

# General Intelligence and Security Service

*Annual Report 2007*



General Intelligence and Security Service



*Per undas adversas*

## Annual Report 2007

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### General Intelligence and Security Service AIVD

*The AIVD safeguards the national security of the Netherlands by identifying threats and risks which are not immediately visible. To this end, it conducts investigations both inside and outside the country. Where necessary, the AIVD shares information so that partners and other interested parties can take appropriate measures. The AIVD identifies risks and advises and mobilises third parties. If necessary, it actively works to reduce risks itself. The service thus has a clear position in the network of official organisations dedicated to the protection of national and international security.*



## Foreword

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The work of the AIVD is very wide-ranging and attracts notice from all sections of society. Its findings in 2007, especially the results of investigations into terrorism and radicalisation, have been extensively discussed by politicians, public administrators and the media. Two reports in particular, *The radical dawa in transition – the rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands* and *Animal rights activism in the Netherlands – springboard for Europe*, attracted wide interest. However, I would like to take the opportunity presented by the publication of this annual report to draw attention to another aspect of the service's work which is seldom highlighted in its own right: the international orientation of the AIVD.

Developments at a global level have a huge impact upon all aspects of Dutch society. Those who take decisions on domestic matters cannot ignore what is happening abroad. Our national interests are increasingly being influenced by opportunities as well as threats from outside the sovereign territory of the Netherlands. This situation demands intensive cross-border co-operation and a strong international awareness in intelligence work. Fortunately, that is a challenge to which the AIVD is rising.

There is broad public support for the work carried out by the AIVD. In my view, that is essential given the exceptional powers enjoyed by the service and the special tasks with which it is entrusted. To retain that support, though, the people of the Netherlands must be confident that the AIVD is responding appropriately to changes in our society. The first chapter of this report shows that it is fully aware of how internationalisation is affecting its areas of work.

To me, this is a prime example of the service's forward-looking approach. It certainly confirms my confidence that the AIVD is ready to continue pursuing its core task in 2008: notifying authorities and its partners of threats to national security which might not be properly identified otherwise .

Dr. G. ter Horst  
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations



## The AIVD in short

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The AIVD carries out investigations in the Netherlands and abroad, in order to identify threats and risks to national security in time. These may be directed against Dutch society as a whole, or against individual citizens. They include threats of violence intended to bring about fundamental social change or to undermine the democratic process, but also efforts to disrupt civil society or to restrict the constitutional freedoms enjoyed by particular groups or individuals. In addition, the AIVD investigates risks to or threats against vital public services like water and energy supply, transport systems and telecommunications, as well as the dangers associated with classified government information falling into unauthorised hands.

Persons and organisations responsible for threats of this kind make every effort to conceal their activities. The AIVD focuses upon risks and threats which have yet to manifest themselves openly, so that preventive measures can be taken in time. In so doing, the AIVD is allowed to make use of special investigative powers under the Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wiv).

The AIVD informs and advises public administrators, policymakers and other relevant parties at local, national and international levels. Using the information received, they can develop and adjust policies and take appropriate action. The service thus has both an advisory and a mobilising role: its products may contribute to or trigger the development of policy, but also prompt preventive measures such as heightened airport security or enforcement activity – arrests based upon an official notice, for example. Under certain circumstances, and when no other effective measures are available, the AIVD itself may also act to reduce a particular risk.

The AIVD is an official agency directed by and accountable to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. In performing its duties, it co-operates with many domestic and international institutions and individual members of the public.



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## List of definitions

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### Agent

A person who, instructed by and reporting to the AIVD, is assigned to gather specific intelligence concerning persons and/or organisations. They may do this under an assumed identity or position, but not necessarily. The information in question is either of potential relevance to the AIVD's performance of its own task or could assist the service in taking measures to protect others.

### Al-Qaeda

In current usage, this refers collectively to both the 'core' Al-Qaeda and to like-minded terrorist organisations in various parts of the world. Organisations which join in with core Al-Qaeda do not establish any organisational ties with it, but instead affirm their allegiance to its international jihadist agenda. Such a joining is only recognised when both parties have acknowledged it. This is usually done through public statements by Ayman al-Zawahiri, on behalf of the core organisation, and a spokesman for the organisation in question.

### AQUA (Appropriately Qualified Agency)

A security organisation of a European Union member state which, by virtue of satisfying the EU standards in that regard, is qualified to carry out so-called 'second-party evaluations' of communications encryption equipment, regardless of its country of manufacture. The Netherlands acts as an AQUA alongside France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy.

### Caliphate

A state ruled by the earthly successors of the Prophet Muhammad.

### CBRN terrorism

Exercising of or threatening with violence against persons or causing serious damage to, property or the fabric of society using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials, with the aim of bringing about social change or influencing the political decision-making process.

### Classified information

Information will be classified either ‘confidential’ (‘confidentieel’), ‘secret’ (‘geheim’) or ‘top secret’ (‘zeer geheim’) if the disclosure to unauthorised persons might be detrimental to the interest of the Dutch state and/or its allies.

If the disclosure to unauthorised persons might be detrimental to the interest of one or more ministries information may be classified ‘restricted’ (‘departementaal vertrouwelijk’).

### Core Al-Qaeda

The depleted remainder of the ‘old’ Al-Qaeda which was based in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, had a membership of jihadists drawn from throughout the Arab world and, after the US-led invasion in 2001, was driven from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

This group includes the first generation of Al-Qaeda leaders, amongst them Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri. It is now called ‘core Al-Qaeda’ to distinguish it from the larger pre-2001 organisation in Afghanistan.

### Counter-terrorism Infobox (CT Infobox)

A partnership of the AIVD, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), the National Police Services Agency (KLPD), the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), the Public Prosecution Service (OM), the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD-ECD) and the Netherlands Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-NL), with the AIVD as lead agency. Its aim is to combat terrorism by centrally compiling and comparing information. This concerns people and networks involved in some way with terrorism, particularly Islamist violence, and the associated radicalisation. The CT Infobox advises the participating agencies and others about the desirability of releasing information, as well as on opportunities to use the criminal law, immigration law, administrative sanctions or intelligence-related measures in the fight against terrorism.

### Countries of concern

Countries suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and which pursue objectives that may pose a threat to the international legal order and to the security and interests of the Netherlands and its allies.

### Dawa

In Arabic, the ‘call to Islam’. The AIVD uses this term to refer to peaceful activities intended to persuade as many Muslims as possible to profess the faith actively. In the case of non-practising Muslims, that means returning them to active religion. See also: ‘Radical dawa’.

### Delivery systems

Means of delivery necessary for the effective use of CBRN weapons, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aircrafts.

### Dual-use goods

Goods or materials which can be used for either civilian or military purposes.

### Fundamentalism

In Islam, a movement which combines a literal interpretation of scripture in social and intellectual isolation with an intolerant attitude towards those of other persuasions.

### Intolerant isolationism

A form of radicalism, on ethnic, religious, ideological or political grounds, which involves highly intolerant attitudes towards other sections of the population and so seeks to create so-called 'enclaves' for its 'own' group. In those domains there is no place for groups from different ethnic backgrounds or with dissenting religious, ideological or political views (exclusivism). In many cases, efforts are also made to impose the dominant group's own laws and standards over those of the western host nation (parallelism).

### Islamism

A radical movement within Islam which seeks to make society a reflection of what it claims is prescribed in the original sources of the faith: the Koran and the Sunnah, i.e. the sayings and practices of the Prophet. Islamism has a political agenda, which may find its expression in violent, non-violent or even democratic forms. Related terms: 'Salafism' and 'Wahhabism'.

### Jihadism

An extremist ideology based upon the glorification of violent jihad, or 'holy war'.

### Jihadist network

A fluid, dynamic, vaguely delineated structure consisting of a number of radical Muslims with some form of mutual association, both individually and at a collective level in the form of cells or groups. At least temporarily, they are linked by a common purpose: the pursuit of a jihadist aim. For the AIVD, a person involved with a jihadist network is classified as a 'member' if they play an active part in it and consciously contribute towards achieving the jihadist goal.

Based upon their member profiles, strategy and methods, the AIVD distinguishes between three kinds of jihadist networks: transnational, internationally-oriented



local and autonomous local. However, these distinctions should only be regarded as providing a model to describe reality:

*Transnational jihadist networks* are groups which transcend national borders in their efforts to achieve objectives related to the violent jihad.

*Internationally-oriented local jihadist networks* confine their activities in pursuit of those objectives to the Netherlands. They do not work with networks in other countries, but are in contact with them. As a result, they may come under the influence of jihadists abroad.

*Autonomous local jihadist networks* are also confined to the Netherlands, but do not have international contacts.

### Jihadist terrorism

Actual or threatened jihadist violence against persons, property or the fabric of society, with the aim of bringing about societal change or influencing the political decision-making process.

### Vital sectors

Sectors and sections of the national infrastructure which are so vital to Dutch society that their failure or serious disruption could cause major damage to society.

### National security domain

See: Safety and Security System.

### Official notice

A (written) notification to a person or institution revealing personal details held by the AIVD which could assist the recipient in discharging their public responsibilities. (Dutch: 'ambtsbericht'.)

### Proliferation

The spread of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and of their delivery systems.

### Radical dawa

As an extension of the classical interpretation of the term 'dawa', this refers to radical activities – including but not limited to religious conversion efforts – as performed by, for instance, a variety of missionary movements from the so-called Islamic 'guide nations' in the Middle East. The radical nature of these activities lies in the fact that they seek to fundamentally reform society along strict Islamic lines, in the process eliminating Western constitutional democracy, openness and pluralism.

### Radicalisation

An increasing willingness to pursue and/or support fundamental changes in society, possibly by undemocratic means, which are in conflict with or could pose a threat to the democratic legal order.

### Safety and Security System

The Dutch national system for protecting people, property and services. Its basic principle is that individuals are primarily responsible for their own safety, with the support of any organisation to which they belong and the relevant local authorities. The central government, however, has a special responsibility for certain groups of people (such as politicians), property (such as the International Criminal Court) and services (such as civil aviation). Collectively, these are known as the national security domain ('rijksdomein') and are overseen by the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCTb). In performing this task, he draws upon threat-related information provided by such bodies as the AIVD, the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and the National Police Services Agency (KLPD). (Dutch: 'Stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen'.)

### Salafism

A broad ideological current which seeks a literal return to the 'pure Islam' of the faith's early period.

### Security screening

An investigation of an individual in search of facts or circumstances which, on grounds of national security, may be relevant to filling a positions involving confidentiality.

### Positions involving confidentiality

A job or other appointment in which the holder might be able to compromise national security. This is the case when there is access to state secrets, when a lapse of integrity could endanger national security and in certain specific positions in vital sectors.

### Separatism

Efforts by a particular section of the population to separate itself from existing national ties and establish its own state.

### Sigint

Signals intelligence: the interception and localisation of electronic signals transmitted on radio frequencies.

### Special intelligence resources

Technical and other instruments which are deployed in the exercise of a special power under the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act and which are usually secret in nature.

### Terrorism

Actual or threatened violence against persons, property or the fabric of society, with the aim of bringing about social change or influencing the political decision-making process.

### Terrorism lists

There are several such lists, including those issued by the United Nations and the European Union. The UN list, compiled pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267, contains the names of persons and entities suspected of terrorist activities associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The EU list complements this, also naming individuals and groups not related to Al-Qaeda.

### Third-party rule

In the intelligence and security community, the principle that information received from another service is for the recipient agency's own use only and cannot be provided to third parties without the prior permission of the originating service. Also called the 'third-country rule'.

### Violent jihad

The armed struggle against supposed enemies of Islam, legitimised by the invocation of Islamic legal doctrine.



ARRIVALS

Rotterdam Airport

Rotterdam Airport

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# 1 The internationalisation of the AIVD

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The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) is constantly examining trends and developments which are important to the way it performs its duties. One of the most significant of these developments in recent years has been the extensive internationalisation of our society. This chapter explains how that is affecting the work of the AIVD.

## 1.1 The internationalisation of interests and threats

The AIVD carries out its statutory duties in order to protect the democratic legal order, national security and other key interests of the Dutch state. More than ever before, those interests now have an international dimension. For example, a terrorist attack outside our national borders may have far-reaching political, cultural and economic consequences for the Netherlands. And the same applies to other countries. Many nations have overlapping interests in the stability of particular regions of the world.

Without exception, the current *threats* to our national security have international elements. All degrees of influence are possible here, from distant inspiration by a situation abroad to fully-fledged international groups or movements. Threats may be directed or funded from overseas, or aided and abetted across borders. The AIVD has also observed imitation: activities in neighbouring countries increase the likelihood of something similar happening in the Netherlands.

Events and situations abroad can greatly increase feelings of insecurity or anxiety in our country, and vice versa. Concern about what is going on elsewhere in the world may also prompt some people here to act, by joining a struggle or in some other way. The Netherlands can be used as a meeting place by persons planning activities abroad or as a refuge by those being monitored by foreign security services. Even the resources available to those who threaten national security are international in nature: the information on the Internet is freely available to all, and modern communications are also unrestricted by national frontiers.

In order to serve the interests of Dutch national security effectively, it has become vital to understand the world's troublespots and the political intentions of other nations. This latter aspect is the primary focus of the AIVD's intelligence role.

## 1.2 Myths and misconceptions about international co-operation

As already pointed out, threats of an international nature affect the interests of other nations as well as the Netherlands. Consequently, they lend themselves to – indeed they almost always demand – an international approach. Intelligence and security services themselves realise that co-operation is the key to success. Every service has its own specialisations, information and abilities. There is international co-operation between them at all levels. Yet there remain a number of misconceptions about this collaboration. Below five principal ones are discussed.

*Misconception 1. Security services do not work together.*

Intelligence and security services do work together, frequently and intensively. And they do so at many levels. Strategically, they share their perceptions of long-term developments or discuss particular problems they face – for example, how to deal with the internationalisation of threats. Another level is analytical co-operation. This encompasses the sharing of analyses themselves and of the methods to perform them effectively. Services also exchange much operational information, as when teams are investigating the same subject or network.

Operational collaboration usually takes place on a bilateral basis or a limited multilateral one, with staff from different services tracking the same network of jihadists for example and exchanging information about them. Co-operation on a wider multilateral basis mainly involves the sharing of analyses. The traditional forum for this in Europe has been the so-called Club of Berne, originally a regular meeting of the heads of the region's security services but since expanded to include a host of expert groups. In 2001 the intelligence and security services of the EU member states also formed a specific Counter Terrorism Group (CTG). This provides a platform for the exchange of information, for the threat analyses and the like and for the preparation of operational collaborations. The CTG is not part of the European Union, but does report to a number of its key officials. The EU Joint Situation Centre (SitGen), on the other hand, is a European Union organisation. It forms part of the Council Secretariat and draws up security reports and intelligence analyses about high-risk countries, as well as on relevant counterterrorism topics. These reports are generated through input by individual services and the CTG and are distributed to working groups, committees and officials of the European Union and other international bodies, such as NATO and the United Nations.

*Misconception 2. Security services do not care who they work with.*

The AIVD is in contact with more than 170 foreign intelligence and security services and has liaison officers stationed in thirteen countries to interact directly with local

services. The nature of these contacts varies as much as do the agencies with which they are maintained. Every intelligence and security service has its own structure, powers and responsibilities. And its own position in the national security apparatus. Consequently, the relationships range from minimal formal contact to intensive operational collaboration. In some cases – and particularly with the other members of the Club of Berne – a close working partnership has gradually built up over many years. When contemplating the level of co-operation with another service, the AIVD always gives high priority to human rights considerations.

*Misconception 3. Security services do not share information.*

Information on a wide variety of topics is shared in many different ways: through operational liaisons, on visits to other countries, in consultative forums and over fast, secure digital networks. Important areas in which information is exchanged include terrorism, extremism and country intelligence, but there is also international co-operation in such areas as enhancing security and screening. There are limits to what can be shared, though; for instance, statutory restrictions on the disclosure of personal data must prevail. Moreover, every service is required – usually by law – to keep its sources confidential. After all, the protection of sources is an absolute precondition for the continuing effectiveness of any service. Guaranteed confidentiality is absolutely essential to the ongoing usefulness and safety of vulnerable sources, human or otherwise.

