. The AIVD provides them with information about actual and potential threats, which enables them to take measures to reduce their own vulnerability. The service’s efforts in this respect are twofold, focusing upon prevention through enhanced structural resilience as well as upon urgent responses to immediate known or suspected dangers. Products range from threat analyses to specific advice and information designed to increase awareness of particular threats.

Counter-terrorism Alert System

The purpose of the Counter-terrorism Alert System (Alertingssysteem Terrorismebestrijding, ATb) is to provide the operators of vital infrastructure with specific information about an identified or conceivable terrorist threat. As in the previous year, in 2011 the jihadist threat to most of the sectors concerned was low.

Only in civil aviation did a higher threat level apply, due to international incidents. The applicable level is determined by the Minister of Security and Justice, acting on advice from the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism and Security (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV). In 2011 the AIVD submitted information for inclusion in the regular threat updates compiled for each sector.

Civil aviation

In 2011 the AIVD drew up a threat analysis for the airports sector. And, in collaboration with the MIVD and the Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee, KMar), it investigated new jihadist threats to civil aviation. The service also looked into the possibility of a threat to air traffic control, a critical operational process in this sector. Relevant parties in civil aviation have been able to use the results of that exercise as a benchmark in revising their security measures.

6.3 Information services

As part of its security task and as part of the SBB, the AIVD provides companies and other organisations with specific information intended to assist them in increasing their own resilience to possible threats.

Espionage

The service arranges informative meetings for sectors likely to be the target of hostile intelligence activities. By raising awareness of espionage, it is hoped that these will be frustrated. Eighty-four such events were held in 2011. The AIVD also organised a symposium to inform companies about the potential consequences of cybercrime, such as the loss of intellectual property and financial damage.

Reconnaissance

The AIVD briefs companies and government agencies about how to recognise and counter reconnaissance activities by terrorist cells gathering information about possible targets. Potential victims are taught to identify reconnaissance techniques and urged to contact the AIVD if they are spotted, so that the service can investigate further. Several firms and agencies received such briefings in 2011.

6.4 Communications security

Leaks of confidential information, such as state secrets, can harm the interests of the Dutch state. Because of this, its integrity needs to be carefully protected. A unit of the AIVD, the National Communications Security Agency (Nationaal Bureau voor Verbindingsbeveiliging, NBV), promotes the protection of such information by providing relevant advice, assessing security products and supporting their implementation. The AIVD is also empowered to develop products of its own if nothing suitable for a particular security requirement is currently available on the commercial market.

Secure mobile telephony

Mobile telephony traffic is becoming more and more vulnerable to interception. The necessary software is now widely available, and the hardware is relatively cheap. Consequently, in 2011 the AIVD put considerable effort into researching and developing products to safeguard confidential calls.

The Netherlands already has a device which facilitates secure telephony up the “Secret” (Stg. Geheim) classification level: the Sectra Tiger. For calls in the “Ministerial Restricted” (Departementaal Vertrouwelijk) category, two solutions were examined and approved in 2011.

In the light of the trend towards device-independent working within the Dutch government, a study of safe evaluable platforms has been initiated. This aims to gain a better insight into the security characteristics of the present mobile platforms, with the results providing the basis for future assessments that make use of them. The first result has already been delivered: a quick scan report describing the current security value of commercially available mobile platforms. The AIVD also looked into security issues and possible safeguards related to the potential implementation of the “Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)” concept within the government service.

As well as pursuing research and development, in 2011 the AIVD also gave presentations about the vulnerability of mobile telephony. By showing audiences how calls can be intercepted relatively easily and cheaply, these served as a reminder to think carefully about what information is communicated over the phone and to use a secure device when appropriate.

Network monitoring pilot

Prompted by the rise of digital espionage, the AIVD has initiated a pilot project in collaboration with commercial and university partners to examine ways of identifying cyber attacks at the earliest possible stage. This aims to develop a prototype of an advanced network probe (also known as a network monitor or sensor), to better understand the nature and scale of such attacks, to facilitate co-operation with other partners at home and abroad and to increase resilience.

With a greater insight into cyber attacks, the AIVD will be able to help others spot them and reduce the vulnerability of their information and communications infrastructures. Monitoring and analysing network traffic is one means whereby organisations can be more certain that their systems are secure, as well as enhancing their resilience. It also enables them to take appropriate preventive or corrective measures.

At the same time the service has been strengthening and extending its expertise in the field of advanced cyber attacks, and also its collaborative efforts in the national and international arenas. This is part of its contribution to the National Cybersecurity Strategy.

Luna

In 2011 the AIVD developed a new file encryption program, Luna. This allows the secure transmission of data up to “Confidential” (Stg. Confidencieel) level to and from government, chain and intelligence partners by e-mail (as an encrypted attachment) and on USB devices.