There are other reasons why it is not always obvious to the outside world that information is being shared. Services must be cautious in releasing material to organisations which are not part of the intelligence community. It is very important that their methods and current level of knowledge remain secret. The co-operation between services is based upon agreements about the correct handling of sensitive matter. One simple yet highly effective principle in this respect is the so-called ‘third-party rule’. This states that information and data received from another service may only be passed on with the prior permission of the provider. In this case, both foreign recipients and other domestic agencies are classified as third parties. In other words, the AIVD requires explicit consent from the originating service before it can share information it receives with, say, another service, the Public Prosecution Service or a Dutch ministry. In the Netherlands, this principle is enshrined in law. Not only does it guarantee that sources are protected, and hence the continuity of information flows, but it also ensures that information continues to be verifiable. This is because the dissemination of it remains under the control of its first provider. The uncontrolled spread of material from a single source can easily give rise to the impression that it actually comes from multiple sources, and so perhaps seems more reliable than it really is. The third-party rule also ensures that a security service can disclose material without



revealing the source. It does also mean, though, that the extent of the co-operation between services tends to be underestimated.

*Misconception 4. Co-operation has to be forced by setting up international agencies and extending international regulations.*

In the wake of the attacks in the United States, Madrid and London, security in general and the fight against terrorism in particular have become an increasingly prominent part of international political co-operation in recent years. This heightened attention to the matter is a good thing. But a number of essential limitations do still need to be taken into account if the security and intelligence services are to continue doing their job effectively. As these are often overlooked, the most important of them are outlined below:

- Security and intelligence services are concerned with national security. This is an area in which national powers are never transferred to the European Union, a fact clearly reiterated in the recent Treaty of Lisbon. That even states explicitly that the member states themselves are responsible for the organisation and conduct of co-operation between their security services. The European Union can facilitate aspects of that co-operation, by providing financial support, for example, or by encouraging the sharing of best practices;
- Ensuring that sources are protected is an essential part of co-operation. And an intelligence and security service can only achieve that if it retains complete control over the information it holds, since that can by its very nature and content lead back to the source – quite possibly unintentionally. Services must therefore be able to decide on a case by case basis whether to disclose particular information, and how that should be done. If sources are not protected, that can seriously undermine the willingness of individuals and organisations to co-operate with the services. The value of information is in part dependent upon the position and reliability of the source, so it must be possible to interpret and collate it based upon knowledge of those factors;
- Observance of the third-party rule is essential to the co-operative relationship between intelligence and security services. If they were to be compelled to pass on material obtained from other services, the rule would be breached. So, whilst disclosure requirements may be intended to encourage the exchange of information, in practice they would severely impair the access to information because the amount of material shared by agencies within the European Union – and certainly the amount coming from elsewhere in the world – would fall sharply. Quite simply, other services would refuse to provide information if they knew it was going to be revealed to others.

When assessing proposed new regulations in such areas as the exchange of information, it is important to look first at whether structures for that process are already in place. The added value to be derived from the new rules needs to be thoroughly considered. The fact that the current extent of international co-operation is not widely known, along with the existence of certain specific restrictions on how services work together, sometimes makes it less obvious why new regulations or initiatives to establish new bodies would not always be beneficial.

*Misconception 5. The Dutch security service plays no part on the international stage.*

As the AIVD has grown in recent years, so it has become an increasingly important partner at the international level. The service has become accustomed to playing an active role in multilateral forums, moreover, it is now increasingly expected of the AIVD to introduce new initiatives. The Netherlands is a strong proponent of and investor in international co-operation. For example, the AIVD was involved in the EU Joint Situation Centre almost from the moment of its foundation and has had a member of staff seconded there since 2002. Also the establishment of the CTG, building upon a working group of the Club of Berne, was a Dutch initiative.

At the practical level, too, other countries can call upon the AIVD: to monitor an international network planning a terrorist attack, for example, or in helping to unravel complex global acquisition schemes for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. Doing so the AIVD can make an immediate contribution. Important successes have been achieved, many of them unknown to the public. Such forms of co-operation also better equip the service itself to understand the international aspects of security issues.

The AIVD actively keeps those responsible for particular national security interests abreast of developments, thus also making its contribution to Dutch foreign policy. It has a specific role to play as well, in preparing and effecting official visits abroad by Dutch government ministers and, conversely, visits to the Netherlands by foreign dignitaries.

### 1.3 Conclusion

International co-operation is hugely important. The internationalisation of security threats and interests in recent years has only increased the need for intensive cross-border collaboration, and the AIVD's readiness to participate in it. Political and media pressure for noticeable interaction has also increased; for example, there have been calls for European intelligence and security services to share information with other

organisations. The AIVD fully endorses the need for co-operation, but always puts the quality of the end result before outward form and visibility. The confidentiality surrounding the work of security services means that much of their work together necessarily remains hidden from general view. Consequently, but unjustly, this aspect of the service's activities is often cast in a negative light. Politicians and the public need to trust that collaboration is happening, and that the AIVD remains reliable, objective and principled in these dealings. The AIVD intends to continue playing a prominent role in international co-operation between intelligence and security agencies.





## 2 Terrorism

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### 2.1 Jihadist terrorism

Jihadist terrorism, the armed struggle against the West and other perceived ‘enemies of Islam’, remains a danger to the Netherlands – not least against the background of events in neighbouring countries with a similar threat profile. Below the outline of the main recent international developments associated with this phenomenon:

- There has been a shift in the source and nature of the threat. Whereas it used to come principally from autonomous local networks, internationally-oriented local networks now also present a danger to the West;
- This increase in the conceivable threat to the West – the Netherlands included – from internationally-oriented local networks occurred primarily during the second half of 2007. It has not resulted in re-adjustment of the overall threat level, however;
- From the known threats in neighbouring countries, the AIVD can discern a shift in the international orientation of these networks. In the past, they were concerned mainly with supporting and sometimes recruiting for the violent jihad in traditional conflict zones. Now, though, they also seem to be focusing upon travelling abroad for training before returning to pursue their struggle in the West. This appears to have added a new dimension to the jihadist threat;
- The degree of influence on European jihadist networks and individuals from Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region is increasing;
- The AIVD has discerned signs that core Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan is recovering, and that its influence as one of the primary sources of inspiration for jihadists around the world has further increased;
- Early in November, Al-Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Laith al-Libi, till his death in the beginning of 2008 leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), announced that that group had affiliated with Al-Qaeda. In the longer term, this development could pose a threat to Europe.

The main developments related to jihadist terrorism in the Netherlands in 2007 were as follows:

- After a period of relative calm within known autonomous local networks, some increase in activity was observed during the year. So far, however, no concrete threat has been identified;
- Members of autonomous local networks exhibited a heightened interest in jihad in traditional conflict zones, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. No actual departures to join the jihad were identified, but it is conceivable that they may eventually occur;

- Although no concrete threat to the nation from that quarter has yet been identified, there was a discernible increase in jihadist influence within the Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands.

### ***How is a threat assessment arrived at?***

When assessing the danger posed by jihadist terrorism, the matter is approached from two perspectives: the known or concrete threat and the conceivable one. A known threat is calculated based upon an analysis of what is known about jihadist networks and cells, and about the processes of radicalisation which play a part in their creation. The conceivable threat is assessed by looking first and foremost at the context (comparing developments in the Netherlands with those abroad), at the national profile (the extent to which this country is regarded as a target by potential terrorists) and, in specific cases, at timing (special dates or events). The final threat assessment comes from weighing up the combination of all these factors. Logically, since it is demonstrable, the known threat weighs most heavily in this process. Too great an emphasis upon the potential aspects could result in the threat being exaggerated.

#### **2.1.1 International developments in jihadist terrorism**

The terrorist threat abroad in 2007 came mainly from local jihadist networks and cells. Most of these operate autonomously and determine their, usually local, agendas without international guidance. However, a number of the plotters of foiled attacks in Denmark and Germany were found to be in contact with networks in Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, raising the possibility that interference from this part of the world is increasing. In the German case, there were links with the Islamic Jihadist Union (IJU) – originally an Uzbek organisation – on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The IJU's ability to carry out attacks in Europe has increased.

Particularly in the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark and southern Europe, there were specific threats from internationally-oriented local networks. As a result, the potential risk to the whole of Western Europe – the Netherlands included – increased, particularly during the second half of 2007. This has not resulted in adjustment of the overall threat level, however.

Local jihadist networks in the West find much of their motivation and ideological basis in international tensions and conflicts. The strategic struggle against the West is a particular source of inspiration; the West is viewed as the enemy of Islam and as propping up what they see as apostate regimes in the Muslim world. Although, as a rule, there are no organisational or hierarchical relationships between international networks like core Al-Qaeda on the one hand and locally active groups on the other, the

latter most definitely feel themselves to be part of the global jihad and they endeavour to further the objectives of core Al-Qaeda and its related networks. These are the eventual restoration of the Caliphate throughout the Muslim world and, in the more immediate future, weakening the position of the current 'apostate' governments in Islamic countries. The relationship between core Al-Qaeda and the other jihadist networks mentioned can be regarded more as a kind of 'franchising' than as a structured organisational connection.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Palestinian situation play an important role in discussions between jihadists. For many, these issues are the primary framework of reference in assessing the position of Muslims in relation to the West – and hence also that of Muslims *in* the West – and they dominate the hostile view of the world propagated by the networks. Jihadists are still leaving North Africa, the Arabian peninsula and the Middle East for Iraq, to join one or other of the insurgent groups active there. Networks in the countries bordering Iraq, especially Syria and Saudi Arabia, facilitate their movement. A few people from Europe have taken a similar path, although their numbers are tiny by comparison.

Amongst Western jihadist Muslims, there is also a growing interest in the conflict in Somalia – this despite the fall of Mogadishu to Ethiopian forces at the end of 2006 and the expulsion from the capital of militias loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts.

A shift has been discerned in the international orientation of local jihadist networks. In the past, they were concerned mainly with supporting and sometimes recruiting for the jihad in traditional conflict zones. Now, though, they also – perhaps even primarily – seem to be focusing upon travelling to those regions for training before returning to pursue their struggle in the West. This adds a new dimension to the jihadist threat in the Netherlands and elsewhere.

There were various signs in 2007 that core Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan is recovering in strength, and that the influence of its ideology as one of the primary sources of inspiration for jihadists around the world has increased. The conflict in Afghanistan is a growing appeal to them. Core Al-Qaeda and the Taliban launch attacks inside Afghanistan from the tribal areas of Pakistan, which have their own power structure and are largely inaccessible to the national government and military. Jihadist recruits are trained at mobile camps here, and fighters withdraw to the tribal areas after operations in Afghanistan.

On 27 December 2007, Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), was killed in a suicide bombing shortly after a party rally in the city of Rawalpindi. At



the time of writing, no concrete information about the assassins' backgrounds was available. It is likely, however, that jihadists or Taliban-related extremists were involved in the attack.

The jihadist struggle in North Africa received a boost late in 2006, with the establishment of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This was created when the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, GSPC) joined to Al-Qaeda. AQIM has links with Moroccan, Tunisian and Libyan cells and individuals, and with networks in the Sahel. By associating itself with Al-Qaeda, the GSPC has to some extent internationalised its agenda; France and Spain are specifically named as enemies in AQIM's public statements. In practice, though, the group's activities remain confined to Algeria, mostly in the form of attacks on elements of the government security apparatus.

Algeria is one of the few nations to have experienced the return of jihadist veterans of the conflict in Iraq during the past year, probably because they have recognised an opportunity to continue the struggle in their homeland. Internal divisions, rejection of terrorism by the local population and a reasonably successful policy on the part of the Algerian government have limited the threat posed by AQIM. Nevertheless, attacks and armed confrontations with the army continued throughout 2007. The most high-profile of these were the bombing of the Prime Minister's palace on 11 April, the attack of 6 September on a crowd waiting for a visit by President Bouteflika and the bombings of the UN offices and the Constitutional Council building in Algiers on 11 December. With these actions, which killed dozens of people and injured hundreds more, AQIM clearly signalled its departure from the GSPC's policy of avoiding civilian targets. It also showed that it is capable of carrying out major simultaneous attacks on heavily guarded locations. The extensive use of suicide bombers is another new development for Algeria. AQIM represents a continuing threat within that country, but its expansion into other parts of the Maghreb and the Sahel now seems less of a danger than was originally feared. Thus far, AQIM has posed no specific threat to Europe.

Early in November 2007, Al-Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) had joined with his organisation. In fact, the relationship began at the beginning of the year. The former leader of the LIFG, Abu Laith al-Libi, was also a highly placed Al-Qaeda leader. The affiliation itself resembles that of the GSPC; in addition to a local agenda – in this case, fighting the Gaddafi regime – the LIFG now also focuses upon the international jihad. That includes the conflict in Iraq, in which many of its members are already participating. In the long term, this group's association with Al-Qaeda could pose a threat to Europe.

A series of explosions in Casablanca, Morocco, in March and April killed a police officer as well as the suicide bombers. None of the attacks damaged their probable intended targets, possibly due to panic reactions and attempts to avoid arrest. There are no indications that the terrorists involved had any international connections or objectives.

On 2 September, the Lebanese army finally ended more than a hundred days of battle with Fatah al-Islam, a Salafist-jihadist group consisting of Palestinian and foreign fighters, in and around the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near Tripoli. As well as an ideological mission, 'the liberation of Jerusalem', Fatah al-Islam's main objectives are to cause unrest in Lebanon and to harm Western interests there. It is unlikely that the group has any direct links with core Al-Qaeda. The fighting at Nahr al-Bared involved some Lebanese – most in fact Palestinian – jihadists who had returned from Iraq. As in Algeria, they seem to have chosen to continue the struggle at home in preference to fighting for the cause elsewhere.

There was an increase in terrorist activities and threats on the Arabian peninsula in 2007. Attacks were committed or foiled in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain and Dubai. All of these countries have been home to networks – some now put out of action – providing the international jihad with recruits as well as financial and practical support. Jihadists travel from the peninsula to combat zones like Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq.

### **2.1.2 Domestic developments in jihadist terrorism**

The international developments described above have a major effect upon the activities of jihadist networks in the Netherlands. Some of these are transnational in nature and dedicate themselves to supporting the jihad abroad, in such places as Iraq and Afghanistan.

There are also local networks inspired by the international jihadist ideology. These form through processes of autonomous radicalisation and 'jihadisation'. Although ideological 'guides' play some part in that, they primarily involve young people inciting one another to radicalise or trying to mobilise their peers to join the violent jihad, with the Internet playing a key role. After a period of relative quiet within known autonomous local networks, some increase in their activities was noted during 2007. The observation in our last annual report, that the known local networks have no real leader figures and are divided amongst themselves, still applies.

During the past year, the AIVD has identified a heightened interest in traditional conflict zones – especially Iraq and Afghanistan – amongst members of these

networks. Although no actual departures to join the jihad in such regions were identified in 2007, it is conceivable that they may eventually occur.

In November 2006, the Dutch Public Prosecutor's Office (OM) authorised the arrest of seven individuals suspected of recruiting for armed struggle, membership of a terrorist organisation, forging travel documents and sedition. Behind this decision was the belief that the young men in question wished to join the international jihad. On 31 November 2007, most of the accused were acquitted; the court ruled that not enough specific preparatory acts had been proven. One person was sentenced to one month's imprisonment for sedition.

The AIVD established that there were occasional contacts between members of transnational networks and autonomous local networks during 2007.

There has been a discernible increase in jihadist influence within the Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands. So far, however, no specific threat to national security from that quarter has been identified.

#### **2.1.2.1 *Three arrests in Rotterdam on New Year's Eve***

On 31 December 2007, acting on an official notice from the AIVD, the National Police Services Agency (KLPD) arrested three people in Rotterdam. The AIVD possessed information that they might be involved in making preparations for an imminent terrorist attack. A possible target for this has yet to be identified. Moreover, the information available to the AIVD does not point to any involvement by the suspects in a wider network or any international connections. Nor has any clear motive, inspiration or form of control been detected. Police searches of the suspects' homes found no explosives or weapons, although at least one of them has made incriminating statements. None of the three can be associated with any known jihadist network. All in all, their actions seem more likely to have been impulsive than part of a detailed plot by a terrorist cell or group. But the AIVD does have evidence that the main suspect, in particular – a person who only recently began studying Islam in any great depth – had radicalised to a violent level within a very short period. This reiterates the point that terrorist threats can emerge rapidly and autonomously, outside known jihadist networks.

## 2.2 Other terrorist groups

The AIVD is constantly monitoring several separatist terrorist groups which may be active or maintain contacts on Dutch territory. Below are our principal observations in 2007:

- The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is attempting to increase involvement in its activities by members of the Kurdish community in the Netherlands. Developments abroad, including the planned incursion into northern Iraq by Turkish forces, have not led to public disturbances in this country;
- Activities by and in support of the Basque separatist movement, ETA, and Irish terrorist organisations have declined;
- The publicity surrounding the participation by a Dutch woman in the activities of the Colombian FARC raised the issue of whether FARC has actively recruited in the Netherlands. Investigations by the AIVD have led to conclude that that is not the case.

### 2.2.1 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) is included on the EU list of terrorist organisations and so proscribed in the Netherlands. The PKK does have sympathisers within the Dutch Kurdish community, however. The AIVD is investigating the extent to which they are providing the organisation with active support, under such guises as 'welfare work'.

In the beginning of 2007, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided that imprisoned PKK leader Adullah Öcalan is not entitled to a retrial in Turkey. This, despite the fact that the European Court of Human Rights had earlier declared that his original trial was unfair and despite the fact that according to media reports Öcalan was being slowly poisoned in his cell. That development raised tensions amongst PKK supporters and other Kurds in Europe. In some countries there were demonstrations and even riots. PKK cadres were arrested in France, Belgium and Germany. A number of Kurds in the Netherlands staged a hunger strike outside the Foreign Ministry, but otherwise the situation here was calm.

That remained so even as Turkish troops prepared to enter northern Iraq in November 2007. A demonstration against the impending escalation of violence passed off without incident. Nor did actual Turkish incursions across the border with Iraq lead to public disturbances in this country. The tensions in the region did strain relations between (nationalist) Turks and Kurds in the Netherlands, but the AIVD has detected no signs that PKK sympathisers here are planning to resort to violence.

Nevertheless, the PKK is attempting to increase involvement in its activities by members of the Kurdish community in the Netherlands. It is also seeking to exercise influence by assuming positions of influence within the community and by encouraging closer co-operation between Kurds of different nationalities: Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian. It remains unclear what the effects of this might be.

On 22 May 2007, a suicide bomber killed himself and five others in an attack in Ankara. It was later discovered that some years ago the perpetrator had lived in the Netherlands for a brief period. Although participation by individual Dutch Kurds in the PKK's armed struggle in Turkey cannot be ruled out, investigations by the AIVD have revealed no large-scale campaign to recruit fighters in this country.

#### **2.2.2 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**

Since the LTTE was placed on the EU terrorism list, the AIVD has been investigating possible support for its struggle from Dutch territory. The AIVD has found that some Tamils living in the Netherlands do contribute to 'good causes' in Sri Lanka, and in so doing may be indirectly – and unintentionally – assisting the LTTE.

#### **2.2.3 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)**

The discovery of a diary written by Dutchwoman Tanja Nijmeijer, a member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), brought this movement firmly into the national spotlight in 2007. Rumours that other Dutch citizens had joined the organisation were investigated by the AIVD. It became clear that several Colombian non-governmental organisations, some with possible FARC ties, had in 2001 sought to recruit participants from Europe for a so-called 'March for Life' through the countryside of Colombia. About seventy Europeans heeded that call, a small number of whom subsequently stayed on in Colombia. And a few of them, Tanja Nijmeijer included, eventually joined the FARC. Our investigation concluded that the organisation itself has not recruited directly in the Netherlands.

#### **2.2.4 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)**

The bombing of Madrid Airport on 30 December 2006 brought an abrupt end to peace talks between the Spanish authorities and the armed Basque separatist movement, ETA. There were more attacks and attempted attacks in 2007, plus a number of arrests and the discovery of several arms storage depots in Spain and France. ETA's political wing attempted to limit the damage to its image through a media offensive, which

extended beyond the Basque Country. Activities included a meeting organised by SEGI, the ETA youth organisation, at a left-wing activism centre in Amsterdam.

### **2.2.5 Irish groups**

Although Northern Ireland has experienced steadily improving relationships between Republicans and Loyalists, now even to the point of political co-operation, terrorist attacks on people and objects continue on a small scale. The prime culprits are two Republican splinter groups, the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA. The AIVD remains alert to any links between organisations of this kind and the Netherlands.

## **2.3 Modus operandi**

The AIVD seeks to acquire expert knowledge of the methods used by terrorists. This includes, but is not limited to, investigating the means of attack they use and their movement patterns.

### **2.3.1 Means of attack**

Our investigations into the means of attack potentially available to terrorists are currently focusing primarily upon access to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) systems and upon explosives – both commercial and home-made. Working in partnership with the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), chain partners, foreign security services and others, The AIVD monitors developments in the Netherlands and draws lessons from terrorist incidents abroad. Using the understanding thus acquired, the AIVD endeavours to identify attempts to acquire or manufacture weaponry and to provide its partners with relevant information about those activities.

The chance of a terrorist attack on the Netherlands using CBRN weapons is currently put at small but conceivable. The most likely scenario would be a small-scale, technically simple attack with few actual victims. Despite the ‘limited’ damage, however, such an incident could easily cause great public anxiety.

With the exception of the 2004 Madrid bombings, all successful, unsuccessful and foiled bomb attacks by jihadist terrorists in Europe in recent years have involved the use of home-made explosives. There were no terrorism-related incidents involving explosives, home-made or otherwise, in the Netherlands in 2007.

### 2.3.2 Movement patterns

Members of terrorist networks make use of all possible migration routes to move internationally, including travel to or through the Netherlands. For this reason, the AIVD tries to monitor the movements of aliens who might pose a threat to national security. The practice of holding so-called ‘awareness briefings’ at Dutch diplomatic posts abroad continued in 2007. These include instruction on how to identify signs of (possible) involvement in terrorist activities.







## 3 Radicalisation

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The AIVD studies the processes which lead to radicalisation. There are many different forms of radicalisation, and hence a wide variety of risks and threats. Our investigations concentrate not only upon those processes with the potential to result in terrorist violence, but also those likely to disrupt Dutch society in other ways. By causing the polarisation of and tensions between communities, for example. Or by creating parallel social structures which reject established democratic institutions and government authority.

- Salafist centres are putting ever greater effort into spreading their message, and seem to be particularly successful in persuading young people of Moroccan origin;
- The radicalisation of young people of Turkish origin remained limited in 2007. Those affected appear to be finding it easier to connect with multi-ethnic groups;
- An Islamic youth culture is forming. Within this there are some who are inspired by radical Islam and, in so doing, rejects Dutch values;
- Despite developments in their countries of origin, the Moluccan, Somali, Pakistani, Iraqi and Afghan communities in the Netherlands remained relatively peaceful in 2007;
- The Internet continues to play an important role in radicalisation processes, contributing to the development of radical jihadist networks. More women are disseminating radical Islamic material online;
- Arab-language jihadist forums on the web have been paying more attention to developments in the Netherlands.

### 3.1 Salafist centres and radicalisation

A significant proportion of the AIVD's study of radicalisation in 2007 focused upon Salafism. As well as a jihadist trend, which includes the Al-Qaeda network, this movement within Islam also has a non-violent version: political Salafism.

It became clear in 2007 that known Salafist centres are increasing their efforts to spread their message, known as 'dawa' or the 'call to Islam'. A growing number of Salafist youth preachers are speaking at more and more locations in the Netherlands, and they seem to have a particular appeal to young people of Moroccan origin. The size of the group receptive to their radical message, to a greater or lesser extent, is estimated by the AIVD at 25-30.000 people.

The growth and professionalisation of non-violent radical Islam in Netherlands, and the risks it poses to the democratic legal order now and in the future, are discussed at length in the AIVD report *The radical dawa in transition – the rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands*. Upon its publication in October 2007, this document was presented to the mayors of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht and other districts with so-called ‘hearths’ of radicalisation. In the spring of 2008, the report is to be presented and discussed at ten or more plenary meetings of regional authorities. It has also been distributed internationally.

Salafist centres invoke theological arguments in support of their outspoken opposition to the values of the democratic state. In the process, they also condemn Muslim integration into Dutch society in the strongest possible terms. They do not openly preach violence, however. That, after all, would undermine their principal objective: the development of radical Islam in the Netherlands into a movement with genuine power and influence. Threats of violence and serious infringements of the democratic legal order are thus avoided. Nevertheless, propagation of the Salafist message is a process with the potential to gradually undermine social cohesion, community solidarity and basic constitutional rights. Its tendency towards so-called ‘intolerant isolationism’, for example, entails hostility towards all those with dissenting views and sometimes involves efforts to put the movement’s own codes of conduct before the rule of Dutch law.

Non-violent radical Islam is gaining ground in virtually every European country with a Muslim community. It is the political Salafists who are leading this advance in the Netherlands, but other movements – the Muslim Brotherhood, Tablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut-Tahrir – are dominant in some neighbouring countries.

The AIVD considers the manner in which these groups are currently manifesting themselves in Western Europe as marking a new phase in Islamic radicalism. That is because their leading activists operate in a different way than did the previous generation of radicals. Rather than acting from a position of social isolation and seeking confrontation, they are more inclined to pursue the gradual but permanent growth of radical Islam in Europe. The AIVD has also observed a process of ‘autonomisation’, with control from the so-called Islamic ‘guide nations’ declining. Another characteristic of this latest phase is professionalisation, with the theological and political message being tailored to specific audiences or local situations. Increasingly, too, the representatives of radical Islam are attempting to present themselves as the legitimate spokespeople of all European Muslims.

### 3.2 The Turkish community and radicalisation in the Netherlands

The radicalisation of young people of Turkish origin remains an issue of concern to the AIVD, although it is affecting only a limited proportion of this group. Those who are radicalising reject democracy as a wicked Western invention and believe that Islamic law, Sharia, should prevail. This is a conviction they project into a distant future. However, it enables them to function ‘normally’ in Dutch society for the time being. Their efforts to bring about that future ideal are channelled into intensive study of the Koran and of writings by conservative or radical Islamic scholars. They also try to propagate the message by spreading radical texts through websites and making personal approaches to potential candidates for conversion.

What is most striking about these young people of Turkish origin is that they appear to be finding it easier to connect with multi-ethnic groups, in which ‘being Muslim’ is more important than ‘Turkishness’. Dutch is usually the language spoken within these groups, so translation – from Arabic, Turkish or English – of the texts they use is important. Nonetheless some radicalisation is also occurring in all-Turkish groups.

So intense was the public debate about Islam in the Netherlands at times during 2007 that certain sections of the Turkish community have come to feel that their faith is under attack. In response, some have tended to withdraw into the ‘safety’ of their own group. If this trend persists, it could have undesirable effects as feelings of affinity with Dutch society are lost.

Milli Görüş, an umbrella organisation for Turkish mosques, received unfavourable media coverage on a number of occasions in 2007. There were suggestions, for instance, that the Dutch branch of Milli Görüş was increasingly coming under the influence of the parent organisation in Germany and so was likely to adopt a more radical course. The AIVD, however, has found no evidence that Milli Görüş willingly encouraged or was in any other way consciously responsible for serious radicalisation last year. But that does not rule out the possibility that some individual visitors to mosques associated with the organisation are radicalising.

## 3.3 The Moroccan community and radicalisation in the Netherlands

### 3.3.1 The emergence of an Islamic youth culture

A new generation of Muslims is trying to develop its own identity and find a place in Dutch society. Many Muslim youths of Moroccan origin, among others, feel that their parents have remained too distant from that society. Often there exists a huge gap between the view of life presented at traditional mosques and the world in which these young Muslims actually live. Consequently, young Muslims tend to look to each other for support and affirmation. Through a process of social comparison, they are developing their own values and collectively shaping a specific Muslim identity. Gradually, an Islamic youth culture is emerging – one through which this group can express its distinctiveness from its parents and from other young people in the Netherlands.

Within the Islamic youth culture there is also a movement inspired by radical Islam. It focuses upon the roots of ‘pure Islam’. The adherents of this tendency reject the values of Dutch society and identify strongly with the young terrorists of the so-called Hofstad Group – responsible, amongst other things, for the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh – copying their dress, behaviour and language. In their view, their parents’ generation has strayed too far from the path of pure Islam and their own generation has become too Dutch. A proportion of them are receptive to radicalisation, and some so much so that they pose an actual threat to national security. The AIVD is making every effort to identify those individuals at the earliest possible stage. For many young Muslims, however, radical statements and behaviour primarily represent an attempt to belong to a group and so shape their own social identity – a way of trying to mask their insecurity and frustration rather than a reflection of any deeply-held radical views.

The AIVD is also exploring the relationship between the radical Islamic youth culture and ‘adult’ radical Islam in the Netherlands. It is possible that involvement in radical youth culture could increase the temptation to take up more ideological forms of radicalism, particularly when that is preached by speakers skilled in exploiting the susceptibility of youth. On the other hand, though, a distinctive youth culture can contribute towards the positive development of a social identity by young Muslims and so help them find a place of their own within Dutch society. Overall, the emergence of a radical Islamic youth culture in the Netherlands should be viewed within the context of wider current developments, which in part are influenced by the ferocity with which the debate about Islam is sometimes conducted.

### 3.3.2 Fluctuations in the Islam debate

Many Dutch Muslims regard criticism of their faith as insulting and offensive. For the radicals and extremists, this criticism is proof that the West is out to undermine Islam. Critical statements by politicians and opinion leaders – and particularly by people from a Muslim background themselves – sparked anger and fury on numerous occasions in 2007. Although these reactions sometimes seemed to lose steam, giving the impression that those responsible had vented all the outrage they had, at other times the debate flared up as furiously as ever.

These fluctuations were related in part to the nature of the statement and who had made it. There was also a relationship with the extent of media coverage and whether the criticism was expressed in isolation or came at a time when anti-Islamic sentiments were already close to the surface.

The AIVD will continue to monitor the development of radical Islamic youth culture and the unfolding debate on Islam closely during 2008, in order to properly assess any threat they might pose.

### 3.4 Radicalisation within other communities in the Netherlands

The AIVD conducted investigations into radicalisation within a number of smaller ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands in 2007. These included the Moluccan, Somali, Pakistani, Iraqi and Afghan communities.

In the middle of 2007 there was an incident in Indonesia. A group of activists displayed the banned flag of the Moluccas (Maluku) during a visit to the islands by the Indonesian President. The subsequent arrests prompted a number of small, peaceful demonstrations in the Netherlands. These were also fuelled by continuing discontent within the Dutch Moluccan community about what some view as the government's passive attitude towards the situation on the islands. The AIVD considers the weak social position of certain young third-generation Moluccans in the Netherlands as continuing to provide a potentially fertile breeding ground for radicalisation. The Somali community in the Netherlands numbers about 19,000 people. In December 2006, their homeland saw a change of government when the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was overthrown by forces loyal to the interim Transitional Federal Government (TFG), backed by Ethiopian troops and the US military. Most Somalians find themselves marginalised in Dutch society, with a relatively high proportion of the community suffering from psychosocial problems. Since this is a

situation which could breed radicalisation, the AIVD will continue to monitor it in 2008.

There are approximately 18,000 people of Pakistani origin resident in the Netherlands. This is another community which has witnessed significant political developments in its home country, with President Musharraf declaring a state of emergency in November 2007. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto on 27 December caused concern within the community, but didn't result in public disturbances. Although Dutch Pakistanis come from a wide variety of religious, ethnic and political backgrounds, no tensions between them were observed in 2007. The forms of Islam practised within this community also have adherents amongst other ethnic groups. Given the orthodox and autonomous nature of many religious institutions in their country, and its location adjacent to the Afghanistan conflict zone, Pakistanis who present themselves as Islamic scholars often enjoy considerable standing amongst young people from a variety of ethnic backgrounds who are receptive to radical ideologies.

Neither the execution of Saddam Hussein in December 2006 nor the threat in 2007 of a Turkish incursion into northern Iraq caused any tensions or unrest within the Iraqi community of about 50,000 people in the Netherlands.

Within the Afghan community of about 37,000 people there was little unrest during 2007. Most notably, the Dutch military presence in the province of Uruzgan has not aroused any particular hostile sentiment within this group.

### **3.5 The Internet, radicalisation and jihadist terrorism**

The Internet continues to play an important role in the radicalisation of individuals and groups, contributing substantially to the ideological and organisational development of jihadist networks.