Securing networking with OpenVPN-NL

During 2011, the AIVD evaluated the open source product OpenVPN (Virtual Private Network) and approved it for use at the “Ministerial Restricted” classification level. This software makes it possible to establish a secure connection between computers and/or networks on an otherwise insecure network, such as the Internet. The end result has been named OpenVPN-NL and is publicly available.



Vertrouwe
veiligheids

acties en
erzoeken



7 Positions involving confidentiality and security screening

In the Netherlands, appointments with a dimension that in some way touches upon national security are designated as “positions involving confidentiality” (vertrouwensfuncties). Were the holder to abuse such a position, that might harm the security of the nation to a greater or lesser extent. Positions involving confidentiality are so designated by the relevant government minister, in consultation with the Minister of the Interior. The AIVD advises designating ministers when they are compiling draft lists of such positions, and on behalf of the Minister of the Interior ensures that actual designations are reasonable and proportionate.

There is a growing need in Dutch society for candidates to be screened or “vetted” before they are allowed to take up a job. The AIVD concentrates upon national security considerations, but there are also alternative screening procedures for other purposes. For example, the Ministry of Security and Justice can conduct criminal record checks with a view to issuing a Certificate of Good Conduct (Verklaring Omtrent het Gedrag, VOG).

A person cannot take up a position involving confidentiality until the AIVD has granted them a Security Clearance (Verklaring van Geen Bezwaar, VGB). This is a statement that – based upon the screening process they have undergone – there is no objection on national security grounds to the subject filling the post in question. The AIVD carries out some of these screenings itself, but delegates others to mandated organisations: the Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee, KMar) for screenings in the civil aviation sector; the police service itself for Category B (see below) positions with the police; and the Royal and Diplomatic Protection Service (Dienst Koninklijke en Diplomatieke Beveiliging, DKDB) for posts in the Royal Household.

Security screenings in 2011	Number of screenings initiated
Initiated by the AIVD	6,386
Initiated by KMar, DKDB or the police	32,539
• Of which: referred to the AIVD by KMar, DKDB or the police.	2,635
• Of which: AIVD enquiries to foreign partner organisations on behalf KMar, the police or the MIVD	1,984
Total screenings initiated	38,925

International commitments	
Enquiries to the AIVD from third countries and international organisations	997
Screenings initiated for Article 13 clearances and reports	1,745

In 2011 the AIVD launched a project entitled “Task B Realignment” (Herijking van de B-taak) to develop a new approach to the designation of positions involving confidentiality and the conduct of security screenings. The aim is to produce a more refined system, which takes into account the likelihood of a security breach as well as the gravity of the potential damage. At the same time, a proposal for passing on the costs of screening is being implemented.

7.1 Designation of positions involving confidentiality

The security screening process intrudes upon a candidate’s privacy. Defining a particular function as a position involving confidentiality must therefore be considered very carefully, after all other reasonable security precautions have been implemented.

Such positions, which are potentially harmful to national security, exist in a variety of sectors. Responsibility for their correct designation rests with the relevant minister, subject to confirmation by the Minister of the Interior. This ministerial accountability covers not only the inappropriate designation of a position as “involving confidentiality”, but also its inappropriate non-designation.

The AIVD is responsible for ensuring that candidates for positions so defined are screened within the statutory deadline.

A person can only take up a position involving confidentiality once the AIVD has issued a VGB. More than 100,000 people held such a position in the Netherlands at some point in 2011, about the same number as in the previous year.

Average FTE number of persons in positions involving confidentiality	2010	2011
Civil aviation*	31,433	30,487
Defence contractors	20,800	20,800
Police (categories A and P)	16,705	16,996
Central government	5,296	5,430
Vital sectors	1,547	1,547
Royal Household	348	296
Total**	76,129	75,556

* Number of screenings conducted. The actual number of persons in positions involving confidentiality is substantially higher and fluctuates considerably.

** Excludes positions in the defence sector.

The scope of the screening is directly related to the sensitivity of the position. There are three standard levels (A, B and C), with Category A – reserved for functions of the highest sensitivity – being the most rigorous.

On 1 September 2011 the Minister of the Interior approved new guidelines for the designation of positions involving confidentiality in the vital sectors. Based upon the Security Screening Act (Wet Veiligheidsonderzoeken, Wvo), these meet a long-standing need by providing concrete designation criteria. The guidelines are available on the AIVD website (www.aivd.nl).

7.2 Security screenings

7.2.1 The screening process

Application

When a candidate applies for a position involving confidentiality, they must be notified of that status by the prospective employer. The same applies to the holder of a position which is redesignated as “involving confidentiality”.

It is the employer’s duty to inform the potential subject about what security screening entails and the legal implications of undergoing the process. The AIVD has published brochures, guidelines and policy regulations in support of this requirement and to help the subject decide whether or not to proceed with screening. Before the process can begin, the applicant must give their written consent.