One notable trend identified by the AIVD in 2007 is the increasing prominence of women in disseminating radical Islamic material online. Delivered on a growing number of websites produced by and for women, their message is designed specifically to encourage other female Muslims to radicalise. The AIVD has also noticed a general increase in the number of people in the Netherlands being radicalised through the Internet. For the most part, they are young Muslims familiar with the use of this medium and apparently particularly vulnerable to its influence. The number of Dutch-language websites propagating a jihadist ideology has not grown significantly in the

past year, but the AIVD has observed an increase in the number of people seeking to play an active part in the online dissemination of radical material.

Internationally, The AIVD indicates greater professionalism in the distribution of jihadist propaganda and more coverage of events and developments in the Netherlands on Arab-language jihadist web forums. These are a source of information for radicals in the Netherlands, who repost it in translation on Dutch-language sites.

In investigating Internet activities, the AIVD co-operated intensively and constructively with a large number of foreign intelligence and security services during 2007.

The AIVD will continue to monitor the use of internet by persons within this area of interest. These investigations will not only be confined to those who use the Internet in preparing acts of violence or disseminating jihadist material, but also extend to include hosts, designers, webmasters and others who facilitate such activities.





## 4 Political extremism

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- On the extreme left, militant anti-fascists continued to violently oppose far-right activities in 2007;
- Some Dutch cities are home to autonomous anti-fascist cells which are predisposed to violence against actual and suspected right-wing extremists;
- There has been an increase in cases of vandalism, criminal damage and personal intimidation perpetrated by radical opponents of the Dutch government's asylum policy;
- On the extreme right, 2007 was a year of fragmentation and diversity.

### 4.1 Left-wing extremism

Extremism on both the left and the right of the political spectrum represents a potential threat to the democratic legal order and so is monitored by the AIVD. As well as organised parties and groups, the AIVD also watches the more fluid networks of extremists active on the streets and in the political arena. Unaffiliated individuals may also merit investigation.

Confrontations between left- and right-wing extremists regularly resulted in public disturbances and acts of violence during 2007. The AIVD frequently shared advance information on potential incidents with the police and local authorities, often in the form of official notices. No change in the current situation is expected within the foreseeable future. The anti-fascists intend to continue pursuing their 'mission' to drive the extreme right off the streets. To this purpose, some elements on the far left co-operate at an international level.

#### 4.1.1 Anti-Fascist Action (AFA)

Based in Amsterdam, the Anti-Fascist and Capitalist Archive Collective (Kollektief Anti Fascistisch en Kapitalistisch Archief, KAFKA) researches right-wing extremism in the Netherlands and elsewhere. It is in direct contact with various like-minded activists, most notably the national group Anti-Fascist Action (Anti Fascistische Actie, AFA). That consists of several dozen hard core activists, plus more than a hundred sympathisers who can be mobilised for demonstrations. Amongst them are several violent local splinter groups. Both KAFKA and the AFA claim that their principal aim is to exclude the extreme right from the public arena. They attempt to do this by preventing right-wing demonstrations, sometimes through more or less menacing approaches to local authorities and venues. The anti-fascists often seem to have advance

knowledge of where groups on the extreme right are planning to meet. They can mobilise dozens, sometimes hundreds, of people from throughout the country – and recently from Germany as well – to disrupt those gatherings. On occasions, violence is used in doing so.

#### **4.1.2 Opposition to government asylum policy**

Radical opponents of the Dutch government's asylum policy stepped up their activities in 2007. The general amnesty for long-term asylum seekers announced during the year had no effect upon this group, which remains totally unreceptive to discussion or compromises. There were blockades, vandalism and intimidation at a number of locations, including the 'prison ships' in Zaandam, Dordrecht and Rotterdam and the detention centres in Zeist and Alphen aan de Rijn. A group calling itself 'No Blood on My Hands' ('Geen bloed aan mijn handen') was particularly prominent in these incidents. Where necessary and possible, the AIVD has provided threat assessments related to this activity.

#### **4.1.3 Other left-wing extremists**

Large numbers of anti-globalisation protesters from many countries held demonstrations during the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, northern Germany. They included a substantial contingent from the Netherlands, most of whom protested peacefully. It remains unclear whether the extent of Dutch participation in demonstrations at the 2006 and 2007 summits indicates a heightened degree of anti-globalisation activism in this country or was due simply to the comparative geographical proximity of the venues. Before and during meetings of the G8, there is wide-ranging co-ordination and co-operation amongst security services in order that the local government can provide the appropriate level of security. Naturally, the AIVD participates in these preparations.

### **4.2 Radical animal rights activism**

The first few weeks of 2007 saw the leading radical animal rights organisation in the Netherlands, Respect for Animals (Respect voor Dieren, RvD), split into two groups. One, operating under the same name, is campaigning against the fur trade and to promote veganism; the other, called the Coalition Against Vivisection (Anti Dierproeven Coalitie, ADC), focuses solely upon action against businesses associated with animal testing. The 'old' RvD's role in co-ordinating activities throughout Europe

from the summer of 2006 onwards is detailed in a 2007 AIVD report, *Animal rights activism in the Netherlands – springboard for Europe*.

The ADC especially has close ties with the UK group Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), and the two organisations are known to collaborate. Both the ADC and the ‘new’ RvD consist of a hard core of several dozen activists, but their public demonstrations sometimes attract more than a hundred sympathisers – often including local people. Their activities during 2007 concentrated upon the extended business network of British firm Huntingdon Life Sciences. Both commercial premises and the homes of company directors were vandalised.

Activists from several countries met for a so-called ‘animal rights gathering’ in the Dutch village of Appelscha in August 2007. At this meeting, they decided to concentrate upon activities at a national level for the time being. The scale of international operations by the ADC subsequently declined, the group shifting its focus to a number of Dutch businesses. They include those involved in ScienceLink, a planned cluster of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies in the town of Venray, which the ADC is attempting to block. The AIVD informed the local authorities in Venray about the expected campaign against ScienceLink, including the likelihood that property would be attacked and people threatened.

### 4.3 Right-wing extremism

Fragmentation and diversity continued to characterise the far right of the Dutch political spectrum in 2007. Attempts by these extremists to co-operate at the national and international level generally founder in the face of irreconcilable ideological differences and individual personality clashes. With a total of about 600 active supporters, the Dutch extreme right remains relatively small in scale.

The trend towards the extra-parliamentary expression and propagation of far-right ideology continued last year. As a result, the number of extremists active in this wing of the movement grew somewhat. On the other hand, those organisations pursuing an extreme-right agenda through positions on elected bodies saw their support stagnate, or at best increase only marginally.

This trend away from (electoral) politics and towards street politics is reflected in the appearance – sometimes only briefly, sometimes for longer periods – of small far-right groups, usually active purely at the local level. Only a handful of these have been observed, however, and a number have already collapsed. One notable development

within this movement is its greater direct hostility towards radical anti-fascists. Compared with previous years, when activists on the far right as a rule offered little or no active resistance in the face of generally unilateral aggression and provocation on the part of anti-fascist counter-demonstrators, there were several violent confrontations between the two groups in 2007. This appears to have been the trigger for a greater readiness by the extreme right to 'fight back' against antifascists.

Although there is a certain fascination with weapons and violence in far-right circles, there are no indications that arms are being acquired with a view to their premeditated use against anti-fascists or other alleged political opponents. Possessing weapons is of great but primarily symbolic value on the extreme right 'scene' in the Netherlands. There are certainly no signs of any tendency towards extreme right-wing terrorism.

Some youth cultures define their identity by the symbolism of the far right. As a result of the forms of verbal and visual expression adopted by these young people they are generally viewed as right-wing extremists, but strictly speaking that is not the case. Only a small hard core actually radicalise ideologically and either join an existing far-right group or form their own. Nevertheless, study of that radicalisation process is and will remain a key element of the AIVD's monitoring of right-wing extremism.

#### **4.3.1 Neo-Nazism**

About 400 people are active across the neo-Nazi spectrum in the Netherlands. With the Dutch People's Union (Nederlandse Volks-Unie, NVU) confining itself almost exclusively to political activity, the groups Youth Storm Netherlands (Jeugd Storm Nederland, JSN) and Blood & Honour enjoy greater popularity with the activist section of the neo-Nazi movement. Both experienced an increase in support in 2007. Blood & Honour actually has two rival branches in the Netherlands: the small but extremely radical Racial Volunteer Force/Combat 18 (RVF/C18) and the larger Blood & Honour Netherlands (B&H-N).

Although the JSN generally takes part in NVU demonstrations, it is increasingly seeking a more independent position within the extreme-right movement.

RVF/C18 is characterised by a highly developed ideology and its ability to organise activities without possessing any clear hierarchy or command structure. A member of this group was arrested for the illegal possession of firearms in the spring of 2007, although no indications have been found that these weapons were intended for use in a terrorist attack with a right extremist signature. At the international level, RVF/C18's main contacts are with like-minded groups in Germany.

Ideologically, B&H-N is closest – and, indeed, considers itself hierarchically subordinate – to the British organisation Blood & Honour Midgard. This branch of the movement devotes itself to right extremist music and to physical preparation for the racial struggle expected some time in the distant future. Early in 2007, there was a violent confrontation between members of B&H-N and supporters of Anti-Fascist Action in the town of Uitgeest. Never before had right-wing extremists fought back against counter-demonstrators, so this event seems to signal an increasing readiness to physically oppose anti-fascists. There have also been leadership changes within B&H-N during the past year, with a number of important figures stepping down to make way for a new guard. Internationally, this group's principal contacts are in the United Kingdom and Belgium.

#### **4.3.2 Ultra-nationalism**

Numbering about 100 people, the ultra-nationalists in the Netherlands have remained largely unorganised since the National Alliance (Nationale Alliantie, NA) disbanded itself in mid-2007. Since then, the Nationalist People's Movement (Nationalistische Volks Beweging, NVB) founded in 2006 has been the most important Dutch organisation of this kind. One striking development last year was the assistance obtained by the NVB from neo-Nazi group Blood & Honour Netherlands, with B&H-N members acting as security guards at its meetings. Nevertheless, the NVB remains clear in its renunciation of neo-Nazi ideology.

For the ultra-nationalist group Voorpost ('Outpost'), 2007 was a relatively quiet year. The only notable incident was an arson attack on a squat in Almere: two of the eleven youths responsible were former Voorpost members. In the summer of 2007 the organisation distanced itself from the episode.

#### **4.3.3 Unorganised right-wing extremism**

Because of their appearance and language, certain groups of young people are sometimes incorrectly perceived as being right-wing extremists. And some of them are regularly involved in public disturbances. Working with police regional intelligence units, the AIVD monitors potential radicalisation within these groups. The youngsters involved use the Internet as a virtual meeting place, and it also has the potential to foster their radicalisation. However, there is no evidence as yet that right-wing extremist organisations have begun using the medium for that purpose in any structured or co-ordinated way. One nascent trend observed by the AIVD in the past year is a transition from online activism to street activism, with the ultra-nationalist New National Unit (Nieuwe Nationale Eenheid, NNE) being formed from within the Internet community.



## 5 Clandestine activities by foreign powers

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Clandestine activities in the Netherlands by other countries undermine our sovereignty and may threaten national security. The AIVD therefore seeks to identify and counter such activities.

Below are our principal observations in 2007:

- As in previous years, a number of countries have sought to secretly acquire military, economic, political, technological or scientific information in the Netherlands. Advanced know-how and technology were a prime target for espionage activities;
- Certain countries of origin attempt to influence immigrant communities or individual migrants in the Netherlands;
- There exists a genuine threat of damage to vital government structures and the national ICT infrastructure;
- Tangible threats to Dutch ICT networks, directed from China, came to light;
- Most of the intelligence-gathering activities by the Russian Federation in the Netherlands appear to be targeting economic, technological and scientific information. Moreover, these activities seem to be intensifying.

### 5.1 General

Clandestine activities by foreign powers can take many forms. ‘Classic’ espionage – the secret gathering of military, economic, political, technological or scientific information – remains as real a threat as ever, just as real as the need to combat it.

Another less traditional and relatively new form of clandestine activity is the violation of vital information and communications infrastructures from abroad. The extent of this threat ranges from obtaining confidential personal data to large-scale breaches of government and/or commercial systems. The AIVD believes that the danger of such violations has increased and is therefore reviewing vulnerable sectors in order to reduce the risks, and where possible tracing preparations for attacks.

Attempts by countries of origin to influence immigrant communities or individual migrants constitute another area of concern. Inappropriate activities may include monitoring opponents of the home government. The AIVD has also observed the intelligence and security services of countries of origin attempting to persuade migrants to perform acts counter to Dutch interests.



The AIVD has uncovered activities by intelligence and security services from all parts of the world. In principle, all clandestine operations by foreign powers merit further investigation. In 2007, undesirable activities by a number of countries prompted countermeasures.

As well as conducting investigations, the AIVD also invests in providing preventive information intended to help counter the threat posed by espionage. In this area, the AIVD works closely with the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD). Companies and organisations in vulnerable sectors are visited and advised. The AIVD intends to intensify this work in 2008, amongst other things by compiling new publications for general release.

## **5.2 People's Republic of China**

The AIVD investigates inappropriate activities by the Chinese government in the Netherlands. These activities often involve the Chinese community, both as a vehicle for clandestine work and as its subject. Chinese immigrants are used in efforts to exercise political influence and control, and also as a means of channelling advanced know-how and technology from the Netherlands to China.

As in many other Western European nations, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is extensively represented in the Netherlands and is forging closer diplomatic and trading relations with this country. However, indications from both here and abroad confirm the AIVD's belief that greater co-operation with China brings with it heightened risks from the espionage point of view. In 2007, for instance, tangible threats came to light involving potential violations of vital Dutch ICT networks, directed from China.

## **5.3 Russian Federation**

In a speech to agents of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in October 2007, President Putin explicitly instructed them to gather economic, technological and scientific information. The Russian interest in material of this kind has also been noticed by the AIVD. For example, there have been clandestine attempts to collect information about the energy industry. Overall, Russian intelligence activities in the Netherlands seem to have intensified in 2007.





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## 6 Proliferation

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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery constitutes a violation of international law as well as a threat to Dutch national security. For the AIVD, therefore, it is an issue which falls within both intelligence and security. The AIVD provides relevant information to three ministries in particular: General Affairs and Foreign Affairs, with responsibility for security policy, and Economic Affairs, which oversees export control policy.

On the security side, the AIVD seeks to identify efforts by so-called ‘countries of concern’ to acquire know-how, technology or goods which might assist them in developing WMD and their delivery systems. The AIVD also endeavours to prevent the Netherlands from becoming involved in such efforts. Both the procurement of materials and the acquisition of knowledge are regarded as part of the proliferation problem. With this in mind, the AIVD actively informs Dutch companies, universities and scientific institutions about the risks of inadvertent involvement in clandestine proliferation activities. Through this preventive advisory work, the AIVD plays a significant part in Dutch counter-proliferation and export control policy.

The AIVD also gathers intelligence about WMD programmes by countries of concern. In 2007, the AIVD again examined the technological standards achieved by those programmes and the level of threat they pose. Another subject of investigation was the structure of and methods used by the procurement networks set up to acquire material and know-how in support of WMD programmes. The AIVD also looked at possible co-operation between the countries involved, and at the programmes’ political management and implementation. In-depth knowledge of all these aspects is essential in enhancing the Netherlands’ ability to combat proliferation activities.

### Essence

- The AIVD possesses concrete indications that countries of concern are co-operating in the development, production and acquisition of WMD and their delivery systems;
- Despite UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747, Iran has made progress in its nuclear enrichment programme;
- Iran also has an active delivery systems programme, which is attempting to develop a ballistic missile with a range greater than that of the current Shahab rocket (approximately 1300 kilometres);
- In 2007, the AIVD submitted eighty recommendations to the Ministry of Economic Affairs concerning applications for export licences. That was twice as many as in 2006;

- Co-operation with the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) was extended and intensified in 2007. In certain key areas, the two services have been very closely co-operating. This collaboration will continue to develop in 2008, with the AIVD and MIVD seeking to form a joint unit to investigate the development, acquisition and proliferation of WMD.