Security awareness is an important aspect of the screening procedure, and also something the subject must always keep in mind after it is completed. As part of the Task B Realignment project, the entire screening process is being redesigned to explore, clarify and assess five – rather than the previous four – personal characteristics. They are loyalty, independence, integrity, honesty and, for the first time, security awareness.

Procedure

Screenings are carried out by experienced investigators. They begin with a check of official records, including police, judicial and AIVD files. Depending upon the screening category, this may be followed by an interview with the subject and possibly also field research amongst referees and informants. Referees are nominated by the subject in support of their application, whereas informants are contacted by the AIVD on its own initiative. They may be selected based upon information obtained during the records check, from the subject or from their referees. The purpose of the interviews with referees and informants is to confirm or correct findings made earlier in the process.

In assessing the information obtained, particular attention is paid to a number of activities. They include the use and supply of hard drugs, embezzlement, fraud, forgery, crimes against national security and membership of a criminal organisation. Depending upon the screening category, involvement in such activities may be reviewed over an evaluation period of up to ten years.

The purpose of security screening is to reach a judgement concerning the risks associated with allowing the subject to occupy a particular position involving confidentiality. In such a post, personal weaknesses have the potential to endanger national security. A VGB is therefore denied if there are insufficient guarantees that the candidate will comply faithfully with all the obligations arising out of the position or if the screening procedure fails to produce enough information to reach a considered judgement in that respect. The following factors are considered during the screening.

- Judicial and criminal history.
- Participation in or support for activities likely to endanger national security.
- Membership or support of organisations which pose a threat to maintenance of the democratic legal order.
- Other personal conduct and circumstances.

In 2011 the AIVD compiled two new screening policy instructions, one on judicial information and the other on evaluation periods and insufficient data. Both entered force on 1 February 2012 and apply to all screenings. They were needed because not all the grounds defined in the Wvo for refusing a VGB in the various screening categories had been translated into policy instructions. That situation has now been rectified.

If a subject has spent more than three uninterrupted months abroad during a certain period prior to screening, the AIVD is required to gather details about that time. To facilitate this, it may share information within its network of partner services for screening exercises.

Partnerships for this purpose are not entered into until it has been established that the exchange of relevant information with an agency abroad is responsible. Factors considered in determining this include respect for human rights, professionalism, reliability and the other service's democratic accountability within the constitutional structure of its own nation.

Since 1 May 2011 the AIVD notifies the subject's employer if it requests information from an agency abroad. In turn, the employer is asked to inform the subject of this fact. Once a response is received, the employer is again notified in writing. In the meantime, the screening procedure is suspended. The statutory completion schedule resumes as soon as the necessary details are provided by the foreign service. In this situation the AIVD is reliant upon third parties and how long it takes them to supply the requested information, which can seriously delay the screening process.

VGB issuance and refusal

At the end of the process, a screening report is compiled and the AIVD recommends that a VGB be either granted or denied. This decision is based solely upon the findings from the screening. If it is negative, an objection and then an appeal may be lodged. Upon objecting, the subject receives a copy of the screening report which may be abridged for security or privacy reasons. Should the case go to appeal, the law provides that the courts and the Council of State may examine the full report, including the edited sections, as long as subject explicitly grants them permission to do so. The Wvo provides that the manner in which the AIVD conducts screenings, and also the objections and appeals procedure, may be reviewed by the Intelligence and Security Services Regulatory Commission (Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CTIVD).

Screening reports are classified Secret (*staatsgeheim*). In the spring of 2011 the Minister of the Interior informed Parliament about the arrangements which are in place to allow referees and informants restricted access to reports to which they have contributed. As the minister pointed out, one overriding factor in this respect is the protection of security service sources.⁴

Following a parliamentary question tabled by Liberal Party (VVD) security spokesperson Laetitia Griffith,⁵ the AIVD conducted a pilot project to record the interviews conducted during screenings. This established that there is no good reason to make such recordings: they add nothing to the quality of the final reports and, given that the service conducts some 1,700 screenings a year, would require considerable effort to maintain. Moreover, the regime of controls surrounding these procedures is already sound. Subjects can lodge objections and appeals against the outcome, and the CTIVD monitors their conduct.

⁴ Second Chamber of the States-General, 2010-2011 session, 30 977 no. 41.

⁵ Second Chamber of the States-General, 2010-2011 session, 30 977 and 29 924, no. 22.

7.2.2 Key figures

The tables below show the number of screenings conducted by the AIVD and by the mandated organisations, broken down by category.

Screenings initiated by the AIVD after request accepted	2010	2011
Category A	1,509	1,674
Category B	3,726	3,873
Category C	511	839
Category BL (civil aviation, referred by KMar)	3,194	2,572
Category BP (police, referred by the police service)	59	59
Category BKH (Royal Household, referred by DKDB)	-	4
AIVD total	8,999	9,021

Screenings initiated under mandate	2010	2011
Category BL (KMar, includes 2,572 referred to AIVD)	31,433	30,487
Category BP (police, includes 59 referred to AIVD)	2,310	1,983
Category BKH (DKDB, includes 4 referred to AIVD)	39	67
Total under mandate	33,782	32,539

The table below shows the number of screenings completed in 2011, broken down by final decision and, where a VGB was denied, the grounds for refusal.

Screenings completed	VGB denied (judicial record)	VGB denied (insufficient information)	VGB denied (other reasons)	VGB denied (total)	VGB issued
Category A	1	1	4	6	820
Category A (police)	0	0	2	2	756
Category B	6	10	7	23	3,801
Category BP	0	3	2	5	1,826
Category BL	351	216	16	583	29,898
Category C	1	1	0	2	827
Total	359	231	31	621	37,928

In Category A, the most rigorous of the procedures, 94.9 per cent of the screenings were completed and a decision made on whether to grant a VGB within the statutory deadline. Five per cent took longer to complete because of their complexity.

Forty-three new objections and one appeal were lodged in 2011. The tables below show the key figures for objections and appeals during the year under review.

Objections and appeals initiated in 2011	
	Submitted
Letter of notification	5
Objection	43
Appeal	8
Further appeal	1
Further appeal to minister	-
Interim injunction (objection)	1
Interim injunction (appeal)	-
Interim injunction (further appeal)	-
Interim injunction (further appeal to minister)	-

Objections and appeals completed in 2011	Dismissed	Upheld ⁶	Inadmissible	Withdrawn	Rejected	Accepted	Dealt with
Letter of notification	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Objection	30	11	4	2	-	-	-
Appeal	11	-	1	-	-	-	-
Appeal, legal effects stand	-	1	-	1	-	-	-
Further appeal by appellant	3	-	-	1	-	-	-

⁶ This does not mean that the Objections Committee believes that a VGB should now be issued, but only that it has found the original procedure deficient or lacking sufficient grounds for the decision reached. In most cases these faults can be rectified in the ruling on the objection.

8 Organisation, development and management

The growing reliance upon digital technologies in all the vital sectors, not to mention their widespread use in social and commercial communications between the public, businesses and government agencies, has brought with it an enhanced risk of disruption. The amount of data and information about individuals and organisations being stored and transmitted electronically is set to explode over the next few years. Technology is evolving rapidly, and so is its impact upon users in terms of communication, networking and encryption. Whether in identifying threats and other important developments at home and abroad or in tracking, understanding and operationalising technological progress itself, under these circumstances the AIVD has no choice but to work with others. It therefore seeks to combine and pool its efforts and expertise as effectively as possible with partner organisations.

8.1 Co-operation with the MIVD

The Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, MIVD) is a key AIVD partner. The two services co-operate closely in the national and international arenas. This helps to ensure that both use their resources as effectively as possible in pursuit of their common goal: developing, maintaining and extending an independent intelligence position. The AIVD and MIVD complement one another, each with its own specific expertise. In some areas the collaboration is already very intensive, with joint teams active in the Caribbean (TCG, see Chapter 4) and in counter-proliferation (UCP, see Chapter 5). Over the past year they have also strengthened their partnership in other domains, with a view to increasing the uniformity of their intelligence and security products, sharing more knowledge, integrating more of their systems and improving effectiveness in foreign intelligence. One good example of this effort is their new joint Sigint and Cyber project.

Sigint and Cyber

In the autumn of 2011 the AIVD and MIVD initiated a project to establish a joint unit for the acquisition of signals intelligence (sigint) and cyber intelligence (cyberint). It will supply high-quality material to both services, thus enabling them to develop outstanding intelligence and counterintelligence products.

A combined unit of this kind offers multiple benefits. By pooling their resources, the services will make more effective and efficient use of valuable technological expertise and communications interception technologies, which in turn will improve the quality of the end product. Moreover, it should enable them to continue innovating in a technologically complex environment and so maintain their intelligence position.

The existing National Sigint Organisation (Nationale Sigint Organisatie, NSO) is to be merged into the new unit. Its main tasks will be intercepting data from wireless communications and conducting research on innovation and continuity in interception.

8.2 Co-operation with Regional Intelligence Units

The forthcoming establishment of a national police service and all the organisational changes which that entails have caused a reorientation of the AIVD's relationship with Regional Intelligence Units (Regionale Inlichtingendiensten, RIDs). The project RID2015 aims to improve these units' efficiency in the timely discernment of emerging threats in their regions.

It is vitally important that relevant incidents and developments be identified as quickly as possible in order to counter any risk or threat associated with them. At the regional level, the police and the RID play a key role in this task. The RID informs the AIVD about developments in its area, performs supporting operational duties and also acts as the official and administrative link between the service and the police in the region.