## 6.1 Countries of concern

### 6.1.1 Iran

Despite claims that it is purely for civilian purposes, Iran's nuclear enrichment programme is one of the keys to its possible development of nuclear weapons. Despite the adoption of UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747, the country made significant progress on the nuclear front in 2007. It is still seeking to master the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from ore extraction to the production of atomic energy. In order to dispel the persistent concern within the international community, it was proposed that Iran be provided with enriched fuel and a light water reactor incapable of producing weapons-grade material. Iran refused this offer, however. In August, the Iranians announced their intention to build their own light water reactor. They have yet to comply totally with the so-called Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and refuse to co-operate fully with inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It must therefore be assumed that the country may be using its civil nuclear programme for military ends. As well as the progress in uranium enrichment, developments in plutonium production are also a cause of concern. Iran continues to build its heavy water research reactor at Arak.

In a *National Intelligence Estimate* (NIE) published at the end of 2007, US analysts concluded that Iran had probably halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003. However, the same report also stated that concern on this point remains justified.

International anxieties only are reinforced by Iran's attempts to develop a new ballistic missile with a range far greater than the 1300 kilometres achievable by the current Shahab rocket. This would make it possible to reach targets in countries like Israel from relatively safe launch sites deep inside Iran. If fitted with a nuclear warhead, such a missile would considerably strengthen Iran's strategic position.

### 6.1.2 North Korea

North Korea's nuclear weapons and delivery systems programme has long been a cause of concern, particularly since the country withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In October 2006, the North Koreans conducted an underground nuclear test. Although the explosion was less powerful than had been expected, it demonstrated that North Korea does possess the means and know-how to produce their own nuclear explosive. In the wake of this test, the so-called six-party talks between the United States, China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea and Japan took on a new urgency. Months of negotiations, mainly bilaterally between the US and North Korea, resulted in an agreement under which the North Koreans undertook to dismantle their only nuclear reactor, at Yongbyon, in exchange for economic and humanitarian aid. In October 2007, American inspectors prepared Yongbyon for decommissioning. Both in the region and on the wider international stage, this act is seen as a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, there remains cause for concern and caution.

North Korea's role as a secondary proliferator remains a matter which warrants attention. Evidence for this can be seen in the fact that its rocket systems form the basis for almost all the long-range ballistic missiles found in countries of concern, including Iran and Pakistan. North Korea sells its relatively advanced technology to other countries of concern in order to prop up its weak economy.

### 6.1.3 Syria

Syria is home to one of the Middle East's most active programmes to develop chemical weapons and their delivery systems. It is also conducting research into biological weapons. Syria states that it has the right to deploy all possible means to defend itself against Israel, but claims that it would only consider using non-conventional weapons if its own sovereignty were in imminent danger.

### 6.1.4 Pakistan

Despite the 2004 outcry about the Khan procurement network, Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear weapons programme. Satellite images have revealed that the country has begun construction of a new nuclear reactor, Khushab III, alongside the unfinished Khushab II. Both are most probably heavy water plants, like the nearby Khushab I. Since none of these installations has been formally reported to the IAEA, they are not subject to its inspection regime. Khushab I is already operational and plays an important role in the country's nuclear weapons programme. It is unclear when the new reactors will be completed.

## 6.2 Procurement

In 2007 the AIVD was in close contact with the Ministry of Economic Affairs in monitoring exports to countries of concern. Compared with the previous year, the number of recommendations the AIVD issued concerning applications for export licences doubled in 2007. In particular, and due in part to the sanctions regime imposed under UN Security Council Resolution 1737, the checks on exports to Iran intensified in 2007.







Panorama

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## 7 Foreign intelligence

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The Foreign Intelligence Task of the AIVD has its origins in Article 6, clause 2d of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv). This states that the topics for investigation in respect of other countries are determined by the Prime Minister, in agreement with the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Article 1 of the annual Designation order (Aanwijzingsbesluit) by the Prime Minister on 28 November 2006 and effective between 1 January, 2007 and 1 January, 2008 lists the following matters as subject to investigation by the AIVD and the MIVD in the interests of Dutch national security:

- a. developments related to international terrorism;
- b. developments in countries deemed relevant to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
- c. political, ethnic and religious tensions or conflicts in specific countries or regions, either internal or between states, which could pose a threat to international stability or the international legal order;
- d. developments which could endanger the security of energy supplies in the Netherlands or Europe.

During 2007, there were intensive consultations between the Ministry of General Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the AIVD and the MIVD about the Designation Order for the Foreign Intelligence Task 2008-2012. These resulted in a document which:

- focuses upon the gathering of political intelligence;
- largely confines investigations to a limited number of countries;
- provides for an 'early warning/quick response' task; and
- covers a longer period.

Based primarily upon the intelligence requirements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the new Designation Order is valid for four years but is reviewed and amended on an annual basis, in line with current intelligence needs.

The intelligence gathered should provide the Dutch government with information which is difficult or impossible to obtain by other means, such as through diplomatic channels, but can assist it in formulating foreign policy positions. In other words, knowledge vital to national security which only the intelligence services are able to gather.

When deemed relevant to our own national security, Dutch intelligence is also placed at the service of common European, allied and international interests. As appropriate, the intelligence obtained can be shared on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

Since this would reveal the subjects under investigation and the issues underlying them, tasks pursuant to the Designation Order do not lend themselves to accountability in the form of public disclosure. When necessary, however, the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Services Committee is informed in confidence about the nature and results of these investigations.

Below is a review in general terms of one of the themes included in the 2007 Designation Order, the security of energy supply.

## **7.1 Security of energy supply**

The AIVD continued its investigation of risks associated with the security of energy supply in 2007. The biggest problem is that the ongoing increase in demand for oil and gas by emerging economies like China and India is outstripping developments on the supply side. Last year alone, the price of oil rose steadily from just over \$50 per barrel to almost \$100. Gas prices followed a similar pattern. This trend in the market has augmented the power of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), as has the accession to that cartel of Angola and Ecuador.

Meanwhile, Europe faces a growing dependence on gas supplies from Russia. The European Union, however, is increasingly worried about the limited and delayed investment in gas production there. Growing state influence over the Russian energy sector and the possibility that Moscow might exploit its strong position in gas and oil supply for geopolitical ends are also causing concern in the EU.

Although there certainly is a potential risk, terrorism is not the greatest threat to the security of energy supply because the industry is well-protected. Instability is a chronic problem in Iraq and Nigeria, whilst energy production in Iran and Venezuela remains below its full potential.

Alternative sources such as nuclear power, clean fossil fuels, biofuels, wind and solar energy have become more attractive as the prices of oil and gas rise, but they have not tempered the increasing demand for those primary fuels. Shortages of equipment and personnel in the energy sector magnify the problem. Consequently, the prospects for

continuing security of energy supply were less favourable at the end of 2007 than they had been a year earlier.



## 8 Protective security

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One of the AIVD's tasks is to encourage official, statutory and other bodies to take adequate security measures. In this respect, the AIVD focuses primarily upon sensitive information, vital sectors, the so-called national security domain – covering people, property and services – and other areas crucial to the security of the Netherlands.

### 8.1 Vision on Promoting security

The AIVD's vision of its security promotion task continued to evolve in 2007. The most important change is that the AIVD has been working to shift the focus of our work from resistance-enhancing advice to customised threat information, provided from the perspective of protecting national security interests. The emphasis here is placed upon threats to vital sectors, classified information and material stemming from Dutch obligations under international agreements. The recipients of this information can then take the necessary measures themselves, based upon it. The AIVD expect to implement this new approach from March 2008. In partnership with the relevant third parties, during 2007 the service sought to effectuate the smooth transfer of those tasks which will no longer fall to the AIVD once the revised vision is in place. The bulk of these are being assumed by the newly created National Advisory Centre for Vital Infrastructure (NAVI, see 8.4) or reallocated under the Public Service Security Regulations for Classified Information (Vir-bi, see 8.5).

### 8.2 Safety and Security System

In general terms, individuals are primarily responsible for their own safety. But the organisations to which they belong and the relevant local authorities also have a part to play. The central government, however, has a special responsibility for certain persons, property and services because the interests of national security demand that they be able to operate safely and without disruption. Amongst these special cases are government ministers and the international organisations based in the Netherlands. Collectively, these are known as the national security domain ('rijksdomein'). As the authority responsible for the official Safety and Security System (Stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen), it is the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCTb) who formally determines the current levels of threat affecting that domain.

Legislation in force since November 2006 provides that the AIVD conduct threat and risk analyses for people, property and services within the national security domain. As part of this new task, the AIVD conducts focused investigations into potential threats which might fall outside our standard remit. In this aspect of our work, the AIVD is not permitted to use special intelligence resources. The resulting information, translated in terms of actual and potential threats to particular targets, is delivered to the NCTb along with similar material generated by the National Police Services Agency (KLPD) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD).

In 2007, the AIVD drew up more than 270 threat profiles covering individuals, properties and services. The majority of these pertained to witnesses of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), national politicians, major events, diplomats, diplomatic premises and overseas visits. Although special events demanded less attention than in 2006, there were more frequent grounds for preparing threat profiles in respect of a small number of politicians.

### **8.3 Counter-terrorism Alert System**

The purpose of the Counter-terrorism Alert System (Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding, ATb) is to provide government services and commercial industries with advance warning of an identified terrorist threat, so that they can prepare themselves accordingly. Responsibility for its operation rests with the NCTb. During 2007, the AIVD conducted threat analyses for all the sectors covered by the ATb: airports, seaports, oil and chemicals, mains water supply, public transport, gas, electricity and nuclear power. Based upon these threat analyses, the NCTb determined a formal threat level.

### **8.4 Vital sectors**

In November 2006, the Dutch cabinet approved the creation of a National Advisory Centre for Vital Infrastructure (Nationaal Adviescentrum Vitale Infrastructuur, NAVI). Formally opened in April 2007, the purpose of this body is to establish stable permanent protection for key infrastructure in the Netherlands. The AIVD contributes to this task by sharing threat information with the NAVI. The AIVD has also seconded staff to the centre to provide it with knowledge and expertise concerning risk analyses and security. Initially, the NAVI has been established for two years, under the auspices of the Minister of the Interior. Its final form, position and funding arrangements will be decided following an evaluation of that trial period.

The AIVD also submits threat information to the National Centre Cyber Crime Information (Nationaal Informatieknooppunt Cybercrime, NICC), a partnership led by the Ministry of Economic Affairs which facilitates the exchange of data concerning risks to and vulnerabilities in vital infrastructure, with particular reference to computer crime. As well as the AIVD, the other contributing public agencies are the KLPD and Govcert, the Government Computer Emergency Response Team.

## **8.5 Sensitive information**

The AIVD promotes the security of sensitive information by contributing towards the formulation of Dutch and international regulations, by issuing advice to government bodies and private businesses and by developing and approving information security products.

### **8.5.1 Government Service Security Regulations for Sensitive Information**

The new Public Service Security Regulations for Sensitive Information (Voorschrift informatiebeveiliging rijksdienst – bijzondere informatie, Vir-bi) underwent a ministerial audit in 2007 in order to review the status of their implementation and what problems have been encountered. Based upon the findings, proposals were drawn up for amendments to the Vir-bi and to tackle the issues arising out of the fact that, at the policy level, safeguarding sensitive information remains separate from the approach to other government data. These activities were co-ordinated by an interdepartmental working group, reporting to the Integrated Security Co-ordinating Committee (Coördinerend Beraad Integrale Beveiliging, CBIB). At the beginning of 2008, the co-ordination of Vir-bi policy was transferred to the Directorate of State Personnel, Organisation and Information at the Ministry of the Interior, the body already responsible for the general Public Service Information Security Regulations (Voorschrift informatiebeveiliging rijksdienst, Vir).

### **8.5.2 Working Group on Sensitive Information Security**

Made up of representatives from the ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice, the Interior and General Affairs, the Data Security Working Group (Werkgroep Bijzondere Informatiebeveiliging, WBI) guides the work and policy of the National Signals Security Bureau (Nationaal Bureau voor Verbindingsbeveiliging, NBV) as they relate to safeguarding classified government information in ICT environments. In so doing, it encourages the use of approved information security products. The WBI meets four



times a year, with the AIVD as chair. In 2007, the group approved the basic principles of a change process intended to realign the NBV's relationship with its clients.

At the WBI's recommendation, several new security products were approved last year. They include systems designed to protect classified government information on USB sticks, hard disks and telephone connections, both fixed and mobile. Also in 2007, it was decided to develop a new generation of secure mobile handsets, the Sectra Tiger.

Following the launch of the process to realign the NBV's relationship with its clients, it became clear that government departments have more and different questions they want to put to the bureau. In response, and in line with the findings of the Vir-bi evaluation, proposals were drawn up covering customer focus, product development and advice. These bear in mind that the NBV has to endeavour to tailor its services to meet the needs of all the departments involved. That requirement has in turn prompted the Council for National Security (Raad voor Nationale Veiligheid, RNV) to request a proposal for the operational control and central funding of the NBV. A decision on this matter will be taken in 2008.

### **8.5.3 National Security Authority (NSA)**

A National Security Authority (NSA) is a designated domestic agency responsible for protecting classified information received from international organisations like NATO and the EU. In the Netherlands that responsibility is shared by the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, who delegates her task to the AIVD. The Ministry of Defence concentrates upon security in the military domain and the AIVD upon the civilian sphere. Co-ordination and external representation remain with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. As an NSA, the AIVD conducts regular inspections of all national agencies with access to classified information from international organisations and screen the personnel who come into contact with it. In 2007 alone, some 180 visits to such organisations were carried out in partnership with the MIVD. Through its representatives on the relevant security committees and working groups, the AIVD also contributes towards the development of security policy and regulations by NATO, the EU and other bodies.

In its capacity as an Appropriately Qualified Agency (AQUA), which arises out of the NSA status, the AIVD last year carried out one second-party evaluation of communications encryption equipment. Reciprocally, the secure mobile handset developed jointly with Sectra was subjected to a similar evaluation and formally approved for communicating information up to 'EU secret' classification.

#### **8.5.4 Host nation**

The Netherlands hosts a number of international organisations and so is responsible for ensuring that they can function without disruption. To this end, the AIVD advises them on security risks associated with their premises, personnel and visitors.

### **8.6 Other activities**

#### **8.6.1 Closing down the Integrity Violations Reporting Desk**

In June 2006, the Minister of the Interior informed Parliament that the Integrity Violations Reporting Desk (Meldpunt Integriteitsaantastingen, Mepia) operated by the AIVD, to which government employees and members of the public could report suspected malpractice by public servants, was to be closed within the foreseeable future. Instead, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice decided to start a pilot project to include integrity violation in the range of offences reportable anonymously to the National Crime Hotline (Meld Misdaad Anoniem, M). That pilot began in September 2007 and Mepia closed on 31 December.

#### **8.6.2 Voting machines**

On 5 February 2007, the District Court in The Hague ruled that the Minister of the Interior must reinvestigate the data security of the NewVote voting machine. That task was entrusted to the AIVD, because of acquired expertise in this field. Research found that the pattern of radio-frequency emissions from the models tested had changed since previous measurements in 2006, but that interceptable signals could still be detected at a range of more than five metres. Based upon these findings, the minister concluded that there had not been sufficient improvement to allow the ban on the use of these machines in elections to be lifted.



## 9 Positions involving confidentiality and security screening

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In some positions, abuse of office can damage national security. To prevent this, the minister responsible for a particular area of policy may – by agreement with the Minister of the Interior – designate certain positions as so-called ‘position involving confidentiality’. These may then be occupied only by persons for whom a Security Clearance (Verklaring van Geen Bezwaar, VGB) has been issued by the AIVD. The service grants or refuses a VGB after a screening process designed to confirm that the subject will fully respect the sensitive nature of the position to which it is proposed that they be appointed. This vetting concentrates upon facts and circumstances which, from the national security point of view, may affect the subject’s performance in that particular position.

The scope of a screening is directly related to the national security sensitivity of the position concerned. There are three standard types, with ‘Level A’ being most rigorous and ‘Level C’ the least, plus special categories for certain positions in civil aviation, the police force and the Royal Household. The AIVD has respectively mandated the Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee, KMar), the National Police Services Agency (KLPD) and the Royal and Diplomatic Protection Service (Dienst Koninklijke en Diplomatieke Beveiliging) to perform the screenings in these categories.

### 9.1 Developments

Meeting the eight-week time limit for completion of the procedure, as required under the Security Screening Act (Wet veiligheidsonderzoeken, Wvo), has always been a problem. This is partly because the demand for screenings consistently exceeds the capacity available to carry them out and partly because thorough vetting sometimes simply takes longer. For the AIVD, national security considerations always prevail over strict deadlines. In considering proposed amendments to the Wvo, Parliament has indicated that it wishes to retain the eight-week limit. A start having been made on tackling the delays last year, this issue has been made a priority for 2008.