8.3 Co-operation with the international network of partner services

The AIVD is also actively endeavouring to work more closely with its network of intelligence and security partners abroad. Efficient co-operation in such areas as technological development and the establishment of joint projects should enhance the effectiveness of these relationships.

8.4 Cyber security

Dependence upon digital technologies is only going to increase in the future. This applies equally to the vital sectors and to social and commercial communications between the public, businesses and government agencies. To increase the nation's resilience in the face of attempts to disrupt these technologies, a National Cyber Security Centre (Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum, NCSC) was established in 2011. The AIVD works closely with this body to ensure that the service is involved fully in the response to any cyber attack that might endanger national security. It also supplies the NCSC with expertise to assist in the identification and understanding of such attacks and to help safeguard digital information.

8.5 Travel movements

The AIVD draws upon a variety of data flows to enhance its intelligence position. The ability to access and exploit collections of third-party data is of huge importance to the service's primary process. It is therefore investing in the specific human expertise and technologies needed to process and analyse those ever-increasing flows. One of them comprises details of travel movements, since the international nature of terrorism makes travel essential to the existence and activities of the networks involved.

This information constitutes an essential addition to the range of data flows already available to the service under its statutory powers. In 2011 the AIVD completed the technical and administrative preparations needed to be able to use travel data in its investigation of terrorist and other threats.

Globalisation has vastly increased international movements, including the number of people entering and leaving the Netherlands through Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. This growth necessitates a new approach to border controls. Under the auspices of the Border Management Innovation Programme (Programma Vernieuwing Grensmanagement, PVGM), a number of government agencies and private partners are working to improve the current process. As one of the participants, the AIVD is making its contribution to safe and smooth travel. In the future, the planned National Border Surveillance Information and Analysis Centre (Nationaal Informatie- en Analysecentrum Grenstoezicht, NIAG) will analyse travel data around the clock, with the participating government agencies jointly assessing the security risk posed by particular travellers and the results used to take appropriate precautions. The AIVD is currently involved in setting up the NIAG and will take part in it, contributing knowledge and expertise in counter-terrorism and the protection of national security.

8.6 Developments in information management

The work of the AIVD is very much reliant upon the service's ability to process and analyse vast amounts of information very quickly. That helps it to identify threats to national security at an early stage. For this reason, it is imperative that the service possesses the most modern, cost-effective and efficient information systems to support its operational intelligence work. To that end, in 2011 the AIVD received structural ICT investment funding to strengthen its sigint capacity, to improve the processing of major international data flows, to enhance ICT provision for RIDs and to safeguard the continuity of the service's own information systems.


Also in 2011, an independent consultancy conducted an audit of the AIVD information management organisation. Its results and recommendations are already being used to make improvements in this area.

In terms of system development, the following results were achieved in 2011.

- The AIVD developed a new system for document management and work process support. With the development activities completed in 2011, the system is now being implemented and integrated into the service's work processes, and the users trained.
- Once the new document management system has been implemented, the AIVD will begin the service-wide rollout of a new target registration and analysis system. A small-scale initial version of this was delivered and tested in 2011.
- The AIVD implemented a new personnel management system, developed in partnership with government HR services agency P-Direkt.
- Security screening processes are now supported by a newly implemented capacity management system.
- A new version of the AIVD's system for processing and analysing sigint data was delivered.

The chart below breaks down AIVD primary process staffing capacity by statutory task, as of 31 December 2011.


Distribution of staffing capacity (full-time equivalents) in the primary process.



8.7 Operations

In millions of euros	2009	2010	2011
Expenditure	189.7	191.0	197.8
General expenditure	181.5	182.7	189.2
Confidential expenditure	8.2	8.3	8.6

AIVD expenditure in 2010.





9 Accountability and control

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is ultimately responsible for the proper functioning and effective performance of the AIVD. The service reports to the minister, who in turn is accountable to Parliament.

The Dutch intelligence and security services are subject to an extensive system of scrutiny and control. For example, the independent Intelligence and Security Services Regulatory Commission (Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CTIVD) ensures that both the AIVD and its military counterpart, the MIVD, perform their statutory tasks lawfully. Beyond that, Parliament scrutinises the service through the Intelligence and Security Services Committee (Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CIVD). This standing committee of the House of Representatives (Second Chamber of the States-General) is entitled to inspect the AIVD's secret annual plan, its quarterly performance reports, the secret appendix to the annual report and so on. Moreover, the House as a whole – and its Home Affairs Select Committee (Commissie voor Binnenlandse Zaken) in particular – monitors the service through public documents such as the published versions of the annual plan and annual report. In addition to the CTIVD, a number of independent external bodies oversee certain aspects of AIVD activity. The Netherlands Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer) checks the legitimacy of its income and expenditure, and also studies its policy efficiency and effectiveness, whilst the National Audit Office (Rijksauditedienst) scrutinises its financial management. Members of the public can complain to the National Ombudsman (Nationale ombudsman) about any aspect of government work which affects them, including AIVD activities. Finally, the Dutch criminal, civil and administrative courts all have jurisdiction over the service.

9.1 Parliament

Two plenary sessions of the House of Representatives specifically addressed the work of the AIVD in 2011, on 29 June and 8 December. In addition, the service contributed to other sessions on such matters as counter-terrorism and the DigiNotar affair (see Chapter 3).

On 29 June the House debated the AIVD's 2010 annual report, its annual plan for 2011, its conduct of security screening procedures, the matter concerning Dutch politician and activist Roel van Duijn, its investigation of the Muslim its investigation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Netherlands and a CTIVD report on its fulfilment of its foreign intelligence task.

In December the House returned to the Van Duijn case, and also discussed government preparations for the release of the controversial film *Fitna* by Dutch politician Geert Wilders and a CTIVD review of official reports issued by the AIVD between October 2005 and May 2010.

In June the members of the Home Affairs and Security and Justice standing committees paid a working visit to the AIVD, during which they were briefed in some detail about its operational priorities. Following media reports about the interception of telephone calls by the service, the Praesidium of the House of Representatives (the Speaker and deputy speakers) attended a presentation on ways of better safeguarding telephony traffic. Finally, the AIVD assisted in preparing the answers to numerous parliamentary questions on topical matters.

9.2 Intelligence and Security Services Committee (CIVD)

Under the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, Wiv 2002), the ministers of the Interior and Defence are empowered to inform Parliament in confidence about the methods, resources and secret sources used by the Dutch intelligence and security services, and about their current level of knowledge.

They do this through the CIVD, which consists of the parliamentary leaders of all parties with elected members in the House of Representatives, with the exception of any group which may have split from an established party during the current session.

In 2011 the AIVD updated the CIVD on operational activities through its quarterly performance reports. The committee also discussed the secret appendices to the annual report and annual plan. More specifically, it considered issues including the threat to the Netherlands from cyber attacks, the Muslim Brotherhood, fulfilment of the foreign intelligence task and the repercussions of the death of Osama bin Laden.

The CIVD also paid a working visit to the service and received special briefings on developments in North Africa, the Middle East and Iran.

9.3 Intelligence and Security Services Regulatory Commission (CTIVD)

The CTIVD is an independent body which oversees compliance with the Wiv 2002 and the Security Screening Act (Wet Veiligheidsonderzoeken, Wvo) by the AIVD and the MIVD. It produced three regulatory reports in 2011: on AIVD fulfilment of its foreign intelligence task, on the role of both services in a failed military evacuation operation in Libya and on the official reports issued by the AIVD between October 2005 and May 2010. All three, together with a ministerial response to each, were later submitted to Parliament. The report on the Libya operation is to be debated by the House of Representatives during the first quarter of 2012. It has already considered the other two.

For more information, please refer to the CTIVD website (www.ctivd.nl), where the committee's reports and the minister's responses are published. The CTIVD also publishes its own annual report, which can be found on the website.

9.4 Council for the Intelligence and Security Services (RIV)

The RIV is a Cabinet subcommittee chaired by the Prime Minister and including the ministers of the Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Security and Justice. The preparatory work for its meetings is carried out by the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Services Committee (Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Nederland, CVIN). The council discusses topics relevant to government security policy in the light of analyses produced by those services.

In 2011 they included the threat from cyber attacks and developments in North Africa, the Middle East and Iran, as well as the quarterly National Intelligence Overview (National Inlichtingenbeeld), the AIVD's 2010 annual report and its annual plan for 2011.

10 Legislation and legal matters

10.1 Amendments to the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002

At the beginning of 2011, the Dutch Senate (First Chamber of the States-General) was considering a proposed amendment (parliamentary paper 30 553) to the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, Wiv 2002). On 17 March, however, with the assent of Her Majesty the Queen and on behalf of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defence and the Minister of Security and Justice as well as himself, the Minister of the Interior informed both houses of Parliament in writing (parliamentary paper 30 553, no. 18) that the said amendment was to be withdrawn. He also stated that certain aspects thereof, where necessary updated, were to be incorporated into a new bill to be tabled at a later date. That bill is currently in preparation.