The AIVD is working to bring the criteria for appointment to positions involving confidentiality and the conduct of security screenings up to date. This process will be intensified once the problems in meeting the time limit have been solved.

## 9.2 'Safer, Faster'

The implementation of an improvement programme entitled 'Safer, Faster' ('Sneller veiliger') began in 2007. This will eliminate delays in initiating screenings due to a backlog of work by 1 May 2008. From 1 September, 95 percent of all Level A procedures will be completed within the statutory eight-week period. Nevertheless, it remains a basic principle that thoroughness comes before speed. There are two particular situations in which it is conceivable that the AIVD may still be unable to meet the eight-week deadline: when insufficient information is available about the prospective holder of a sensitive position due to an extensive stay abroad and when supplementary investigation is needed in order to reach the required level of confidence in a subject.

One exception to this rule is the current programme to screen incumbent police personnel, resulting from the phased introduction of vetting for this group. The AIVD intends to complete the Level A screenings over a three-year period. The KLPD, which is carrying out the less rigorous police-specific (Category P) procedures under AIVD supervision, has set itself the same target.

Since 2007, appointments to positions involving confidentiality have been made with the help of guidelines providing criteria to ascertain how vulnerable they are to abuse of office. In 2007, several government departments and the police service revised their lists of positions involving confidentiality in line with those criteria, which have helped them to refine their definitions and so reduce the number of positions falling within this category. The new lists are now being used as the basis for formal screening agreements between the AIVD and the agencies concerned. The remaining government departments and the so-called High Councils of State (the two houses of Parliament, the Council of State, the Netherlands Court of Audit and National Ombudsman) are to compile new lists of positions involving confidentiality in 2008, with AIVD assistance, and will then reach their own screening agreements. A number of posts at the Public Prosecution Service were added to its roster of positions involving confidentiality in 2007.

A pilot project to accelerate vetting procedures by means of direct submission, thus avoiding bottlenecks in the process, has reduced completion times to less than eight weeks. Consequently, this way of working is being introduced across the board in 2008. Since 2007, temporary additional capacity has been made available in order to achieve the targets set.

By agreement, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will report to Parliament twice a year on the progress of the 'Safer, Faster' programme.

## **9.3 Police security screening**

### **9.3.1 Police Security Screening Project**

The AIVD has been responsible for security screening at the Dutch police service since 2001. The service continues to perform the more rigorous Level A screenings in-house, but has mandated the force itself to conduct police-specific Category P vetting. When this arrangement was introduced, an estimate was made of the expected demand for Level A procedures and the resources needed to meet it. In practice, however, demand has considerably exceeded the capacity available. This has resulted in substantial backlogs of work. Early in 2007, the Minister of the Interior approved a solution to this problem proposed jointly by the Police Directorate at her own ministry, the Board of Chief Constables (Raad van Hoofdcommissarissen) and the AIVD. This was designed to reduce completion times to the statutory limit of eight weeks and to clear the backlog. It would be implemented as the Police Security Screening Project (Project Veiligheidsonderzoeken Politie), a collaborative effort by all the relevant parties.

### **9.3.2 Designation and clustering revised**

As part of the Police Security Screening Project, the policy for designating positions involving confidentiality within the force was revised in 2007. Underlying the approach now is the potential damage to national security arising out of any abuse of a particular office. New criteria have also been compiled to refine the designating process.

Moreover, all positions involving confidentiality within the police service are now clustered by equivalent level of vulnerability to abuse of office. Personal integrity is a fundamental quality required of everyone appointed to a position of responsibility with the police, but there are differences in the extent to which any failure to live up to that standard may damage the public interest. It is based upon this understanding that positions involving confidentiality has been divided into two clusters: A and P. The great advantage of this arrangement is that, once an employee has obtained Security Clearance, it covers any future position within the same cluster. That considerably reduces the number of security screenings needed.

## **9.4 Dynamic security screening**

To enhance security at Dutch airports, in September 2005 the ministers of Justice and the Interior promised Parliament that they would introduce a system of dynamic security screening for the civil aviation sector. In practice, this means that the AIVD

regularly checks judicial and police records for data which might prompt rescreening of the holder of a position involving confidentiality. The necessary amendments to the Wvo were adopted by Parliament in 2007, and the AIVD has now adapted its information and administrative systems to handle dynamic screening. All that remains is for the computerised enquiry procedures to be formalised. The AIVD is currently in the process of arranging this with the operators of the databases in question, the police and the Ministry of Justice.

Once dynamic security screening has been introduced in the civil aviation sector, work will begin on extending the procedure to other areas.

## **9.5 Legislation**

### **9.5.1 Amendments to the Wvo**

The 2007 amendments to the Wvo include a new obligation upon employers to report any changes which might affect the nature and number of positions involving confidentiality within their organisations to the AIVD. The definition of an employer for these purposes has also been changed. Police data can now be used in vetting, too, and rescreenings can be initiated without the prior consent of the subjects. Finally, as mentioned above, dynamic security screening is now possible.

### **9.5.2 Regulatory review of the Wvo**

In 2007, the Intelligence and Security Services Regulatory Commission (Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CTIVD) published a report reviewing executive compliance with the Wvo. Over the past year, the AIVD has been working to implement the recommendations made. For example, the commission identified a discrepancy between the method used by the KLPD to consult police records and the process as laid down in the AIVD's *Security Screening Handbook* (*Handboek Veiligheidsonderzoeken*). In this case, the AIVD has revised the handbook in line with actual practice. The commission also recommended that the established assessment framework for security screening be defined in greater detail. The AIVD expects to complete this operation during 2008.

In certain respects, the AIVD and the MIVD differ in the way they carry out vetting. The commission, however, expressed a clear preference for consistency. The two services are endeavouring to achieve this, although there will always be some variations

in their approaches due to the different risks associated with positions involving confidentiality in general and those at the Ministry of Defence.

## 9.6 Security screening statistics

In all, 54,543 requests for security screening were received in 2007. Table 1 summarises these by category, together with the total number of positions classified as sensitive and the figures for previous years.

**Table 1. Total number of positions involving confidentiality (SP) and requests for security screening received (SS), 2005-2007**

	2005		2006		2007	
	SP	SS	SP	SS	SP	SS
Central government	5,960	2,423	6,259	1,831	6,499	1,494
Defence contractors	18,500	2,362	18,500	2,230	20,800	2,412
Civil aviation	31,330	31,330	35,437	35,437	44,369	44,369
Police	17,000	4,137	16,147	4,014	16,608	3,758
Royal Household	240	72	269	108	269	51
Vital sectors	1,235	489	1,547	305	1,547	646
Miscellaneous		1,502		1,626		1,813
<b>Total</b>	<b>74,265</b>	<b>42,315</b>	<b>78,159</b>	<b>45,551</b>	<b>90,092</b>	<b>54,543</b>

The 20,800 positions involving confidentiality listed at defence contractors are those subject to vetting by the AIVD and the MIVD; the AIVD conducts the screenings for positions with private companies. The increase in the number of positions involving confidentiality in this category since 2006 is attributable in part to the adoption of the private-public partnership model (PPP) by the Ministry of Defence. Amongst other things, this has resulted in a number of technical maintenance tasks and the operation of certain military establishments being contracted out to commercial businesses. Since this process is set to continue, the number of positions involving confidentiality in this category is expected to increase.

The largest year-on-year rise in the number of positions involving confidentiality was in civil aviation. Nowadays, everyone who requires a pass giving permanent access to the secure areas of an airport is deemed to hold a position involving confidentiality. For this reason, the table shows only the numbers of vetting requests and not the total number



of positions involving confidentiality (hence the fact that the figures in the columns SP and SS are identical).

The ‘Miscellaneous’ category covers screenings conducted by the AIVD as part of its National Security Authority (NSA) task, at the request of other countries and international organisations.

**Table 2. Requests for security screening received by the AIVD, by level and category, 2005-2007**

	2005	2006	2007
Level A	2.969	2.584	2.694
Category P (police)	93	76	93
Category KH (Royal Household)	8	18	12
Level B	8.328 (3.846 through KMar)	8.756 (3.708 through KMar)	9.702 (4.806 through KMar)
Level C	1.035	364	482
<b>Total</b>	<b>12.433</b>	<b>11.796</b>	<b>12.983</b>

In all, 277 requests for NATO and EU clearance were received in 2007.

**Table 3. Security Clearance refusals, 2007**

Grounds:	Criminal background	Insufficient information	Other
Clearance Level A	0	0	4
Clearance Level A, police	0	1	5
Clearance Category P (police)	0	2	2
Clearance Level B	5	7	2
Clearance Level B, civil aviation	592	227	6
Clearance Level C	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>597</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>19</b>

The ‘Other’ category in the above table covers clearance refusals based upon personal conduct and circumstances or information from AIVD files.

## 9.7 Objections and appeals

A person who is refused Security Clearance, or has it withdrawn, is entitled to submit an objection to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. If that is rejected,

they can appeal against the decision through the courts. The table below enumerates the objections and appeals submitted in 2007.

**Table 4. Objections and appeals in 2007, procedures started and completed in 2007**

	Submitted in 2007	Settled within the year
Objections	108	80
Appeals	31	17
Second appeals	7	3
Appeals by minister	3	1
Objections by injunction	5	4
District court injunctions	8	8
High court injunctions	3	2

Other objections and appeals settled during the year had been submitted in 2006.

**Table 5. Total of objection and appeal procedures completed in 2007 (procedures started in 2007 or earlier and have been completed)**

	Upheld	Dismissed	Inadmissible	Withdrawn	Refused	Granted	Settled	Total
Objections	70	22	26	4				122
Appeals	16	7	5	4				32
Appeals to dismiss legal effects		2						2
Second appeals, application by appellant	4		1					5
Second appeals, application by minister		1						1
Injunctions			2	2	6	5	15	30

The number of objections submitted pursuant to the Wvo fell to 108 in 2007, compared with 120 the previous year. Of these, sixteen concerned Security Clearance refusals on the grounds that insufficient information was available about the subject on their partner. Most of the others arose out of the refusal or withdrawal of a Security Clearance after criminal background checks.

The number of appeals lodged rose from 23 to 31. There were also more second appeals to higher courts: ten in 2007 – three of them by the minister – compared with just two in 2006.

The Council of State (Raad van State) made a number of relevant rulings in 2007. In two separate cases it confirmed that information about a subject's partner should be included in the security screening procedure.

In one of the appeals initiated by the minister, the Council of State reconfirmed that he or she is primarily responsible for judging whether sufficient security guarantees are in place and is free to make that judgement as he or she sees fit. The same ruling also stated that refusing or discontinuing holdership of a sensitive position upon withdrawal of a Security Clearance is an inherent part of the Wvo system, and hence that that effect prevails over the interests of the subject as holder of such a position.

Finally, the Council of State ruled that, whilst the Wvo imposes no obligation as such to provide information for or co-operate with security screening, refusal to do so may result in insufficient information being available to allow the granting of a Security Clearance. In such a situation, therefore, the minister has sufficient grounds to refuse clearance pursuant to Article 8, clause 2, of the Wvo.





## 10 Control and accountability

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### 10.1 Control

#### 10.1.1 Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is ultimately responsible for the proper functioning and effective performance of the AIVD. She oversees and plans its tasks in such a way that they serve the public interest as usefully as possible. That requires that priorities be set clearly and by a single authority, but also that they be co-ordinated with a variety of interested parties or those who set AIVD requirements. In the fight against terrorism, for example, there are close and frequent consultations with the Minister of Justice in his capacity as co-ordinating minister for counter-terrorism. In the case of foreign intelligence, there are intensive contacts with the Prime Minister and the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The Minister of the Interior also attaches great importance to good relations with public administrators at the regional and local level, including the supply of relevant information to them.

To improve understanding of how the AIVD is managed and how its priorities are set, a new system for compiling the service's annual plan was introduced in 2005. Under this, The AIVD first indicates where its priorities should lie, based upon the insight and know-how. Consultations are then held with key political and official stakeholders in order to ascertain their information needs. Next, based upon the results from these two processes, the draft annual plan is revised and discussed with the minister. After that, it is submitted to the Joint Intelligence Services Committee (Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Nederland) and the Council for National Security for consideration, before finally being adopted by the Cabinet.

The annual plan details the service's priorities for the coming year, as well as the choices made by the minister concerning the allocation of human and material resources. Each January, the minister informs Parliament of the main points in the AIVD's plan for that year.

#### 10.1.2 Council for National Security

The Council for National Security (Raad voor Nationale Veiligheid, RNV) is a Cabinet subcommittee made up of the Prime Minister, the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the ministers of the Interior, Justice, Defence and Foreign Affairs. They meet monthly to discuss a wide range of issues touching upon national security. Preparatory work

for these sessions is delegated to two official bodies: the Joint Counter-terrorism Committee and the Joint Intelligence Services Committee (see also 10.1.3 and 10.1.4).

A number of items featured more or less regularly on the RNV's agenda in 2007: the annual plans of the AIVD and the MIVD; the allocation of subjects for investigation by the Foreign Intelligence Branches of those two agencies; the reports on their investigations; the quarterly National Terrorism Threat Assessment (Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland, DTN) produced by the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, NCTb); the counter-terrorism progress reports submitted biannually to Parliament by the ministers of the Interior and Justice; and developments in international conflicts and tensions. Other subjects discussed during the year included the threats associated with radicalisation, animal rights extremism and CBRN terrorism, legislative opportunities such as those provided by the report on the implementation and evaluation of the Public Service Security Regulations for Classified Information Order (Vir-bi) and the general political and operational situation.

The RNV is strongly policy-oriented, but to some extent also has an operational focus. Legislative measures such as amendments to the Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wiv) and the Security Screening Act (Wvo) are discussed in another Cabinet subcommittee, the Council for Security and Legal Order (Raad voor de Veiligheid en de Rechtsorde).

### **10.1.3 Joint Counter-terrorism Committee**

The Joint Counter-terrorism Committee (Gezamenlijk Comité Terrorismebestrijding, GCT) is one of the RNV's two official preparatory bodies. With a remit covering all matters specifically related to terrorism and the fight against it, the GCT meets once a month under the chairmanship of the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism (see 11.1.2). All central government organisations with a role in the fight against terrorism are represented on this committee.

#### **10.1.4 Joint Intelligence Services Committee**

The Joint Intelligence Services Committee (Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Nederland, CVIN) is the RNV's second official preparatory body. Unlike the GCT, which addresses only issues directly related to terrorism, this body has a more wide-ranging national security remit. It meets once a month under the chairmanship of the Intelligence and Security Service Co-ordinator at the Ministry of General Affairs. Its other members are senior servants from the ministries of the Interior, Defence, Justice and Foreign Affairs.

### **10.2 Parliament and legislation**

The Minister of the Interior is accountable to parliament. This is an obligation she fulfils both in public before the entire Lower House and, where necessary, in private at confidential sessions of the Intelligence and Security Services Committee. In principle, this is made up of the parliamentary leaders of all the parties currently represented in the Lower House. The role of the indirectly elected Upper House, the Senate, is generally confined to purely legislative matters such as the budget debate.

#### **10.2.1 Intelligence and Security Services Committee**

When matters related to the AIVD cannot be publicly disclosed, the Minister of the Interior fulfils her duty of accountability to Parliament behind closed doors to the Intelligence and Security Services Committee (Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CIVD) of the Lower House. This currently includes the parliamentary leaders of all the parties with elected members, apart from those groups which have split from established parties during the current session. The Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) and the Party for the Animals (Partij voor de Dieren, PvdD) have been represented since entering Parliament in the general election of November 2006. In 2007, the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP) deliberated on whether to join the CIVD.

When invited to appear before the committee, the minister – supported by the Head of the AIVD – provides verbal responses on topics raised concerning the service's operational activities. If required, she also supplies requested information in writing. In addition, she may herself take the initiative to notify the CIVD of developments.

The minister appeared before the CIVD on six occasions in 2007. Matters discussed included a number of reports by the Intelligence and Security Services Regulatory Commission, as well as a variety of topics related to terrorism. Because of his



responsibilities in this regard, the Minister of Justice was also present on those occasions. The committee also made a working visit to the AIVD, giving particular consideration to the Internet as one of the service's priority areas.