10.2 The National Police Service and the Intelligence and Security Services Act

Under Article 60, clause 1, of the Wiv 2002, the chief constables of the Dutch police forces are designated for legal purposes as functionaries who may carry out duties for the AIVD. Clause 2 of the same article states that the chief constables may, by agreement with the Minister of the Interior, appoint subordinates to actually perform and supervise those duties. In practice, these provisions enable a force to establish a Regional Intelligence Unit (Regionale Inlichtingendienst, RID). The forthcoming creation of the National Police Service – a single police force for the whole country, with one commissioner replacing the regional chief constables – means that Article 60 will have to be amended. The necessary changes, as well as those found in Article 62 concerning the duty of notification by police officers, are contained in Article 10 of the Police Bill (wetsvoorstel Invoerings- en aanpassingswet Politiewet, parliamentary paper 32 822) currently before Parliament. In addition, Article 7 of that bill provides for a transitional arrangement to maintain the existing powers of current RID personnel once the new law enters force.

10.3 Complaints

Twenty-four formal complaints concerning alleged activities by the AIVD were received in 2011. Of those dealt with during the year, one was upheld in line with Intelligence and Security Services Regulatory Commission (Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CTIVD) advice. In one case the minister and the CTIVD were unable to establish whether or not the complaint should be upheld. All the other instances referred to the committee were dismissed by it or declared patently unfounded.

Several complaints were either not admitted, pursuant to Article 9:8 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht), or were dealt with to the satisfaction of the complainant. One was withdrawn and three are being dealt with in 2012.

The National Ombudsman also received one complaint concerning the AIVD in 2011. He has yet to report his findings on this matter. However, he did issue a report concerning a complaint submitted in 2010. In this he ruled that it is inappropriate for the minister concerned unilaterally to treat a request to comply with the duty of notification as an application to inspect a dossier. The minister has since promised that, from now on, such applicants will first be informed that the law does not provide for members of the public to request a notification report. He has also offered to treat such requests as applications for inspection only if the applicant so wishes.

10.4 Freedom of information requests

Under freedom of information rules, anyone is entitled to submit a request to inspect material the AIVD may hold about them. Much use was again made of that right in 2011. However, a number of restrictions apply to this form of disclosure. For example, it covers only information which is not relevant to current AIVD activities. And even outdated material cannot be inspected if that would or might compromise the service's sources and methods. Moreover, a person may only inspect their own record or that of their deceased spouse, registered partner, child or parent. The procedure and conditions are described in more detail online, at www.aivd.nl.

The tables below show the number and nature of the freedom of information requests submitted, and how they were dealt with.

Freedom of information requests	Submitted	Dealt with	Granted
Initial requests	177	178	79
Objections	22	19	-
Appeals	6	6	-
Further appeals	1	2	-

Subject of request	Submitted	Dealt with	Granted
Applicant	84	92	31
Deceased relative	33	34	11
Non-personal matters	53	44	37
Third party	7	8	-
Total	177	178	79

	Completed	Upheld	Dismissed	Inadmissible
Objections	19	14	3	2
Appeals	6	3	3	-
Further appeals	2	2	-	-

10.5 Notification

Article 34, clause 1, of the Wiv 2002 imposes a duty of notification upon the AIVD. Specifically, it requires that, five years after the completion of certain investigations involving its special powers, the service reviews whether the subjects can be notified that they were investigated. Since this regulation only covers enquiries regulated under the Wiv 2002, which entered into force on 29 May of that year, the duty of notification has effectively existed only since 29 May 2007, five years later. Moreover, compliance with it may be annulled, deferred or suspended if, for example, the subject is untraceable or an ongoing investigation might be compromised. The same applies if notification could endanger sources or damage international relations. Partly for these reasons, the service has not yet issued any such notifications. The CTIVD continues to closely monitor the service's policy and practice in respect of this obligation.

In an earlier regulatory report on AIVD compliance with the duty of notification (*Toezichtrapport naar de rechtmatigheid van de uitvoering van de notificatieplicht door de AIVD*, no. 24, 2010), the CTIVD noted that the service would be unable to exercise its duty in 43 per cent of cases reviewed because the subjects of the original enquiries are untraceable. In response, the AIVD has taken measures to improve its ability to locate persons it has previously investigated. For example, it now consults population registers (Gemeentelijke basisadministratie, GBA), RID files and Tax and Customs Administration (Belastingdienst) records in search of current addresses. This has reduced the proportion of untraceable subjects in searches conducted in 2011 to 10.5 per cent.

Glossary

Activism

The general name for the phenomenon where people or groups, outside the parliamentary system but within the limits of the law, strive to improve the rights and living conditions of individuals, groups and also animals.

Al-Qaeda

In current usage, this refers collectively to both core Al-Qaeda and to networks associated with it. These are allied with one another ideologically: the leaders of local groups adopt the ideology of international jihad propounded by core Al-Qaeda and swear their allegiance to its late leader, Osama bin Laden. They subsequently use the name Al-Qaeda, followed by the name of the area where they are active. Examples are Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). These groups may support the international jihad, but they also clearly have their own individual agendas. There is not necessarily any co-operation or control relationship between core Al-Qaeda and the allied networks. Because the term Al-Qaeda can refer to different groups, its use presents difficulties in practice. As a rule, then, the specific name of the organisation in question is used.