### 10.2.2 Lower House

Compared with previous years, the direct threat posed by and the fight against terrorism were less prominent in the service's interaction with the Lower House in 2007. Instead, there was a greater focus upon radicalisation processes, right-wing extremism and animal rights activism. Another important topic was the proposed amendment of the Wvo (Security Screening Act) and the Wiv. (Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002)

The ministers of the Interior and Justice provided the house with a summary of the quarterly National Terrorism Threat Assessment and the biannual counter-terrorism progress reports, which were then discussed with the Interior and Justice select committees.

The AIVD's conduct prior to the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004 remained a contentious issue. On 18 December 2006, the ministers of the Interior and Justice sent the Lower House a review of official actions in the period leading up to the killing. This was based upon the knowledge and facts revealed during the trials of Van Gogh's murderer, Mohammed B. and the other members of the so-called Hofstad Group. Following subsequent consultations, the Minister of the Interior asked the Intelligence and Security Services Regulatory Commission (Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CTIVD) to conduct an independent inquiry into the AIVD's intelligence assessment processes in respect of Mohammed B. before the murder.

On 1 February 2007, the minister met the departmental select committee to discuss the AIVD, CIVD and CTIVD annual reports for 2005, as well as her memorandum of 8 December 2006 on right-wing extremism. Parliamentary questions concerning animal rights activism were tabled on 20 March, and on 28 July an emergency debate was held on that issue. At these sessions, the minister stated that there is no terrorist threat from either the far right or animal rights activists at present.

The 2006 annual reports of the AIVD, CIVD and CTIVD were discussed with the house on 5 September 2007, with the conduct of security screenings receiving particular attention. Also addressed were the legal basis of the Counter-terrorism Infobox and the authorisation of AIVD agents to commit illegal acts when deemed

necessary. The house requested that the minister be more forthcoming in sharing solid information concerning the service's performance and priorities. In response, she promised to include more details of this kind in annual plans and reports where possible.

Throughout the year, but particularly during October and November, a key theme in dealings with the Lower House was trends in radicalisation and the threat they pose. The Minister of the Interior forwarded the AIVD report *The radical dawa in transition – the rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands* to the House on 9 October and discussed it with the select committee on 18 October. With the policy follow-up to that document anchored firmly in the Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Programme (actieprogramma Polarisatie en Radicalisatie), submitted during the same period and subsequently debated in the house, motions were tabled calling on the government to be alert and cautious in subsidising organisations associated with the radical dawa and to investigate foreign funding of and influence over mosques in the Netherlands. In the light of its involvement in a controversial mosque project in Amsterdam, numerous questions were asked about the power of Milli Görüs. Another topic raised was the extent of the Muslim Brotherhood's influence in the Netherlands.

### 10.2.3 Legislation

A bill to amend the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wet op de inlichtingen en veiligheidsdiensten, Wiv) completed its passage through the Lower House on 16 October 2007. The purpose of the changes is to enhance the means available to the security services to investigate and act against terrorism and other threats to national security. Later in the year, the Senate requested advice on the proposed amendments from the Data Protection Authority (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, CBP). This was provided in December. Meanwhile, work also began on the secondary legislation arising out of the amendments: an Order in Council mandating the disclosure of information by designated agencies and by certain categories of financial services provider and transport operator.

Amendments to clarify the applicability of the Security Screening Act (Wet veiligheidsonderzoeken, Wvo) were passed by the Lower House on 5 June and the Senate on 9 October, before entering the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees on 18 December 2007 (*Staatsblad* 508). The main change is that dynamic screening is now permitted; the other amendments are primarily technical in nature.

Preparations for the next round of amendments to the Wiv have already begun. These will include a general statutory basis for special collaborations between the security

services, such as the Counter-terrorism Infobox. In part, this will put into effect the position adopted by the Minister of the Interior in response to the CTIVD's report on the Infobox.

### 10.3 Communications

The AIVD further extended its proactive approach to communications in 2007. Obviously, though, the openness to which the service aspires remains tempered by the statutory limitations in place to protect information about methods and sources. The motto the service goes by in this respect is 'Public when possible, secret when necessary'. The restrictions sometimes give rise to misconceptions concerning the AIVD's role, tasks and powers, which the AIVD is not always in a position to dispel.

The service actively seeks to forge contacts with a wide variety of groups in society, including the media, students, public administrators, working partners and specific sections of the general public. The aim in doing this is to clarify the AIVD's position in the national security system and to share knowledge about known and potential threats.

In addition to its annual report, the AIVD issued two major public documents last year: *Animal rights activism in the Netherlands – springboard for Europe* (15 June). Charts the latest domestic developments in this field, plus a number of international trends. *The radical dawa in transition – the rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands* (9 October 2007). Describes a new phase in the evolution of radical Islam.

Through publications of this kind, the AIVD provides a wider audience with the analysis of research findings in areas related to the security of Dutch society. The service also puts knowledge of the threats facing the nation to use by sharing it with public administrators and relevant organisations at the local, regional and national levels.

During Children's Book Week in October 2007, the AIVD launched a special website aimed at youngsters aged about ten and upwards. This gives them an entertaining way to learn more about the service.

The AIVD has begun a major campaign to recruit more staff. This uses a wide variety of mass media, include advertisements in newspapers and specialist publications, radio commercials, websites and text messaging.

## 10.4 Notification

Article 34 of the Wiv requires that, five years after the completion of certain investigations involving its special powers, the AIVD review whether the subject can be notified that they have been investigated in that way. This provision took effect on 29 May 2007, five years after the Wiv entered into force. Since then, a number of notification reviews have been carried out. The CTIVD has been provided with details of the policy framework utilised and is now also aware of the first recommendations concerning notification.

## 10.5 Applications under the Freedom of Information Act

Anyone is entitled to submit a request to inspect any information the AIVD may hold about them. The procedure and conditions are posted on our website: [www.aivd.nl](http://www.aivd.nl). A number of restrictions apply to this form of disclosure. For example, it covers only information which is not relevant to current AIVD activities. And even outdated material cannot be inspected if that would compromise the service's sources and methods. Moreover, a person may only inspect their own record or that of their deceased spouse, registered partner, child or parent.

There were more applications for inspection under the Freedom of Information Act last year than in 2006. Particularly in November and December, there was a noticeable rise compared with previous months.

On the other hand, there were far fewer applications to inspect the records of people with whom the applicant had no family connection. The number of objections concerning freedom of information requests also fell slightly. All requests were dealt with inside the statutory time limit.

In all, 178 requests were received last year: 122 for information held on the person making the application, 29 concerning deceased relatives, 23 for non-personal data and four in respect of unrelated persons.

Ten applicants submitted objections following a refusal to permit inspection of records, four lodged appeals against rejected objections and three went to second appeals in a higher court. Of those cases active in 2007, ten objections, eight first appeals and two second appeals were settled during the year. Of the objections, all but one were dismissed. The AIVD lost one of the appeal cases but has now referred the case to a

higher court, where it is still pending. In every completed appeal procedure in a higher court, the AIVD's case was upheld.

**Active request for information procedures, 31 December 2007**

Requests pending	95
Objection procedures	2
Appeal procedures	5
Second appeal procedure	3

## **10.6 Complaints**

Under Article 6 of the Wiv, the AIVD itself, the CIVD, the CITVD, the Minister of the Interior and the National Ombudsman are all empowered to consider complaints from private citizens concerning actual or alleged conduct by the service. In the first instance, a complaint should be made directly to the AIVD. If it cannot be settled, it is referred to the minister, who seeks the advice of the CITVD. A complainant who is unhappy with the minister's decision may turn to the National Ombudsman for independent reconsideration of the matter. Last year, the AIVD's own complaints procedure was compiled and published in the Government Gazette (*Staatscourant* 2007, no. 177) to complement the general scheme for the public service (Awb-klachtregeling) and the specific provisions of the Wiv in this respect.

During 2007, the minister referred only one new complaint to the CITVD. This concerned alleged service involvement in the complainant's detention abroad; he is under the impression that information was passed between the AIVD and the secret service of the country concerned. This complaint was submitted in December 2007 and will be considered during 2008.

## **10.7 Intelligence and Security Services Supervisory Commission**

The Intelligence and Security Services Supervisory Commission (Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CTIVD) is an independent body which oversees compliance with the Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wiv) and the Security Screening Act (Wvo).

In 2007, the commission compiled five regulatory reports concerning the AIVD. These covered the legitimacy of the Counter-terrorism Infobox, compliance with the Wvo, investigations into malicious interference by foreign powers, the exchange

of information with the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, IND) and the functioning of police regional intelligence units and the Royal Military Constabulary. The first four of these were forwarded to Parliament during last year, accompanied by a response from the minister; the fifth followed suit early in 2008.

Overall, the commission's findings were positive. Almost without exception, the recommendations it made were accepted by the Minister of the Interior and – in so far as that had not already been done – implemented by the AIVD. One, concerning the statutory basis for the Counter-terrorism Infobox, has required the development of additional legislation. The CITVD's reports and recommendations, and the ministerial responses to them, were subject of written and verbal questions in the Lower House.

Other issues considered by the commission during 2007 were: the application of Articles 25 and 27 of the Wiv; a review of the official notices issued by the AIVD between October 2005 and January 2007; the legitimacy of financial investigations; the conduct of overseas activities; the legitimacy of AIVD collaborations with foreign intelligence and security services; and the manner of the service's compliance with the promises made by the minister in respect of commission reports 1-10.

In the wake of the parliamentary debate on the review issued on 18 December 2006 concerning official actions prior to the murder of Theo van Gogh (Tweede Kamer 2006-2007, 29 854, no. 18), the Minister of the Interior requested the CITVD to conduct its own investigation. The purpose of this was to verify and validate the assessment processes which informed the extent of previous AIVD interest in Mohammed B., as already presented to the Lower House by the minister, as well as her conclusion that the service cannot reasonably be expected to have acted any differently given the information available to it. The report of this investigation was submitted to the minister early in 2008, and subsequently forwarded to the Lower House, together with her response.



## 11 Co-operation

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Co-operation with strategic partners, interested parties and foreign security services is vital to the effective functioning of the AIVD and serves a variety of ends. One is to gain a good understanding of relevant policy areas and the associated needs of patrons and partners. Another is the ability to utilise available information, sometimes culled from each other's sources, and to make the best use of logistical opportunities. A third is the exchange of assessments and interpretations with other experts. Ultimately, the aim of all these forms of co-operation is to provide partners with information they can use to form effective operational perspectives with a view to attenuating identified threats and/or strengthening the ability to cope with the risks they pose.

### 11.1 Domestic co-operation

#### 11.1.1 Local authorities

AIVD co-operation with local authorities continued to increase in 2007. Information on such issues as radicalisation was supplied to numerous mayors and regional executive bodies, either at their request or on the service's own initiative. As well as providing general background on trends and phenomena, the service also notified local authorities about specific matters of relevance to their own communities. For example, local activities by animal rights activists and groups on the extreme left and right of the political spectrum.

#### 11.1.2 National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism

The AIVD remained in frequent and intensive contact with the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, NCTb) throughout 2007. As well as playing a co-ordinating role, the NCTb is responsible for compiling the quarterly National Terrorism Threat Assessment (Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland, DTN), for developing and shaping counter-terrorism policy, for the national Safety and Security System and for civil aviation protection. The AIVD provides information in all these areas, including details of specific and potential threats.

The AIVD and the NCTb work closely together on the designation of positions involving confidentiality and the conduct of security screenings in civil aviation. As well as continuing to invest in this regular co-operation, in 2007 the service also



jointly compiled the Civil Aviation Policy Guidelines (Beleidsregel Burgerluchtvaart). Finally, the AIVD collaborates on the development of a screening solution for persons requiring one-day passes to enter the secure area at Schiphol Airport.

### 11.1.3 Counter-terrorism Infobox

The Counter-terrorism (CT) Infobox is a special partnership of the AIVD, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, IND), the National Police Services Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, KLPD), the Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst MIVD), the Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie, OM), the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst/Economische Controledienst FIOD-ECD) and the Netherlands Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-NL), with the AIVD as lead agency. Since 1 September 2007, the Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee, KMar) has also been participating on a pilot basis; after this involvement has been evaluated in the spring of 2008, KMar will decide whether or not to join the partnership permanently. A 2007 review by the Intelligence and Security Services Regulatory Commission (Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CTIVD) confirmed that the activities of the CT Infobox are within the law.

Meanwhile, the CT Infobox investigative procedures were harmonised in 2007. In a measure implementing one of the recommendations from the CTIVD report, for example, all newly referred subjects are now assessed individually as to whether their inclusion on the CT Infobox list is justified. Also, it will become possible to place subjects from regional infoboxes on the national list. And the role of the Co-ordinating Board, on which all the participating organisations are represented, is to be enshrined in the CT Infobox covenant.

To improve the overall clustering of available data, the CT Infobox is taking part in the programme 'Better Security through Information Awareness' (Veiligheidsverbetering door Information Awareness, VIA). Co-ordinated by the NCTb and also involving the AIVD, the KLPD and the Netherlands Forensic Institute (Nederlands Forensisch Instituut, NFI), this has initiated a dedicated project called 'Improving the CT Infobox', which last year produced the working design for a shell-search system due for delivery in mid-2008.

#### **11.1.4 Police and Royal Military Constabulary**

By better integrating the work of police regional intelligence units (regionale inlichtingendiensten, RIDs) and the Special Service of the Royal Military Constabulary (Bijzondere Dienst van de Koninklijke Marechaussee, BD/KMar) with the AIVD's operational processes, their effectiveness improved considerably in 2007. This was achieved through more direct guidance of those organisations' activities, with the hoped-for results being formulated as clearly as possible. In particular, the annual intelligence plans used to regulate the AIVD's formal partnerships under Article 60 of the Wiv have gained in clarity and uniformity.

A method to improve co-operation with the RIDs was piloted last year. This involved the secondment of an RID liaison officer to the AIVD, with a dual function: better communication of police information needs to the service and co-ordination of RID work on behalf of the AIVD. The evaluation of this pilot having proven very positive, the AIVD now proposes that all constabularies be offered the opportunity to appoint such a liaison officer.

#### **11.1.5 Customs Service**

Since the enactment of the Wiv in 2002, under Article 60 employees of the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration (Belastingdienst) can be deployed to duties on behalf of the AIVD. With the decision to establish an Intelligence Unit within the Customs Service, co-operation between the two organisations is set to intensify in 2008.

#### **11.1.6 Public Prosecution Service**

Both the AIVD and the police are in the front line of the national fight against terrorism. To prevent criminal investigations and intelligence operations interfering with one another, The AIVD consults regularly and when necessary with the Public Prosecution Service and the KLPD at a number of levels. In so doing, the service always upholds the basic principle that judicial enquiries and intelligence work should remain strictly segregated.

#### **11.1.7 Military Intelligence and Security Service**

The collaboration with the Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst MIVD) was consolidated on a number of points in 2007. The objectives arising out the 2006 AIVD-MIVD covenant have now been all but achieved; significant steps have been taken towards the facilitation of staff exchanges

and the service is closer to setting up two proposed joint task groups. There has been particularly intensive co-ordination around the designation of tasks for the Foreign Intelligence Branch in 2008, and that is now being put into effect. Agreement has been reached on even closer co-operation, in the form of a planned joint unit to investigate the development, procurement and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

Then there is the creation of the National Signals Intelligence Organisation (Nationale Sigint Organisatie, NSO), which has full responsibility for all the technical aspects associated with the interception of wireless communications by both the AIVD and the MIVD. The resources previously held separately for this purpose by the two services have now been transferred to the NSO.

The AIVD attends both national and international meetings on CBRN weapons and explosives. At the domestic level, the service is co-operating actively with chain partners in the CBRN Terrorism project to develop means of reducing the chances of an attack of this kind in the Netherlands as well as minimising the effects should one take place. Over the past year, the AIVD has strengthened ties with the MIVD on this issue. The exchange of information has been substantially improved and agreement has been reached to begin supplying products for use as part of the CBRN Terrorism project from 2008.

The AIVD and MIVD are seeking to harmonise the organisation and conduct of their investigations, and also to develop a common assessment framework. The two services notify one another of current security screenings and share information obtained during earlier vetting procedures. And, where possible, each recognises the other's Security Clearances.

## **11.2 European co-operation**

In many of its contacts with the EU institutions, the AIVD is seeking to promote the interests of the intelligence and security community. Above all, though, the service provides information intended to assist in the formulation of security-related policy. The usual channel for that is the EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) at the Council Secretariat. On occasions, however, the AIVD communicates directly with MPs or the European Commission.