CBRNe weapons

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and home-made explosives.

Countries of concern

Countries suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and which pursue objectives that may pose a threat to the international legal order and to the security and interests of the Netherlands and its allies.

Delivery systems

Means of delivery necessary for the effective use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft.

Dual-use goods

Goods or materials which can be used for either civilian or military purposes. This term is used in the fight against further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Extreme

Individuals, groups or organisations are defined as extreme when their actions extend to, but do not cross, the boundaries of what is acceptable within a democratic legal framework.

Extremism, extremist

The phenomenon whereby people and groups, when striving to improve the rights and living conditions of individuals, groups or animals, deliberately commit illegal and sometimes violent acts. Those who act in this way are called extremists.

Intolerant isolationism

A form of radicalism, on ethnic, religious, ideological or political grounds, which involves highly intolerant attitudes towards other sections of the population and so seeks to create so-called "enclaves" for its own group. In those domains, there is no place for groups from different ethnic backgrounds or with dissenting religious, ideological or political views (exclusivism). In many cases, efforts are also made to impose the dominant group's own laws and standards over those of the Western host nation (parallelism).

Islamism, islamist

A radical movement within Islam which seeks to make society a reflection of what it claims is prescribed in the original sources of the faith: the Koran and the sunnah (the sayings and practices of the Prophet). Islamism has a political agenda, which may find its expression in violent, non-violent or even democratic forms, and is related to Salafism.

Jihadism

An extremist ideology based upon the glorification of violent jihad, or holy warfare.

Jihadist network

A fluid, dynamic, vaguely delineated structure consisting of a number of radical Muslims with some form of mutual association, both individually and at a collective level in the form of cells or groups. At least temporarily, they are linked by a common purpose: the pursuit of a jihadist aim. For the AIVD, a person involved with a jihadist network is classified as a member if they play an active part in it and consciously contribute towards achieving the jihadist goal.

National security domain

See Safety and Security System.

Official report

A notification, usually in writing, to an individual or institution concerning personal or other details obtained by the AIVD that could be of interest to the recipient in discharging their responsibilities and taking relevant action.

Position involving confidentiality

A job or other appointment in which abuse of office could seriously compromise national security or other important interests of the state. This is the case when there is access to state secrets, when a lapse of integrity could endanger national security and in certain specific positions in vital sectors.

Proliferation

The spread of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, radiological or biological) and of their delivery systems.

Radicalisation

An increasing willingness to pursue and/or support fundamental changes in society, possibly by undemocratic means which are in conflict with or could pose a threat to the democratic legal order.

Radicalism

The pursuit and/or support of fundamental changes in society that would endanger the democratic legal order, possibly by undemocratic means which are themselves in conflict with that order.

Safety and Security System

A co-operative arrangement, led by the Safety and Security Unit of the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism and Security (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, NCTV) on behalf of the Dutch government, which bears responsibility for the security of people, property and services within the so-called “national security domain” in the Netherlands. The AIVD provides threat information concerning these subjects within the Safety and Security System framework.

Salafism

A broad ideological current which seeks a literal return to the “pure” Islam of the faith’s early period.

Security screening

An investigation of an individual in search of facts and circumstances which, on grounds of national security, may be relevant to their holding a specific position involving confidentiality.

Separatism

Attempts by a particular section of a population to shake off existing national ties and establish a state of its own.

Sigint

Signals intelligence: the interception and localisation of electronic signals transmitted on radio frequencies.

Special intelligence resources

Technical and other instruments which are deployed in the exercise of a special power under the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act and which are usually secret in nature.

Terrorism

Ideologically motivated actual or threatened violence against persons, property or the fabric of society, with the aim of bringing about social change, creating fear amongst the population or influencing the political decision-making process.

Violent jihad

Armed struggle against supposed enemies of Islam, legitimised by the invocation of Islamic legal doctrine.

Vital sectors

Sectors and sections of the national infrastructure which are so crucial that their failure or serious disruption could cause major damage to Dutch society.

AIVD publications in 2011

- *Leidraad aanwijzing vertrouwensfuncties vitale sectoren* (December 2011). Guidelines for the designation of positions involving confidentiality in the vital sectors.
- *AIVD Jaarverslag 2010* (April 2011). Also published in English as *AIVD Annual Report 2010*.
- *Tegen de stroom in, voor de nationale veiligheid* (February 2011).
AIVD corporate brochure. Against the current, for national security.
- *Handleiding Kwetsbaarheidsonderzoek spionage* (January 2011).
Handbook for espionage vulnerability reviews.

These and other AIVD publications can be downloaded from the service's website, www.aivd.nl. Past annual reports are available at www.aivdkennisbank.nl.

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