The AIVD is actively involved in determining the Dutch national standpoint on EU topics of relevance to the service, contributing at all phases in the European

negotiating process. Subjects addressed in 2007 included the Framework Decision on the Protection of Personal Data, the revision of the 2002 Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, the revision of measures to freeze terrorists' assets and Council of Ministers conclusions on such themes as radicalisation.

When deemed necessary and useful, service experts and policy personnel play a direct part in negotiations in Brussels. The AIVD always seeks to provide input of substance at as early a stage in the decision-making process as possible. The AIVD also contributes to a variety of seminars organised by EU institutions and member states.

### **11.2.1 Joint Situation Centre**

The AIVD made dozens of contributions last year to analyses by the EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), which shares a substantial proportion of its terrorism reports with Europol. Our input covered a wide range of areas, from the background to political developments in various countries to analyses of terrorists' modus operandi and material for use in threat assessments. SitCen analyses are used by several bodies in Brussels, most notably the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Council Working Party on Terrorism (COTER) and the Working Group on Terrorism (WGT). In contacts with EU officials and at interdepartmental meetings, the AIVD advises that these analyses be followed up at the policy level.

### **11.2.2 Counter-terrorism Group**

The Counter-terrorism Group (CTG) is an informal partnership of security and intelligence services from the EU member states, Norway and Switzerland. It serves as a platform for the exchange of information about terrorist attacks, actual or foiled, for the compilation of threats assessments, for operational co-operation on specific themes and so on. During the past year, it also regularly provided input to SitCen so that know-how from its analyses could be channelled to policymakers.

The extent of collaboration and information-sharing within the CTG continued to intensify in 2007. The AIVD is leading a number of the group's projects, including one on CBRN and a study of target selection. Moreover, the report *The radical dawa in transition – the rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands* – to which several foreign services contributed – was discussed on several occasions at CTG level. Since this partnership also served as a platform for the intensive exchange of information concerning successful and unsuccessful terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark, the AIVD's participation enhanced the ability to inform Dutch

ministers and domestic partners about the impact of those events upon the threat level in the Netherlands.

### **11.2.3 Other European partnerships**

#### **11.2.3.1 *Club de Berne***

The Club de Berne (CdB) is an informal alliance of security services from the EU, Switzerland and Norway. Within this forum, information is exchanged and co-operation arranged on all aspects of security and intelligence work: counter-terrorism, espionage, proliferation, Internet investigations and so on. In 2007, at the AIVD's instigation, the CdB specifically focused its attention upon issues related to the services' position in a changing environment.

#### **11.2.3.2 *Forum***

Forum is an alliance of civilian intelligence services in the European Union, through which they mostly share information on strategic matters like the security of energy supplies and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

#### **11.2.3.3 *Middle Europe Conference***

The Middle Europe Conference (MEC) is an informal platform for the security services of the central European nations, plus a number of their counterparts – the AIVD included – from Western Europe. Because the majority of MEC countries are now involved in other informal consultative bodies, the AIVD has been playing a less prominent part in this forum since 2005.

## **11.3 International co-operation**

### **11.3.1 NATO**

Co-operation between the security services of the NATO member states comes under the auspices of the organisation's Special Committee, on which each of them is represented. AIVD activities in this forum during 2007 included membership of a working group to advise the Ukrainian intelligence and security services on improving their democratic accountability and anchoring themselves in civil society.

### **11.3.2 AIVD liaison network and contacts with other services**

Alongside the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Interior, the KLPD, the IND, the Royal Military Constabulary, the MIVD and the special enforcement agencies,

the AIVD is a member of the National Liaison Forum (Nationaal liaisonoverleg). This shares experiences and insights with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of liaison posts and intensifying co-operation through them.

The AIVD further strengthened its international liaison network in 2007. A liaison officer has been stationed in Beijing for a period of at least two years to help deal with security issues surrounding the 2008 Olympic Games. The post in Moscow has been expanded with the appointment of a permanent attaché.

### **11.3.3 United Nations**

In 2007, the AIVD again helped to prepare missions by the UN Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) to various nations around the world. Thanks to the expertise on a number of countries, the AIVD was able to provide the CTED with useful information in formulating relevant research questions. The contacts with the UN are maintained in close consultation with the Dutch Permanent Mission in New York.

### **11.3.4 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)**

Last year, the AIVD participated in a number of forums to counter the further spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. These included the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which was founded in 2003 and has the support of more than eighty countries.



## 12 Organisational development and management

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### 12.1 Organisational development: Prospect 2007

Prospect 2007, the AIVD's development programme for quality and growth, was completed last year. It has implemented conclusions and recommendations made by the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD (Commissie Bestuurlijke Evaluatie AIVD, CBE), as adopted by the government. In support of the AIVD's mission, four core competence were identified: investigative, interpretive, mobilising and executive competence. Through Prospect 2007, the service has fundamentally strengthened all four, both individually and collectively. Projects to guide our rapid expansion and to reinforce ancillary processes were also implemented. The results of Prospect 2007 are summarised below.

#### *Investigative competence*

The ability to identify invisible threats has been enhanced, both quantitatively and qualitatively, by investing in advanced technology and in traditional methods such as human intelligence. Within the Netherlands, development of the Counter-terrorism Infobox has continued; abroad, the AIVD has prioritised increasing the number of liaison posts and improving their yield. To make the most of the investigative opportunities available to the service, particular attention has been paid to combining intelligence resources as effectively as possible. Agreements with partners like the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), the Royal Military Constabulary (KMar) and the Public Prosecution Service (OM) have enabled the AIVD to better harmonise intelligence gathering and information needs.

#### *Interpretive competence*

It is hugely important that security-related information be contextualised in an unambiguous and traceable way. Staff training and supervision on this point have therefore been intensified. The analysis of service-wide knowledge and expertise concerning jihadist terrorism, including radicalisation processes, has been raised to new levels.

#### *Mobilising competence*

The information and know-how possessed by the AIVD should enable interested parties and partners to take appropriate measures to limit threats and risks. With this in mind, the AIVD has strengthened relationships with local governments, national policymakers, fellow services and other partners. The decision to take part in the programme 'Better Security through Information Awareness' (see Chapter 11) should



also be seen in that light. Just as it is important to understand the patrons' information needs, and the background to them, so it is vital that they have a proper understanding of what the service can do for them. To that end, the service has invested in improving the relationship management.

#### *Acting competence*

In certain cases, where better solutions are lacking, the AIVD can itself act to counter risks and threats. This also applies in cases where later executive or judicial action is likely to involve unreasonable effort or entail unacceptable risks. An example of such action might be the AIVD revealing to persons who have been secretly preparing an illegal act that their plans are known and so have no chance of success. As part of Prospect 2007, the executive ability has been defined and formalised in both administrative and legal terms.

#### *Personnel policy: intelligent and secure growth*

With the service expected to grow from 945 staff (full-time equivalent) at the beginning of 2005 to about 1500 by 2009, the recruitment process needs to be shortened and further professionalised by then. The recruitment priorities in 2007 were specialist functions in such areas as ICT and certain specific languages.

The AIVD has also been investing in the quality of the existing workforce. A new system has been developed for career and management development policy, and the internal training institute now offers professional courses for virtually every job within the service. Its expansion will continue in 2008 with the introduction of background modules. Also in the training field, the service has intensified co-operation with external partners; for example, various courses are now organised jointly with the MIVD and with other European intelligence services.

To sum up, through Prospect 2007 the AIVD has invested in the development of the staff and the organisation as a whole. This has certainly benefited the professional standard service of the organisation, especially in respect of external orientation (working and sharing knowledge with others) and operational effectiveness. Organisational development must remain an ongoing process, however. That is especially vital for a service which has to recognise indications of invisible threats and risks to national security as early as possible, then act upon them. In 2008, the service will be investing heavily in information management – in particular, the management of systems and equipment and the development of infrastructure and new technologies.

Absenteeism through illness rose from 3.6 per cent in 2006 to 4.6 per cent in 2007. Relatively speaking, the greatest increase occurred during the second half of the year. The AIVD cannot with any certainty offer an explanation for this, but it seems likely that the effects of high workloads for large groups of staff over a long period due to the relocation to Zoetermeer played a part.

## 12.2 Management

The Head of the AIVD has issued the following management statement for 2007. The management of the AIVD received permanent attention throughout the 2007 budget period. Based upon a risk analysis, a systematic assessment was made of the management and control tools to be deployed. The service fulfilled its duty of regular accountability to the Minister of the Interior by means of quarterly progress reports on results relevant to political and administrative matters and on adjustments to the annual plan. Management reporting was based upon the working agreements reached with the minister.

### 12.2.1 Finance

The AIVD's 2007 budget was approximately € 44 million higher than in the previous year. Of this, about € 19 million came from series of previously allocated resources for expansion of capacity and about € 25 million was once-only funding to pay for the service's new premises in Zoetermeer. Some € 6 million of that latter amount has been carried forward to 2008 because invoices from contractors and suppliers were not received on time. Finally, investments were made in internal information management and the associated technology infrastructure.

#### Budget

	2006	2007
Personnel expenditure	€ 69.2 million	€ 80.2 million
Equipment expenditure	€ 59.8 million	€ 89.5 million
Confidential expenditure	€ 4.4 million	€ 4.5 million

### 12.2.2 Quality management

With a view to safeguarding and improving quality, several studies of this aspect of the AIVD's performance were conducted last year. In part, they were connected to the Prospect 2007 development programme.

Four relatively major studies are particularly worthy of mention. One of these concerned the effects of a pilot project to improve analysis and its exploitation; the temporary unit established for that pilot has since become a permanent structure within the organisation. A second, focusing upon the interaction between operational directorates and their counterparts responsible for developing, managing and implementing special investigative resources, identified a number of opportunities for optimisation. A third study, on use of the Internet, concluded that a number of improvements have been made since the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD (CBE) delivered its findings and that the results related to international co-operation in this field have contributed towards the goodwill enjoyed by the service. Finally, the fourth study established that the choice of a different organisational basis for the security screening of the AIVD's own personnel had produced the desired results.

The service carried out its third staff satisfaction survey in 2007. The results have prompted a variety of improvement activities at all levels of the organisation.

In the autumn, implementation of the internal audit programme began. This is focusing primarily upon the outcomes of Prospect 2007. Initial results are expected during the first quarter of 2008.

### **12.2.3 Registration, documentation and archiving**

Further progress was made last year in designing the configuration of the service's new information systems. The priority here is the recording, retrieval and migration of datasets. In collaboration with the Central Archives Selection Agency (Centrale Archief Selectiedienst, CAS) the AIVD is working to improve the accessibility and conservation of archive documents dating from the period 1946-1960. This project is on schedule and continues in 2008.

The interdepartmental consultation process to draw up a policy document to guide the selection of archive materials for either retention or destruction produced no final result in 2007. The AIVD will continue its contributions to the completion of this so-called 'basic selection document' in 2008.

The service's relocation to Zoetermeer provided a natural opportunity to reorganise the AIVD's central archive, as well as to focus attention upon ensuring that information is recorded and retrieved in line with the defined working procedures.





## List of abbreviations

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ADC	Anti Dierproeven Coalitie <i>Coalition Against Vivisection</i>
AFA	Anti Fascistische Actie <i>Anti-Fascist Action</i>
AIVD	Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst <i>General Intelligence and Security Service</i>
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AQUA	Appropriately Qualified Agency
ATb	Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding <i>Counter-terrorism Alert System</i>
AZ	Ministerie van Algemene Zaken <i>Ministry of General Affairs</i>
B&H-N	Blood & Honour Netherlands
BD/KMar	Bijzondere Dienst van de Koninklijke Marechaussee <i>Special Branch of the Royal Military Constabulary</i>
BZ	Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken <i>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i>
BZK	Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties <i>Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom</i>
CBE	Commissie Bestuurlijke Evaluatie AIVD <i>Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD</i>
CBIB	Coördinerend Beraad Integrale Beveiliging <i>Integrated Security Co-ordinating Committee</i>
CBRN	Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (weapons)
CdB	Club de Berne
CIVD	Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten van de Tweede Kamer <i>Intelligence and Security Services Committee of the Lower House of the States-General</i>
COTER	European Council Working Party on Terrorism
CTED	Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate of the United Nations
CTG	Counter-terrorism Group
CT Infobox	Contraterrorisme Infobox <i>Counter-terrorism Infobox</i>

CTIVD	Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten <i>Intelligence and Security Services Regulatory Commission</i>
CVIN	Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten Nederland <i>Joint Intelligence Services Committee of the Netherlands</i>
DKDB	Dienst Koninklijke en Diplomatieke Beveiliging <i>Royal and Diplomatic Protection Service</i>
DTN	Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland <i>National Terrorism Threat Assessment</i>
EP	European Parliament
ETA	Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna <i>Basque Homeland and Freedom</i>
EU	European Union
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia <i>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</i>
FEC	Financieel Expertise Centrum <i>Financial Expertise Centre</i>
FIOD-ECD	Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst – Economische Controledienst <i>Fiscal Information and Investigation Service/Economic Investigation Service</i>
FIU-NL	Netherlands Financial Intelligence Unit
GCT	Gezamenlijk Comité Terrorismebestrijding <i>Joint Counter-terrorism Committee</i>
GSPC	Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédiction et le Combat <i>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</i>
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IND	Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst <i>Immigration and Naturalisation Service</i>
JSN	Jeugdstorm Nederland <i>Youth Storm Netherlands</i>
KAFKA	Kollektief Anti Fascistisch en Kapitalistisch Archief <i>Anti-Fascist and Capitalist Archive Collective</i>
KLPD	Korps Landelijke Politiediensten <i>National Police Services Agency</i>
KMar	Koninklijke Marechaussee <i>Royal Military Constabulary</i> LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MEC	Middle Europe Conference
Mepia	Meldpunt Integriteitsaantastingen <i>Integrity Violations Reporting Desk</i>
MIVD	Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst <i>Military Intelligence and Security Service</i>
NA	Nationale Alliantie <i>National Alliance</i>
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAVI	Nationaal Adviescentrum Vitale Infrastructuur <i>National Advisory Centre for Vital Infrastructure</i>
NCTb	Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding <i>National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism</i>
NFI	Nederlands Forensisch Instituut <i>Netherlands Forensic Institute</i>
NICC	Nationaal Informatieknoppunt Cybercrime <i>National Cybercrime Information Hub</i>
NNE	Nieuwe Nationale Eenheid <i>New National Unit</i>
NSA	National Security Authority
NSC	NATO Special Committee
NSO	Nationale Sigint Organisatie <i>National Signals Intelligence Organisation</i>
NVB	Nationalistische Volks Beweging <i>Nationalist People's Movement</i>
NVU	Nederlandse Volksunie <i>Dutch People's Union</i>
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OM	Openbaar Ministerie <i>Public Prosecution Service</i>
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan <i>Kurdistan Workers' Party</i>
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PPP	Public-private partnership
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
RID	Regionale Inlichtingendienst <i>Regional Intelligence Unit (police)</i>
RNV	Raad voor de Nationale Veiligheid <i>Council for National Security</i>



RvD	Respect voor Dieren <i>Respect for Animals</i>
RVF/Cr8	Racial Volunteer Force/Combat 18
SHAC	Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
Sigint	Signals Intelligence
SitCen	EU Joint Situation Centre
UN	United Nations
VGB	Verklaring van Geen Bezwaar <i>Security Clearance</i>
VIA	Veiligheidsverbetering door Information Awareness <i>Better Security through Information Awareness (programme)</i>
Vir-bi	Voorschrift informatiebeveiliging rijksdienst – bijzondere informatie <i>Public Service Security Regulations for Classified Information</i>
WBI	Werkgroep Bijzondere Informatiebeveiliging <i>Data Security Working Group</i>
WGT	European Council Working Group on Terrorism
Wiv	Wet op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten 2002 <i>Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002</i>
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
Wvo	Wet Veiligheidsonderzoeken <i>Security Screening Act 1996</i>





## About the photography

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The AIVD wants to be more transparent, seeking the right middle way between the openness society demands and the overttness our work requires. The photographs in this report symbolise our link with the wider community. The paste-ups depict a world where people can live and work safely.

The locations shown are public places which reflect the diversity of Dutch society. The inventive use of inserts providing different views of the same situation suggests time and movement.

The images are illustrative only, with no direct relationship to the content of this report.

## **Credits**

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